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1.1 Setting the Stage 
When asked about the major challenge faced by the partnership, one respondent1 stated 
that “[B]alancing power was most challenging. Over years, conflict rose over anything 
related to [Name of location]. Water waste and pollution were massive. [Name of 
partners] bore upon the consequences, but they were simply ignored […] there was not 
much latitude in the dealings between them anymore. We had to build credits first and 
get them all involved, from the villagers to [Name of partner].” Another respondent 
described: “Needless to say, their [Partners] appetite for risks is low. Yet, they have 
committed themselves to a set of goals, which involve risks. Pricing and scope certainly 
are examples. It has to pay off for them but we also have to meet priority needs. It has to 
pay off for [Name of partners] too. There is no use in it if they cannot afford it. We have 
to work on both sides. That is what taxes their patience. It’s a gamble but the bottom-line 
is to keep them at it.”  
One partner argued: “if a project becomes a success depends on mutuality. If our 
partners need us as much as we need them, fine, then it is a give and take. If that is not 
clear then it becomes tricky […]. When they lose interest, they drop out or push their 
interest through, regardless of what that means to us or the project.” Another one argues: 
“it depends on whom you partner with and how you get started. Normally, our chances 
for success are low in projects of this magnitude. [Name of a partner] and us may be 
invited later to politically somehow legitimise the whole process […] In the [Name of 
the partnership] our role was clear and our input requested at all stages. That put us in a 
rather commanding position with all of them. When it worked out, our role was 
expanded which gave a clear signal to [their stakeholders] […] that is what makes it a 
success.” 
 
Partnerships among a range of diverse organisations, from different societal sectors, with 
various resources, diverse interests, perspectives and attitudes, often render conflict and 
power struggles rather than effective collaboration. Power relations between partners and 
the questions if and how these are effectively governed in partnership are of great 
                                                 
1 This and the following quotes on this page are derived from interviews with respondents. Names 




importance for partnership success. Be it the meaningful participation of individual 
partners or the overall success of the collective endeavour. 
The next sections of this introduction will elaborate upon these issues and take them to 
a more abstract level resulting in the overarching research question that guided this 
research. Subsequently, the contributions obtained from the study of power in the 
empirical context of partnerships will be discussed followed by a description of the 
research approach adopted and the data collection procedure. Finally, the layout of the 
book will explain how the main research question was broken down into related sub-
questions, which are addressed in each chapter respectively. 
 
 
1.2 Research problem 
Partnerships have been labelled “the new orthodoxy” (Russel, 2002: 45) to attain 
sustainable development. Involving all kinds of organisations such as national and 
international donor agencies, civil society organisations (e.g., non-governmental, non-
profit and community organisations), businesses, contractors and service providers, as 
much as one third of total Official Development Aid (ODA) (co-) finances globally and 
regionally operating partnerships today (Lele, Sadik, & Simmons, 2006). The popularity 
of partnerships and other joint approaches to development financing, implementation, 
coordination and governance (e.g., Desai, 1998; Mavrotas, 2005; Pessoa, 2008; Quartey, 
2005; Raffer & Singer, 1996) is often argued to have arisen against the backdrop of 
several inadequacies (Börzel & Risse, 2005: 196) of previous bi-lateral and country-
focused aid systems (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1998; Rowan, 2009). Examples are resource 
scarcity and in particular governance-related issues such as a lack of inclusiveness, 
ownership, transparency and effectiveness (Bornstein, 2003; Burnside & Dollar, 2004; 
Lewis, 1998; Maurizio, 2008). 
However, participation in partnerships is not always a success for the individual 
partners, nor do all partnerships deliver on their goals. In fact, after an initial phase of 
enthusiasm about partnership without much reflection (Buse & Harmer, 2004), critical 
voices raised and pointed out several challenges to effective partnering. The present 
study has been inspired by two seemingly contradictory empirical observations, both of 
which are reflected in the current partnership literature and the quotes of the respondents 
presented in the above. First, the challenges posed by differences in power between 
partners, identified as a cross-cutting theme in the respondents’ accounts, are equally 
centre-stage in a controversial debate in the literature. Controversial is this debate 
because though partnerships suggest a “cooperative alternative to the traditional 
characterization of relationships among the actors involved as competitive, adversarial or 
hierarchical“ (Tomlinson, 2005: 1196), “critical problems surround the deployment of 
power amongst members” (Newell, 2005: 288). In this way,  some see in partnerships a 




abandoned the idea that the mutuality necessary for effective collaboration can possibly 
be attained by partnerships and they remain to be “dialogue[s] of the unequal” (Elliott, 
1987: 65).  
This and similar diagnoses and prognoses, however, seemingly contradict a second 
observation. Just as well illustrated by the respondents’ quotes, the partnership literature 
covers numerous examples of effective collaboration, viz. cases of successful 
participation of partners and/or effective collective endeavours. Even in face of diverse 
constituent bases and seemingly considerable power differences (i.e. Ashman, 2001b; 
Holcombe & Anderson, 2009; Ingle & Shpresa, 2007; Jütting, 1999; Livesey, Hartman, 
Stafford, & Shearer, 2009; von Malmborg, 2003). The fact that both phenomena 
presented in the above describe parts of the reality of partnership raises an interesting 
question. The question lies in the fact that while effective partnership is assumed to 
require collaboration at least to some degree at eye-level (cf. Alter & Hage, 1993; 
Ashman, 2000; Brown & Ashman, 1996; Bryson, Crosby, & Middleton Stone, 2006; 
Lewis, 1998), diverse organisations may not only hold different parts of the solution to 
the problems a partnership seeks to address (Waddell, 2000, 2005), but also different 
degrees of power (Dolan & Opondo, 2005: 8). On that account, the over-arching 
question that arises in the presence of this tension is: why are some partners and 
partnerships effective in the face of power differences whereas others are not? 
 
The micro-foundations of power and effective partnership participation  
Over the past decades, there has been a burgeoning literature unpacking the belief that 
the power of an organisation is a somewhat given phenomenon. That is power or a lack 
of it can be ‘read off’ from the resources or status of an organization, unaffected by 
context (cf. Derkzen, Franklin & Bock, 2008). Today, power is commonly regarded a 
relational concept, derived from and defined by the specific context of, for example a 
partnership (cf. Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Burgess & Nielsen, 1974; Crozier, 1964; 
Dahl, 1957, 1961; Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971; Molm, 1990; 
Pfeffer, 1981 ; Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980). In the contexts of 
partnerships, most of the thinking about power has been informed by inquiries into 
episodes of agency in partnerships, via the analysis of partnership discourse, 
contestation, negotiations, and exchange. Power arises when partners effectively part-
take in partnership processes and this way influence each other in terms of ideas, 
language, attitudes, behaviours and decisions (Cardini, 2006; Gray & Putnam, 2005; 
Hanke, Gray, & Putnam, 2002; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Hastings, 1999; Poncelet, 2001). 
Yet, the respondents’ quotes cited at the beginning of this introduction illustrate that this 
equation does not eventuate for all partners and all partnerships. Little empirical 
evidence however, is available that further specifies the underlying structural factors that 




Different theories of action that seek to explain inter-organisational agency and 
effective collaboration in partnerships predicate on different structural conditions, which 
ensure constraint and enablement (Alter & Hage, 1993). Going back to the debate about 
“faces of power” in organised decision-making contexts (Clegg, 1989a; Clegg & 
Haugaard, 2009; McPhee, 2004; Phillips, 1997) many of the political organisation 
theories2 explain power by the interaction between two factors or bases of power. 
Partners have access to and/or control resources which are perceived as critical to the 
other partners and/or to the partnership; and/or partners hold the position, meaning they 
are involved in interactions and partnership processes to be able to enact their resources, 
which again are subject to approval by others (Jacobson & Cohen, 1986). Partners will 
tend to get involved with and be influenced by those who access or control valuable 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 44). Reflexivity, that is a recursive relationship 
between resources, positions, agency and effective participation develops and gradually 
leads the collectivity of partners to structurally embed their interactions and enable 
reciprocal control and effective collaboration (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997: 911).  
Contrasting structural perspectives (Astley & Ven, 1983) have to a lesser extent been 
applied to the study of inter-organisational power relations in development partnerships 
to date (Ashman, 2000). Instead, primary attention has been given to the broader context 
of larger systemic inequalities, e.g. to the relationship between donors and recipient 
communities (Staudt, 1991), or between Northern NGOs (NNGOs) and other 
intermediary organisations and their local ‘implementing’ partners (e.g. Ebrahim, 2003); 
or to what is more generally referred to as ‘the North/South divide’ (i.e., Raffer & 
Singer, 2002). In comparison, systemic commonalities (e.g. in hierarchies, public sectors 
and service spheres, markets and industries) have mostly been taken for granted in the 
predominantly Northern/Western literature on inter-organisational relations (Hastings, 
1999) and interest has moved toward the structural determinants which develop from and 
underlie these systems and the organizational interactions therein. The need for a 
synthesis of the limits and potentials of theories of inter-organisational power applied in 
and outside of the development context, however, appears indicated. Parallel to an ever 
increasing use of partnerships in all kinds of service spheres and issue areas, the 
problems they seek to address and the organisational actors they involve become ever 
more complex. The particular challenges that arise from this complexity are firmly 
demonstrated by the great deal of attention placed on the issue of power by the multi-
disciplinary literature on cross-sector partnerships for sustainable development 
(Armistead, Pettigrew, & Aves, 2007; Bäckstrand, 2006; Battisti, 2009; Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff, 2001; Bryson & Crosby, 2006; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Murphy & 
Bendell, 1999; Rodriguez, Langley, Beland, & Denis, 2007; Selsky & Parker, 2005; 
Waddell, 2005). 
                                                 




The macro-foundations of power and effective partnerships 
In the context of partnerships in which common frameworks for mutual assessments 
cannot be taken for granted (e.g. Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Emirbayer & Johnson, 
2000; Granados, 2005; Westphal & Milton, 2000), yet impact upon the recursive 
functioning of bases of inter-organisational power and effective participation, two 
“extreme” scenarios can be hypothesised: 
First, the guiding principle of partnerships, stating that not one single partner alone but 
each partner holds part of the solution to the issues addressed (Selsky & Parker, 2005), 
may result in a situation in which “assets” (valuable resources) are perceived as 
dispersed over “owners” (partners) (cf. Homburg, 1999: 102-111). Second, perceptions 
of resources as valuable to oneself and to others and/or to the success of the collective 
endeavour are concentrated. Both scenarios in their pronounced form harbour 
challenges, which have been contrasted by hierarchical and economic models of inter-
organisational coordination3. Partnerships as inter-organisational settings are often 
posited distinct to markets and hierarchies (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Yet, the extent to 
which partnerships reflect upon one scenario rather than the other may inform strategies 
to systematically address the necessary structural conditions for effective partnership. 
Since, “[t]he reason why partnerships are (in theory) such potent vehicles for sustainable 
development is not that different players each happen to hold a different part of the 
solution to complex problems, but that the systems of governance which hold them 
accountable make it so” (Rochlin, Zadek, & Forstater, 2008: 5). 
Though largely omitted in the initial promotion of partnerships (Brinkerhoff, 2002b) 
questions about their governance have regained attention lately (Provan & Kenis, 2008; 
Brinkerhoff, 2002a; Rochlin, Zadek & Forstater, 2008). Two interventionist approaches 
to altering the development of inter-organisational power relations in partnerships can be 
distinguished. On the one hand, there are governance interventions aiming at relationship 
building, changing perceptions and strengthening trust and clarifying goals, e.g. through 
joint learning, trainings and workshops, conflict resolution and brokerage (e.g. Brown & 
Ashman, 1996; Lewis, 1998; Mohr et al., 1994; James, 2001). That is, governance 
interventions building upon the occurrence of inter-organisational agency and exchange 
(Ashman, 2000). On the other hand, there are governance interventions addressing the 
design and implementation of partnerships and herewith setting the foundations for inter-
organisational agency to occur. For example, through the design of the administrative, 
coordinative, financial and control structures of partnerships (Agranoff, 2006; Agranoff 
& McGuire, 2001; Ashman, 2000; DeBruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1997; Provan & Kenis, 
2008; Rochlin, Zadek & Forstater, 2008). That is by altering the so-called “power infra-
structure” of partnerships (Huxham & Beech, 2003).  
                                                 
3 Notably, one often finds partnerships contrasted with markets and hierarchies as a distinct, 
‘network’ type of inter-organisational coordination (see for example: Entwistle,  Bristow, Hines, 




Although both approaches carry the potential to impact upon the way power relations 
develop in partnerships, they take different perspectives on and address different aspects 
of the issue. Development scholars have long acknowledged the need to tackle the 
challenges posed by power inequalities between partners through enabling governance 
interventions (Thomas, 1998). Together with the institutionalization of the partnership 
rhetoric, participative and empowering approaches have been advocated in contrast to 
prior top-down and donor-induced interventions (Chambers, 1983; Chambers, 1995). For 
that matter, the first of the two interventionist approaches mentioned in the above, 
dominates discussions about the governance of inter-organisational relations in 
development partnerships to date (Ashman, 2000), whereas the latter approach is 
discussed primarily with regard to the governance of ‘external’ power relations, e.g. to 
donors and investors (Fowler, 2000; Rochlin et al., 2008). On that account, scholars as 
well as practitioners have pointed out several technical and theoretical shortcomings of 
the present ‘participatory orthodoxy’ (Dar & Cooke, 2008). Central are the questions of 
whether broader participation through partnerships is an ends rather than a means 
(Nelson & Wright, 1995), and whether enabling interventions aiming at relationship 
building through learning and exchange alone are sufficient in bringing about 
effectiveness. These questions become more pressing in the face of a persistence of 
“significant gaps in perceptions of the value and impacts of partnerships“ (Ashman, 
2000: 1) among partners, as well as of budget constraints (Robinson, Hewitt, & Harriss, 
2000; Smillie, Helmich, German, & Randel, 1999) that limit the room to manoeuvre and 
invest in cost-intensive trainings and capacity-building (Patel, 2001).  
For a recursive relationship between the bases of organisational power and effective 
participation to come about in partnerships, critics point out two issues that need to be 
addressed. First, chances for effective partnerships are small when individual 
contributions are not acknowledged to the extent that they ‘automatically’ translate into 
inter-organisational agency, influence and effective participation (Derkzen & Bock, 
2007). Second, governance interventions aiming at changing perceptions alone 
frequently do not translate into such, when at the same time differences in the positions 
and/or in the level of influence between partners persist (Ashman, 2000).  
In contrast, the public administration and management literature provides a different 
take on partnership governance, mainly in terms of accountability and control (Entwistle 
et al., 2007) rather than of enablement. Related interventions primarily comprise the 
latter of the two approaches described in the above, due to a perspective tailored to the 
needs and possibilities of public and donor agencies. A growing literature in this field 
builds on a network analytic approach to partnerships (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). 
Early work explained variance in the performance of partnerships by the degree of 
integration and centralisation of (resource-exchange-related) activities and control 
among partners (Milward & Provan, 1995; Provan & Sebastian, 1998). Yet, recent 




Tsai, 2003) by incorporating non-structural partnership-level properties, such as 
governance interventions in order to capture the partnership as a whole (Provan, Huang, 
& Milward, 2009). On that account, Provan and Kenis (2008) propose a contingency 
framework for partnership effectiveness based on three, in a Weberian4 sense, ‘ideal 
types’ of partnership governance forms: shared governance, and governance by either a 
NAO (network administrative organisation) or a lead organisation. 
Based on this distinction, advantages and disadvantages are proposed to derive from 
‘governance fit’. Governance fit suggests that different governance forms are more or 
less suitable for the effective governance of a partnership, depending on whether a 
partnership is characterised by the presence or absence of certain partnership-level 
conditions, e.g. size or the level and dispersion of trust and/or goal agreement among 
partners. Provan and Kenis (Ibid.) draw a more general distinction between the shared 
and the two brokered governance forms with regard to their fit to certain partnership-
level conditions. Lead organisations, which are at the centre of a partnership’s resource 
control and coordination, can direct partnerships even under difficult conditions, such as 
a lack of shared goals and low and centralised trust. Instead, under favourable 
conditions, shared governed partnerships are more effective, i.e. because horizontal 
relations keep the costs for transactions low. Yet, as proposed by Povan and Kenis 
(Ibid.), both models circumvent addressing the issue of power. For shared governance to 
be effective the presence of favourable partnership-level conditions (e.g. balanced 
power) is precedent and in the lead-organisation model the governance of power 
relations is left entirely at the discretion of a single or a few partners.  
The twofold theoretical argument on the basis of which Provan and Kenis (Ibid.) 
propose a superior performance of the third, the NAO governance form however, can be 
applied to address the issue of power. The NAO governance form predicates upon 
interventions in the design of partnerships that enable the sovereignty of the governing 
entity (an organisation or partnership administrative staff) and reciprocal control 
between this entity and partners. The latter aspect is assumed likely to be implemented 
and maintained if governance tasks are assigned to an entity or staff distinct from the 
direct partners involved that is provided with the necessary means to effectively 
moderate between individual partners’ and between partners’ and partnership-level 
interests. Notably, such structural interventions that effectively link participation to 
mutual influence and control are core to the thinking about partnership governance in 
many disciplines. For example, Elinor Ostrom (1990) regards collective choice and 
reciprocal monitoring and control arrangements as key ‘design-principles’ of ‘common 
pool resource’ governance systems, and in the development literature such ideas are 
                                                 




discussed by scholars and practitioners under the heading of a so-called ‘rights-based’5 
approaches (e.g. Elbers & Schulten, 2010).     
From different perspectives, the interventionist models proposed in the literature on 
development and public service partnerships address similar problems associated with 
the challenges posed by power differences between partners. In essence, this study sets 
out to analyse how inter-organisational power relations link to and build the micro-
foundations for effective collective development efforts in partnerships; and how, 
through governance interventions the two seemingly contradictory, empirical 
observations described in the above can be reconciled.      
 
   
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual model6  
 
1.3 Research question 
In line with the title of this dissertation, “Same same but different7”, the fact that 
partnerships involve a range of diverse organisations from different sectors, geographical 
regions and socio-economic backgrounds, with different resources, diverse interests and 
perspectives does not automatically enable them and put them in the position to 
contribute their ‘part of the solution’. Nor do differences between partners by definition 
                                                 
5 For example, Marks (2005) identifies seven approaches through which a rights-based thinking is 
applied to development. 
6 Adapted from the Weberian ‘Sociological Explanation Model’ as presented by Esser (1996: 94). 
7 The expression “same same but different” for the English word “similar” is said to have 
originated from the Thai parlance of total reduplication but became popular in other languages 




result in ineffective participation and/or partnership failure. In fact, the power of partners 
and consequently any similarities or differences between them are subject to various 
partnership-level influences and may even effectively be transformed when combined 
with the adequate partnership governance form. 
The preliminary question, why are some partners and partnerships effective in the face 
of power differences whereas others are not translates into the following over-arching 
research question:  
 
“What are the origins and effects of power and differences in power in partnerships 
on the effective participation in and the effectiveness of partnerships? And what is the 
role of ‘governance-fit’ in this context? 
 
In the present analysis of the phenomenon of power in partnerships within the context of 
international development cooperation, value is seen to derive from combining insights 
and theories from both fields, the study of partnerships in the development and public 
service domain. The research question is answered by constructing and testing models of 
the relationships between the abovementioned concepts. 
 
 
1.4 Research contributions  
Besides the specific contributions of each particular chapter, which will be attended to in 
each chapter separately, the present study adds to the existing scientific literature in 
several distinct ways.  
Firstly, the study addresses a general Northern/Western bias in the public-
administration and management literature (Brinkerhoff, 2002a) for which the study of 
inter-organisational partnerships is of no exception. Largely derived from a relative 
uniform empirical base (Raab & Kenis, 2009), in particular the emerging field of 
partnership-level theory building can benefit from an “external” validation in the area of 
international development cooperation. The long and fruitful tradition in development 
studies of placing the issue of power centre-stage to partnership research (Hastings, 
1999) can inform attempts to address similar challenges, for example, faced by cross- or 
multi-sector partnerships in solely Northern/Western contexts (Bryson & Crosby, 2006). 
Research on development partnerships, on the other hand, has been informed to an only 
limited degree by theoretical frameworks (Brinkerhoff, 2002). Applying theories and 
insights from research on public-service networks and organisation studies can 
contribute to the development of more coherent and systematic frameworks and 
analyses.  
This study seeks to demonstrate the benefit and potential of such synthesis and 
integration, in finding answers to comprehensive questions that arise in both fields, i.e. 




effectiveness. Improving partnerships to be more equitable and effective has been a 
guiding principle and concern of most development practice (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 
2001). Yet, both issues have been treated in the literature, apart from a few exceptions 
(Brown & Ashman, 1996; Bryson & Crosby, 2005, 2006; Lewis, 1998), rather mutually 
exclusively to date. While the primary intent by some scholars has been upon the 
exposure of persisting inequalities in seemingly participative partnerships (e.g. Ashman, 
2000; Battisti, 2009; Bell & Park, 2006; Buse & Harmer, 2004; Cardini, 2006; Castro, 
2008b; Dedeurwaerdere, 2005; Derkzen & Bock, 2007; Tomlinson, 2005) rather than 
upon their effectiveness, others have neglected the first and focused on the latter (e.g. 
Provan & Milward, 2001). 
A second main contribution of the present study is its comparative empirical base, 
which consists of the complete partnership data of 38 development partnerships. It has 
been pointed out by several recent reviews (e.g. Berry et al., 2004; Blockson, 2003; 
Provan et al., 2007; Selsky & Parker, 2005; Van Huijstee, Francken, & Leroy, 2007) and 
confirmed by own inquiry (Chapter Two of this volume) that such comparative data is 
extremely rare, yet urgently needed. On the one hand, data across a number of 
partnerships is required to verify claims about how organisational bases of power and 
outcomes relate across different partnership settings (Provan, Sydow & Fish, 2007). A 
rather small number of existing studies across partnerships (Selsky & Parker, 2005) to 
date have focused on the perspectives of single or specific groups of participants, for 
example on the antecedents and consequences of partnering for environmental (e.g. 
Milne, Iyer, & Gooding-Williams, 1996) or development NGOs (Elbers, 2004), 
businesses (e.g. LaFrance & Lehmann, 2005), or public agencies (e.g. Andrews & 
Entwistle, 2010). The present study contributes to this literature, by following early 
advice on the study of inter-organisational power (Provan, 1980; Jacobson & Cohen, 
1986) and utilises the concept of resources to transcend sector-related or other group-
specific distinctions (Gray & Wood, 1991). Herewith, not only specific actors or 
predefined groups but all partners involved in a partnership are dealt with. Their bases of 
power are analysed in relation to effective participation. This way, building the basis on 
which power differentials in partnerships enfold (see Chapter Two and Three of this 
volume).  
On the other hand, data across a number of cases is required to substantiate theoretical 
endeavours of establishing the partnership as the unit of analysis (see Chapters Four and 
Five of this volume and Provan, Sydow & Fish, 2007). The few existing, often 
longitudinal (e.g. Cho & Gillespie, 2006; Morse & McNamara, 2006) partnership-level 
analyses are often of only one or a very few cases (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Larger data 
sets are extremely rare (Provan et al., 2007; Selsky & Parker, 2005) and are mostly based 
on secondary data obtained from donor, government or foundation databases (e.g. 
Altenburg & Chahoud, 2001; Andonova & Levy, 2003; Bäckstrand, 2006; Eweje, 2007; 




literature by empirically verifying partner- and partnership-level theoretical concerns 
across partners and partnership cases.   
Finally, the present study represents a first attempt of conceptualising power, in terms 
of power differentials between partners, as an aspect not only important for the success 
of individual organisational participation, but as a partnership-level condition that 
requires adequate partnership-level governance response, in order for the collaborative 
endeavour to become effective. The study develops a multi-level framework for the 
study of power in partnerships, by developing the concept of power differentials as a 
partnership-level condition and analysing its impact on effective participation and 
partnership, in combination with different governance forms. This way, the multi-level 
design allows for conclusions to be drawn for individual organisations and for the 
provision of insights into partnership-level phenomena that can inform the design and 
implementation of partnerships (Provan & Kenis, 2008).     
 
 
1.5 Research approach and data collection 
Power in partnerships, its causes, consequences, and governance in partnerships, can be 
studied at different levels of analysis. Data sets obtained from donors, government, 
companies or foundation databases can be utilised to assess, e.g., the inclusiveness of 
partnerships, by the extent to which certain groups are represented among the constituent 
bases of larger partnership initiatives (e.g. Altenburg & Chahoud, 2001; Andonova & 
Levy, 2003; Baeckstrand, 2006; Eweje, 2007; Hale & Mauzerall, 2004; Ziemba, 2005). 
At the partnership-level, governance interventions can be analysed, for example 
leadership styles (Derkzen, Franklin, et al., 2008; Rodriguez, 2008) or partnership design 
and implementation schemes (Ashman, 2000; Brown & Ashman, 1996). Finally, at the 
micro-level, the causes and consequences of partnership involvement for single 
organisations or the relative power and outcomes of certain groups of partners can be 
evaluated (e.g. Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003; Offenheiser, Holcombe, & Hopkins, 
1999). Valuable insights can be obtained from analyses at each analytical level. 
However, research on partnerships generally addresses phenomena that reside at those 
two levels of analysis (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1994; Provan et al., 20078) that are 
considered in this research. By combining the individual partner and partnership-level of 
analysis, both are looked at, the relationship between combinations of a presence or 
absence of power differentials and governance forms and partnership effectiveness and 
the micro-foundations, defined by the relationship between individual organisational 
bases of power and effective participation.  
                                                 
8 The present study addresses the two outcome levels of the lower column of Provan et al’s (2007: 




A large scale, network analytic survey has been adopted as the data collection 
procedure. One of the biggest challenges of studying inter-organisational power relations 
across a number of comparable partnerships, is the availability of complete partnership 
data (Provan, Sydow & Fish, 2008), meaning first-hand data of the relational structures 
that originate from the interactions between all partners. Although partnerships in 
international development cooperation stretch over a range of geographically widespread 
constituent bases and sites, diversity of partnership approaches are often less indicative 
of the various country contexts than of the actors involved and the donor initiatives 
promoted (Brinkerhoff, 2002b: 13). On that account, a main donor design is chosen. This 
choice is the European Union (EU), collectively the world’s largest provider of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA).   
Two large-scale financing facilities, which built part of the EU’s commitment to the 
Millennium Development Goals, were approached for this study. Via the two facilities, 
the EU Water (EUWF) and the EU Energy Facility (EUEF), a total amount of € 640 
million has been allocated to co-finance in total 250 partnerships operating in the ACP 
(African-Caribbean-Pacific) region, via two competitive tendering calls for proposals. 
The two calls were launched in 2005 and 2006 for the EUWF and the first9 call in 2005 
for the EUEF. All 250 applicant organisations who had successfully applied for 
partnership funding were contacted and asked for participation and explained the 
purpose and procedure of the study. Forty-nine of those ‘so-called’ intermediary 
organisations or direct implementing partners10 indicated their interest, resulting in an 
initial response rate of 20%. These organisations were asked to provide the contacts of 
all their local and foreign partner organisations involved in the specific project. As a 
result, the total number of 249 participant organisations was asked for participation. If 
interested, the respondents were requested to choose between three ways of taking part 
in the study: to complete an online questionnaire, which was provided in English and 
French; to receive a printed version of the questionnaire; or to indicate time and date, 
and preferred language for a telephone interview, for example in case of an unstable or 
no internet access. 
Questionnaire and interview guidelines were provided for each organisation and each 
partnership individually since the collection of relational data required individualising 
most of the items to obtain the perspective of each respondent organisation and about all 
its partners. In addition, two of the indicators operationalised in this study, were 
designed especially for the present inquiry (their development is described in Appendix 
I). The survey instrument is displayed in Appendix II. Another implication of this 
approach was that only those partnerships were included in the study, for which 
                                                 
9 For the Energy Facility, a new call for proposals was launched on the 30th of November 2009. 
10 Distinctive from operational partners with no direct funding obligations to the main donor 




complete data were obtained, viz. all partners completed the questionnaire or 
participated in the interviews. 
Ultimately, such complete data sets were obtained for 38 partnerships, involving in 
total 175 organisations. This number can be considered sufficient for a first step towards 
a generalisation of findings across partnerships (Provan et al., 2007). Albeit though, this 
way merely 15,2% of the original population of 250 partnerships were included in this 
study, such a conservative approach was required, since no direct observations were 
obtained (Provan & Kenis, 2008). However, initial expectations were met, because 
quantitative studies in a development context generally report on low response rates 
(Brunetti, Kisunko, & Weder, 1998; Bulmer & Warwick, 2001; Devereux & Hoddinott, 
1992; Warren et al., 2000) not least because public funds bring along extensive reporting 
requirements, which understandably limit the willingness of participants to get involved 
in just another inquiry. Nevertheless, the fact that a large part of the applicant 
organisations did not respond, raises questions whether or not the data might suffer from 
a sample bias. Therefore non-response analysis was conducted on the basis of the data 
published by the main donor, which showed no significant selection effects with regard 
to the region of operations of the partnerships, their budget size, or the regional 
affiliation and the type of the intermediary organisation (for an overview of the results of 
this analysis see Appendix III).   
After the first round of the data collection, the data was analysed and complemented 
by a document study on the basis of publications and project reports, resulting in a 
detailed case description for each partnership. As further questions arose, follow-up 
telephone interviews were conducted, which happened with six of the intermediary and 
four of the partner organisations. Multiple sources were employed to gather case 
information (Yin, 2008), yet the vast majority of data originated from the questionnaire 
and telephone interviews. Originally formulated in English, items were translated into 
French for the survey. On request, telephone interviews were conducted in four 
additional languages (Italian, Spanish, Arabic and Amharic). Since the research process 
was somewhat complex but necessary to achieve the desired results, a more elaborate 
description of the concepts utilised for the analysis of each relationship is presented in 
each chapter separately.  
1.6 Layout of the book 
In order to answer the general research question formulated in section 1.3., the research 
question was broken down into several sub-questions, of which each is addressed in a 
different chapter. Because this dissertation consists of a collection of articles, each 
chapter has its own individual goal and contribution. As a result, the relevance and 





In Chapter 2, the general question, “What are the theoretical conceptualisations and 
related empirical operationalisations of power put forward in the partnership literature?” 
is answered. The main purpose of this chapter is to identify the most pervasive 
approaches to power in the specific context of partnerships, their overlaps and gaps and 
methodological issues to be addressed for future attempts towards synthesis and 
integration. The most basic finding of this inquiry is that insights on power in 
partnerships to date rest on a rather fragmented theoretical and meagre empirical basis, 
which poses several challenges to an integrative conceptualisation. A main distinction is 
drawn between two relatively independently developing directions, distinct in the way 
scholars treat the latency of the concept of power in partnerships and understand power 
as either a dispositional (“having power”) or an episodic (“exercising power”) concept 
(cf. Wrong, 1995, for a theoretical discussion and comparison of both approaches). 
Scholars sharing a dispositional understanding posit power as the explanans for 
partnering outcomes, mostly of single or groups of partners. Although this understanding 
can provide a substantial argument for or against partnering, since its impact can be 
measured by the benefits obtained, this approach tends to treat power as a one-way 
process and the partnership as a black-box (Derkzen, Franklin, & Bock, 2008). 
Partnership-level influences are either underspecified or neglected. Operationalisations 
of organisational dispositions and outcomes remain rather one-sided and tailored to 
single or groups of partners. Partnership-level specific influences on the relationship 
between the two concepts remain underspecified.  Following an episodic understanding 
instead, power is the explarandum, defined by the interactions between partners in 
specific partnering processes which are mainly studied via discourse and network 
analyses. An episodic understanding of power provides rich insights into how power 
occurs, for example in discourses, and manifests, for example by favourable positions in 
the relational structures of partnerships. Yet, this perspective lacks a grounding of 
situation-specific phenomena and episodes of agency in partnerships in the broader 
picture of organisational dispositions and outcomes (e.g. Morse & McNamara, 2006). 
The arguments for and against both understandings and the resulting methodological 
strengths and limitations are identified and illustrated by examples taken from the 
literature. Finally, the complementary potential of both understandings to capture their 
recursive relationship in partnerships suggests a number of directions that the study of 
power in partnerships might proceed and of which some are addressed in the following 
empirical chapters of this dissertation.  
In Chapter 3, the question “How do organisational bases of power relate to effective 
participation in partnerships?” will be answered. This relationship, building on the 
micro-foundations of power in partnerships, addresses the individual organisational level 
of analysis for all 175 partner organisations involved in this study. Partnership-level 
influences on this relationship are introduced into the analysis to the extent to which the 




recognition and mutual assessments. The first part of the analysis examines how, via 
such assessments, individual organisational resources translate into advantageous 
positions and/or effective participation in partnerships. Positions are conceptualised as 
centrality in the interactions between partners and involvement in partnership-level 
decision-making. Effective participation is defined as a partner’s level of individual 
organisational goal attainment and/or the influence gained on partnership-related 
decisions. Inter-organisational resource dependence and/or the utility of resources for the 
success of a partnership are proposed as the translating principles. Thus, beyond a mere 
demarcation of powerful and powerless groups, the chapter explains how these 
differences develop and why a translation of bases of power into effective participation 
cannot be taken for granted. The second part of the analysis inquires into the effects of 
each base of power on effective participation separately, controlling for the other one 
respectively. This way, in anticipation of the governance argument that is developed and 
tested in the following chapters, several possibilities for interventions are pointed out 
that hold the potential to significantly alter the effectiveness of bases of power in 
partnerships and thus the way inter-organisational power relations unfold. 
Chapter 4 will address the question, “What are the partnership-level conditions that 
explain the adoption of a particular governance form by development partnerships?” 
This chapter explicitly addresses the partnership-level of analysis and further develops 
the contingency framework of Provan & Kenis (2008) described in the above but 
incorporating the additional partnership-level conditions of power differentials between 
partners and uncertainty of the operational partnering environment. The chapter explores 
via a qualitative comparative analyses (qca) the partnership-level conditions or drivers 
for adopting one governance form over another by development practitioners. Indicators 
for the governance forms combine relational structures and interventions. Governance 
structures are determined based on the aggregated network data for each partnership on 
two dimensions: the extent, to which the interactions among partners are centralised or 
decentralised, and whether decision-making power and influence are concentrated or 
shared among partners (Milward & Provan, 1995). Governance interventions encompass 
enabling interventions, such as assistance, support, conflict mediation and brokerage, 
and following Provan & Kenis’ (2008) interventions addressing the design of 
partnerships, such as the set-up of governing entities and reciprocal control structures. 
Structures and interventions are assessed in combination, resulting in the identification 
of four different types of governance forms. Partnership-level conditions are established 
from the in parts aggregated data sets obtained for each partnership and subsequently 
“calibrated” and translated into a qca truth table. The solutions, in terms of combinations 
of partnership-level conditions, which explain the choice for each governance form by 
are identified. Reasons for the adoption of one form over another in face of the absence 
and presence of certain partnership-level conditions, power differentials in particular, are 




development cooperation compared to those identified by Provan & Kenis (Ibid.) from 
the literature on public-service partnerships.  
Chapter 5 will bring together the pieces of the puzzle and answer the question “How 
does ‘governance-fit’ relate to partnership effectiveness?” Having defined the different 
governance forms and partnership-level conditions in the Chapters, 3 and 4, governance 
fit conceptually builds upon the contingency assumptions of Provan & Kenis (Ibid.) and 
those defined by development practitioners in Chapter 4. Again, qca is chosen as the 
analytic approach to verify the relationship between governance fit that is the fit between 
governance forms and partnership-level conditions, and effectiveness. Effectiveness is 
evaluated at the individual organisational and partnership-level of analysis and herewith 
links the micro- to the macro-foundations of power in partnerships. Variety in the 
effectiveness of governance fit will be discussed in the light of existing work, primarily 
by contrasting the findings of the present study (Chapter 4) with the propositions 
formulated by Provan & Kenis’ (Ibid.) contingency framework.  
Based on the empirical findings presented in the Chapters 3, 4 and 5, an answer to the 
overarching research question proposed in section 1.3 of this chapter will be formulated 














The issue of power in partnerships has provoked a great deal of often polarised 
discussion but generated considerably less theoretically and empirically informed 
research. This review argues that partially, this is due to research to date has rather 
separately proceeded from two seemingly incompatible understandings of power with 
respect to its latency in partnerships, as either dispositional or episodic. The strengths 
and limitations of research following these understandings are presented in two steps: 
first, for each direction separately by means of examples taken from the literature, and 
subsequently, by highlighting their complementary potential. Future directions are 
identified for the study of power in partnerships to proceed. 
                                                 
11  Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Academy of Management Annual 
Conference 2007 in Philadelphia, (PA), US, and at the Third International Colloquium on 
Corporate Political Activity and Business & Society Special Issue, 2008, at the Institut d'Etudes 
Politiques, Science Po, in Paris, France. 
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2.1. Introduction  
A wide range of definitions of partnerships exists. For the purpose of this review we 
broadly define partnerships as inter-organisational settings in which, through “[…] the 
linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and capabilities […]” (Bryson et 
al., 2006: 44), organisations strive to jointly achieve some common or complementary 
goals (Powell, 1990). Involving different organisations as businesses, governments, civil 
society organisations (non-governmental, non-profit and community organisations), 
contractors and service providers, donors and recipients, partnerships have been labelled 
“the new orthodoxy” (Russel, 2002: 45) to address many of today’s most difficult 
challenges. Partnerships are operating in a broad variety of issue areas and service 
spheres, ranging from small-scale dyadic collaborations to large-scale infra-structure 
projects, involving large numbers of partners in cross-border and nation-wide 
programmes, global policy development and implementation (Agranoff & McGuire, 
2003; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997a; Mandell & Steelman, 2003).  
Despite the promises, partnerships have evoked controversial discussions about many 
of their aspects (Selsky & Parker, 2005). In particular, “critical problems surround the 
deployment of power amongst members” (Newell, 2005: 288). While partnerships 
suggest “a cooperative alternative to the traditional characterization of relationships 
among organisations as competitive, adversarial or hierarchical“(Tomlinson, 2005: 
1196) in which no party can solely rely neither “on market nor hierarchical mechanisms 
of control to gain cooperation from each other” (Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005: 58); 
very little is known about how power relations in partnerships unfold. 
The seemingly insuperable ambivalence of the Weberian and the Parsonian 
understandings of the concept of power12 resurface in a strong polarisation of the present 
partnership literature today. Which Johnson and Wilson (2006) juxtapose as on the one 
hand, power is treated as a non-issue, partnerships are considered a ‛win-win’ solution 
(Brinkerhoff, 2002a) and differences between partners are seen as drivers for creativity, 
mutuality, innovation and change. On the other hand, power differences between 
partners are posited to rule out any form of “real partnership” upfront (Fowler, 1998; 
Miraftab, 2004), since “[…] different degrees of power, [which] determine what issues 
will be negotiated, whose interests count, and how the process is likely to unfold” (Dolan 
& Opondo, 2005: 8).  
Yet, such heuristics13 can only serve as starting points for looking at power in 
partnerships, in terms of what Brinkerhoff calls a “relative practice” (2002:14) to be 
explored by and become the subject of systematic empirical research. Notwithstanding 
the considerable scholarly interest (Bryson et al., 2006; Vangen & Huxham, 2003) 
                                                 
12 For a recent comparison between Parson’s collective “power-to” and Weber’s distributive 
“power-over”, see: Heiskala (2001). 
13 Similar heuristics are used by Tomlinson (2005) in his analyses of “Idealistic and Pragmatic 
Versions of the Discourse of Partnership”. 
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however, very little empirical research has been generated and no comparable data sets 
and cumulative results have been yielded yet (Parker & Selsky, 2005) by the ever 
increasing number of partnership initiatives in recent years (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; 
Ostrower, 2005). In part, this might be due to some general difficulties in the collection 
of partnership data (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007; Selsky & Parker, 2005). On the other 
hand, any inquiry into power in partnerships is predicated upon a clarification of the 
concept of power in this context. By the means of examples taken from the studies 
included in this review, it will be demonstrated that the present literature in this respect 
is beset with some basic problems of conceptualisation and operationalisation.  
Specifically, the analysis will identify two largely separately pursued developments 
distinct by the way the latency of the concept of power is treated in the context of 
partnerships, that is proceeding from either a dispositional or an episodic understanding. 
The question to guide this literature review has been formulated: “What are the 
theoretical conceptualisations and related empirical operationalisations of power put 
forward in the partnership literature?”  
The literature on power in partnerships is reviewed and suggestions are offered for what 
can be learned from the modest number of empirical studies that have been conducted 
and what are the gaps that might be worth exploring in the future. 
 
 
2.2. Literature search 
To gain insights into the different conceptualisations of power and their 
operationalisations in partnerships a systematic literature search was undertaken, using 
the ISI and the ABI Inform databases. Separately and in combination, the following key 
words were used: 1) Partnership, alliance, collaboration, network; 2) tri-sector, cross-
sector, inter-sector, multi-sector, public-private, profit, non-profit; 3) and power. These 
key words correspond to the terms predominantly used among the various bodies of 
literature that study partnerships (Mandell, 2003: 128). 
This first step revealed three areas in which the issue of power has been discussed 
from an inter-organisational perspective and the results were verified by applying the 
same search again for the leading journals in these fields: organisation studies and 
management14, public administration15, and non-profit and development studies16. This 
                                                 
14  Journals: Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Strategic 
Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Management Studies, 
Organization Studies, Organization Science, Organization, Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Environmental Management, Journal of Corporate Citizenship, Business & Society. 
15  Journals: Administration & Society, American Review of Public Administration, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, International 
Review of Administrative Sciences, Public Administration and Development, Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, Policy & Politics, Public Administration, Public 
Administration Review. 
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measure was taken to ensure a balanced coverage of all different sectors, related 
academic disciplines (Selsky & Parker, 2005) and to adjust for the Northern/Western 
bias in the management literature (Brinkerhoff, 2002a). After checking for double 
entries, these searches together yielded in total 834 articles. Their abstracts were 
analysed and those conforming to the following two characteristics were selected: The 
empirical phenomenon of study is (1) an inter-organisational partnership12, and (2) the 
term “power” refers to inter-organisational power in partnerships17. As such, we arrived 
at a sample of 94 articles. 
The articles were categorised with respect to the conceptual approach they used and 
the theoretical and empirical mechanism, specifying the origin, function and outcomes of 
power. The papers were discussed and aggregated and further criteria were included, 
such as the type and goal of the partnership(s), the area of operation (e.g. health, 
education, infra-structure), the sectors involved, the underlying research question, the 
level(s) of analyses addressed, and (if not power) the main topic of the study 
(governance, CSR, participation, aid effectiveness, etc.). 
Notably, this method of searching the partnership literature only considers articles, 
leading to the omission of books and book chapters from the search. Furthermore, the ISI 
and the ABI/Inform databases include only articles from the periods between 1988-2010 
and 1975-2010, respectively. Nevertheless, this period encompasses the time in which 
most of the empirical works on inter-organisational partnerships have been conducted 
(Provan, Sydow & Fish, 2007) and is hoped to give a reliable overview of the content of 
the leading journals with regard to the issue of power in this empirical context.  
 
 
2.3 Search findings  
The selected articles consist of 14 theoretical and 80 empirical articles. Power is the 
main topic in only four of the theoretical works (Buse & Harmer, 2004; Hastings, 1999; 
Huxham & Beech, 2003; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000)18 that give insight into the 
approaches most prominently applied to the phenomenon. Buse and Harmer (2004) 
compare elite, pluralist, and neo-pluralist governance theories in their discussion of 
power in partnerships. Huxham (2003) inductively theorises about behavioural accounts 
of power in partnerships, which she together with Beech (Huxham & Beech, 2003) 
                                                                                                                        
16  Journals: Development and Change, Development in Practise, Journal of International 
Development, Non-Profit Management & Leadership, Non-profit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, Progress in Development Studies, Public Administration and Development, World 
Development, Voluntas. 
17  Thus excluding articles that discuss the power of partnerships, e.g. as policy instruments 
(Abrahamsen, 2004). 
18  In the other articles power was only a side-issue and the authors focused on, e.g. CSR (Newell, 
2005) or more generally on the issue of collaboration (Bryson, Crosby & Middleton, 2006; 
Gray, 1985; Gray & Wood, 1991). 
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conceptually collates in an analytical framework of a “power infra-structure” of 
partnerships. Previously, Gray et al (1985) and Hastings (1999) had pioneered a 
constructivist perspective on partnerships and the use of discourse analysis in this 
context. Phillips and colleagues (2000) use institutional theory to explain the effects of 
power by the moderating role of collaboration in the transformation of institutional 
fields. 
In addition, focussing on the reasons and motives of various parties for partnering but 
without an explicit focus on power, scholars have employed a multitude of theoretical 
arguments to the study of partnerships. These include, policy-process and contingency 
models (Porter & Ronit, 2006), international (Andonova & Levy, 2003) and urban 
regime theory (Yang & Chang, 2007), social identity (Phillips & Hardy, 1997) and 
constructivist theories (Gray & Putnam, 2005), exchange and resource-dependency (Cho 
& Gillespie, 2006; Gazley & Brudney, 2007) and transaction-cost theory (Sanyal, 2006).  
Likewise, only a very few of the empirical studies have developed a sound theoretical 
argument for their empirical inquiry into the issue of power in partnerships upfront (e.g. 
Barnes, MacLean, & Cousens, 2010; Derkzen & Bock, 2007; Derkzen et al., 2008; 
Huxham & Beech, 2003; Lister, 2000; Porter & Ronit, 2006; Rhodri, 2007). In their 
design and methodological approach, the majority of works applied a combination of 
explorative single or multiple case studies. Thereof four studies were longitudinal (Cho 
& Gillespie, 2006; Morse & McNamara, 2006; Poncelet, 2001; Provan, Isett, & 
Milward, 2004a; Rodriguez et al., 2007). The analysis of partnership discourse was the 
methodological approach most frequently chosen (e.g. Cardini, 2006; Gray & Putnam, 
2005; Hanke et al., 2002; Poncelet, 2001; Selsky & Parker, 2005; Van Huijstee et al., 
2007).  Only very few (18) large-N studies across partnership cases were found, and 
none of the studies directly focused on power. First-hand partnership-level data was 
obtained for the largest set of fifteen development partnerships by Brown and Ashman 
(1996). Seven of the comparative studies across a number of partnerships were based on 
secondary data (e.g., reviews of published case-studies: (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Gillies, 
1998) and five of them utilised data gained from one and the same set of partnerships19 
(Andonova & Levy, 2003; Bäckstrand, 2006; Eweje, 2007; Hale & Mauzerall, 2004; 
Mert & Sander, 2006 ). The remaining large-N studies addressed not the partnership but 
single partners as the unit of analysis, mostly through their perceptions of and benefits 
gained from different cases of partnership-involvement (Thomson, Perry & Miller, 2007; 
Hardy, 2003; Hasnain-Wynia, Sofaer, Bazzoli, Alexander, Shortell, Conrad, Chan, 
Zukoski & Sweney, 2003). Yet, others addressed a particular sector or group of partners, 
such as alone or in combination, for example NNGOs or SNGOs, non-profits, 
businesses, or public agencies (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Elbers, 2004; Gazley & 
                                                 
19 Cf. http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/partnerships.htm 
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Brudney, 2007; Milne et al., 1996). Finally, 28 of the 94 reviewed articles discuss power 
in North-South partnerships compared to 58 in a solely Northern/Western context. 
 
 
2.4 Two perspectives on power in partnerships 
The preceding brief overview of the present state of research on power in partnerships 
shows that only a very few studies directly focus on power and/or developed a 
theoretical argument for their study of power in this context upfront. Most of the 
empirical studies analyse single or only a narrow number of partnerships and almost all 
comparative studies across a larger number of cases take the perspective of only single 
or specific groups of partners. This rather meagre basis poses several challenges to an 
integrative conceptualisation of power in partnerships. A main distinction can be drawn 
in that research to date has relatively independently developed into two directions, 
depending on the way scholars treat the latency of the concept of power. In the theories 
they use as well as in the design, sampling and methodologies they apply, different 
approaches are chosen contingent on whether power is understood as a dispositional 
(“having power”) and/or an episodic (“exercising power”) concept (Wrong, 1995). 
In the tradition of research on mostly for-profit dyadic alliances (Barringer & 
Harrison, 2000), scholars sharing a dispositional understanding of power in partnerships 
look at, mostly, the analytical level of single but also of groups of partners, their various 
organisational power dispositions and how those relate to differences in partnering 
outcomes. Following an episodic understanding instead, power is understood to derive 
from and be defined through the interaction between partners in specific partnering 
processes. The arguments for and against both understanding are as follows: 
Consistent with a dispositional understanding, power and differences in power 
between partners are treated as an explanans for partnering outcomes. This approach can 
provide a substantial argument for or against partnering for individual partners or 
groups, since benefit can be traced back to the individual organisational level. Yet, this 
approach tends to treat power as a one-way process and thus the partnership as a black-
box (Derkzen et al., 2008). The episodic approach instead defines power as the 
explarandum and provides rich insights, into how power occurs in inter-organisational 
processes and how power is constructed and contested by multiple constituents. This 
perspective however, lacks an integration of situation-specific phenomena and episodes 
of agency into the broader picture of individual organisational dispositions (Morse & 
McNamara, 2006) and partnership-level characteristics that enable or constrain and 
ultimately define the outcomes of organisational agency.   
Yet, if not both understandings are integrated, meaning “[…] actual influence 
attempts are not observed, or the capacity to exert influence […] is not considered, the 
researcher lacks the basis for assuming that power actually caused the observed 
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outcome” (Provan, 1980: 553). Currently, such integration is needed in this rather 
fragmented state of the field, in which power is situated at different analytical levels, 
following different assumptions of latency, and consequently causalities. This need will 
be demonstrated in the following section.  
 
A dispositional understanding of power in partnerships 
An understanding of power as deriving from dispositions, predicates upon the 
assumption that differences in power dispositions between partners result in differences 
in outcomes. Via the antecedents and outcomes of the involvement of individual 
organisations or of groups of organisations in single or across a number of cases, studies 
following this understanding, primarily address the individual organisational or group-
level of analysis. For example, Ashman (2001) looks across ten cases operating in 
Brazil, India, and South Africa, at the extent to which Southern NGO (SNGO) partners 
achieve to advance their individual organisational goals in partnerships with businesses. 
In a similar way, Milne and colleagues (1996) employ a large-scale survey to inquire 
into the outcomes acquired from partnership for environmental organisations, comparing 
those across partnerships with other non-profits, governments or businesses. In a similar 
vein, Andrews and Entwistle (2010) compare the benefits obtained for public agencies 
from partnerships with other public agencies against collaborations across sectors, with 
businesses and non-profits.  
Since the vast majority of studies are based on single or a few partnership cases 
and/or pre-sampled on individual or specific groups of partners, frequently an a-priori 
(mostly sector-related) difference perspective on organisational power dispositions is 
taken (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010; Parker & Selsky, 2004). In this manner, scholars for the 
most part obviate the issue of operationalising differences in the dispositions and 
outcomes of partners and ultimately in the operationalisation of partnership-level 
influences on the relation between both concepts.  
 
Power dispositions 
In organisation studies, conceptualising and operationalising the individual power 
dispositions of organisations traditionally directly relates to the concept of resources. 
The resource-based approach to the analysis of organisational power is as some argue 
most direct (Phillips, 1997) and also the approach to power most frequently referred to 
by the reviewed studies. Though resources are a potentially rich concept for the analysis 
of power dispositions (Korpi, 1985), several inadequacies in the present state of its use in 
the partnership literature are identified. 
First, resource-dispositions were rarely found to be fully operationalised to an extent 
that they effectively discriminate between partners. On the one hand, further resource 
specifications seem to appear unnecessary with regard to the generally rather narrow 
scope of the studies, since in-depth knowledge about single or a few cases enables 
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scholars to estimate resource access and/or control, and differences therein between 
partners. On the other hand, a lack of specification of resources may result in the 
assumption that individual organisational power rests within an organisation, that is 
power can be ‘read off’ from the resources that partners are assumed to have or have not 
available (Derkzen et al., 2008: 459). The word assumed is used here because frequently 
references to resources are not assessed on the merits of individual partners but linked to 
certain sectors or groups of partners. Most clearly, this tendency is demonstrated by 
studies on diversely resourced partnerships e.g. North-South and/or cross- or multi-
sector partnerships. Along a donor-recipient continuum (e.g. Fowler, 1998) and/or 
according to sectors or groups of partners and without empirical scrutiny, resources are 
attributed to some rather than other partners and by the same token linked to different 
degrees of power and influence in partnerships.  
As a prominent example in multi-sector partnerships, scholars have adopted Phillips 
and colleagues’ (2000) heuristic, which contrasts authority and the access to and control 
of scarce and critical resources to discursive resources. Supplemented is this heuristic by 
the notion that the latter ones are of particular importance to partners who cannot exert 
authority and/or access or control scarce and critical resources (Phillips, Lawrence & 
Hardy, 2000). There appears to be evidence that different partners bring different 
resources to a partnership and that these resources vary in the degree to which they are 
perceived as legitimate, accepted and institutionalised in a partnership (Alexander, 1996; 
Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Ganz, 2000; Rogers, 1974). Yet, a analysed from different 
perspectives, a specific partner or group of partners neither exhibited the same resources 
always and to the same degree as proposed by such heuristics (Waddell, 2000, 2005), 
nor were they powerful or powerless in all cases. In fact, the kind of resources and the 
extent to which they can potentially be accessed and controlled by partners vary 
considerably among individual representatives of such groups and lack generalisability, 
e.g. to all Southern or Northern partners, businesses, NGOs or governments. In the same 
manner are resource-related attributes, such as their scarcity, criticality, and legitimacy, 
subject to and derive from partnership specific assessments. A partner’s resources are 
evaluated by and have to be seen relative to its environment that is the partnership, 
consisting of multiple organisations and relationships between them. These relationships 
and the position an actor holds in them are important indicators of the extent to which 
resources function as bases of power and to which partners can control their own actions 
and influence those of their partners, meanwhile this may only partially be known to the 
individual partners themselves (Barley et al., 1992:313).  
Therefore, notwithstanding the heuristic use of distinctions and resource typologies, 
such as the one proposed by Phillips and colleagues (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000) 
for operationalising the potential diversity and scope of resources that partners may 
possibly access and/or control, they cannot substitute thorough empirical analyses 
(Waddell, 2000). Alone fully operationalising the scope of potential resources, in this 
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sense, has rarely been done in partnership studies so far. Illustrated in the above, 
variations of resource heuristics have mostly led to the drawing of distinctions between 
financial capital and (governmental) authority and discursive resources or resource- or 
powerlessness. In the face of such narrow conceptualisation of resources, Derkzen et al 
conclude, “an analysis of power based on resources alone is limited“ since partnerships 
with diverse constituencies of which not all partners access and control either financial 
resources or authority are bound to be seen as “unjust spaces of inequality” (Derkzen et 
al., 2008: 459). Yet, it has been demonstrated by earlier studies on power in diverse 
resource environments before that such narrow conceptualisations do not have to be the 
case (Jacobson & Cohen, 1986). Proceeding from a careful analysis of the kind of 
resources that can come into play in collective processes between the different 
representatives of a specific domain in partnerships, mutual assessments among partners 
can be conducted and individual resource-related power can systematically be assessed 
in their relationship to partnering outcomes (Ibid.). 
To the extent that such resource-assessments and the impact of partnership-level 
influences on individual power dispositions and outcomes vary across partnerships, 
exceptions to such heuristics will be found. Their systematic analysis must receive 
primary empirical attention, since it is not the fact that partners exhibit different 
resources per-se that builds a valid argument for dispositional power differences in 
partnerships, but rather the question of how such differences relate to differences in 
power in and across various partnership contexts.   
For example, one may derive the converse argument that if some resources are 
discursive, others will rather implicitly function as bases of power, with less or no need 
for enactment. To support such a dispositional argument, however, partnership-level 
influences in the perceptions of resources and their enactment require analytically 
separate consideration in their relation to influence and other outcomes. In particular, 
consideration is required should variation exist in the degree to which resources are 
recognised and acknowledged as legitimate and thus potentially effective (Phillips, 
Lawrence & Hardy, 2000). There is necessity to analytically discriminate potential 
(resources and positions) against enacted power and influence (Provan, 1980). Though 
such systematic analytic distinctions have to date not consistently been applied to the 
study of power in partnerships, this seems required, if the aim is to move beyond 
repetitive descriptive accounts of exceptions from actor or group-specific heuristics 
when at the same time giving yet another ad-hoc explanation to their support (Esser, 
1996: 101).  
 
Outcomes 
Similar to dispositions, the outcomes of power in partnerships have mostly been 
conceptualised and examined at the organisational level. This is done through the 
benefits obtained by individual partners and, as illustrated for dispositions, through the 
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limits and promises of partnering expected for certain sectors and groups (Ashman, 
2001; Elbers & Schulpen, 2010; Elbers, 2004; Kock & Van Tulder, 2008; Milne, 1996; 
Dorado & Vaz, 2003). Most likely, this interest derived from the initial promotion of 
partnerships, as demonstrated by the extensive body of literature elaborating upon the 
“strategic” grounds for partnering for ‘non-traditional’ partners, for example for business 
to get involved in development (Austin, 2000a). Evaluations of outcomes, based upon 
criteria derived from and valid in the respective domains of single organisations or 
specific groups (Phillips et al., 2000) however, have received critique (Ashman, 2001a; 
Ashman, 2004) for being one-sided in the first place and thus supporting the impression 
of gains of one partner or group at the expense of others (Jørgensen, 2006). This 
knowledge gap arising from a lack of operationalisation of outcomes in a way suitable to 
capture the effective participation of all partners, allows for the conclusion that current 
research on partnering outcomes seems to be largely driven by dogmatism and ideology 
rather than based on empirical evidence (Dowling, Powell, & Glendinning, 2004). 
Since different backgrounds of partners bring along very specific criteria for the 
evaluation of effective participation and partnership success, many of the in fact multiple 
dimensions and/or partnership-process-related outcomes have been neglected by scholars 
who follow a dispositional understanding. Together with the inadequacies in the 
conceptualisation of power dispositions, power tends to appear as a zero-sum equation. 
Yet, exceptions give a different picture. For example, Hardy et al (2003) rather 
comprehensively evaluate an NGO’s benefits gained from a number of collaborations 
over a period of four years, based on three criteria: resources, knowledge and influence. 
Morse and McNamara (2006) further illustrate the trade-offs that occur for a field 
implementing agency in its partnership with a donor over the time-period of 36 years. 
Both studies illustrate the fact that the complex development of power relationships in 
partnerships cannot be broken down to a simple zero-sum equation but rather to display 
losses of partners in one aspect and wins in another and at different stages of the 
partnering process (Cobb, 1984). 
Theoretically, a temporal as well as a substantial distinction is drawn between what 
Huxham and Beech (2003) call “points of power” upon which partners can exert their 
influence at different stages of the partnering process, whether related to the design or 
the implementation of a partnership. Hale and Mauzerall found in this respect only very 
few genuinely and autonomously evolving partnerships and concluded that: “[M]uch 
more common are partnership arrangements in which partners are drawn after a lead 
agency decided about the vision and strategic objectives before partners can have a say” 
(2004: 861). Outcome indicators, e.g., for the influence gained in partnerships hence 
ought to be operationalised in a way capturing different stages of the process and 
differences in the quality of the contended issues. The initial decision about membership 
and the chance to exert influence on this issue may be more momentous for some than 
for others. Not only in the case where partners are influential but especially in case they 
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do not have a say in these constitutive decisions though they are directly affected. In this 
respect, Rogers (1974: 112), distinguishes instrumental from infra-decisions. Influence 
on the decisions about instrumental issues serves as the direct realisation of individual 
organisational goals. Infra-decisions instead encompass questions about the “power 
infrastructure” (Huxham & Beech, 2003) of partnerships. This is those decisions define 
the rules of the game and the room for manoeuvre for partners in subsequent encounters, 
for example, by defining the theme, membership, practices (Phillips et al., 2000) control, 
accountability (Ashman, 2001b; Ashman, 2004) and administrative positions and 
structures (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001a; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Provan & Kenis, 
2008). Brown and Ashman (1996) found that balanced involvement in and influence on 
such constitutive decisions were important criteria, in particular for the evaluation of 
successful partnership participation for grassroots organisations, whereas NNGOs’ were 
primarily concerned with lowering the administrative burden for their organisations and 
placed lesser significance on full involvement of their organisation in and influence on 
all partnership-level decisions. Hence, influence on different points of power may have 
differential significance for partners for different reasons. Empirically, comparative 
analyses of the outcomes of all partners, incorporating a range of different gains and 
losses at different stages of the partnering process have received only scant scholarly 
attention to date.    
 
 
An episodic understanding of power in partnerships 
An episodic understanding locates power at the partnership-level of analysis. Power is 
constructed through and derives from episodes of interaction in which partners implicitly 
or explicitly (Provan, 1980) exercise their power and construe partnerships as arenas of 
social construction (Clegg, 1989b; Gray, 1989; Hanke et al., 2002) political contestation 
(Stewart & Gray, 2006) and immediate resource environments (Hudock, 1995; Pfeffer & 
Leong, 1977; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980). Two analytic approaches that base upon this 
understanding of power in partnerships can be identified from the literature: the 
discourse and the network analytic approach.   
 
Discourse analytic approach 
Discourse analysis is the preferred methodological approach (Cardini, 2006; Gray & 
Putnam, 2005; Hanke et al., 2002; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Hastings, 1999; Poncelet, 
2001) when scholars refer to power in partnerships as symbolic20. This is apart from the 
rhetoric of partnerships part-taking in the normative debate about what partnerships 
should or should not be (Miraftab, 2004; Tomlinson, 2005; Wettenhall, 2003), for 
example, in bringing about citizen participation (Newell, 2005) or in meeting the 
                                                 
20 Similar to the concept of ‘communicative power’ (i.e. Dryzek, 1990, Habermas, 1986). 
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capacity needs of Southern partners (Pieterse, 1991). A comparably fewer number of 
studies analyse power in partnerships (Buse & Harmer, 2004) giving accounts of the 
ways partners manage meaning (Gray, 1989; Hardy, 1994) by shaping other partners’ 
perception, cognitions, and as some argue even their preferences (Lukes, 2005). Scholars 
have interpreted language use in partnership and analysed how collaborative issues are 
contested and become the focus of discursive struggles, when partners “work to realise 
their goals and interests within the collaborative activity” (Lawrence, Phillips, & Hardy, 
1999: 490). 
Since symbolic power is created in and through partnering processes, constructivist 
approaches tend to refrain from the use of heuristics or presumptions about dispositions 
and “given” differences in power between partners. Instead one proceeds from the 
assumption that symbolic power can potentially be employed by all actors in order to 
shape collaborative discourse in favour of their interests and causes (Phillips, 1997). For 
example, discursive legitimacy as a source of power for partners may derive from their 
ability to successfully link their own efforts to larger societal values by legitimately 
speaking for an issue or representing the interests of others (Hardy, 1998; Thomson, 
Perry, & Miller, 2007). From an episodic understanding then, resource-based analyses of 
power are subject to partnership-level influences, since resource use and effects are 
‘‘modified, displaced or disrupted depending upon the relationships that come into play’’ 
(Allen, 2003:97), which can hardly be identified upfront.  
Still implicitly, almost all studies assume actor-related differences in power 
dispositions to cause variations in the enactment of power in partnerships. For example, 
Hanke and colleagues (2002) found that “weaker” groups use more conflictive and 
disruptive frames than “powerful” ones in partnership negotiations. Phillips et al (2000) 
more generally ascribe stronger influence and potential to diffuse and catalyse change 
through collaboration, to “powerful” partners. Gray and Putnam (2005) likewise explain 
the use of different narratives as constructions of identity in partnerships by differences 
in power between partners distinguishing “privileged” from “low power” discourse. 
Poncolet argues that “[…] diverse and evolving conceptualizations and understandings 
are not neutral but infused with power as they are utilized by individuals, who 
themselves, have different amounts of influence and prestige […]” (Poncelet, 2001: 15).  
Rarely, however, has it been further specified by the authors how those differences 
between “weaker” and “stronger”, or “powerful” and “less powerful” partners were 
defined in the first place.  
By the same token, are changes and outcomes of power in partnerships mostly 
evaluated through dialectic discursive gains (Hastings, 1999), for example, by the extent 
to which partners control and influence a partnership’s discourse (Hardy & Phillips, 
1998), affect each other’s ideas and perceptions of contested issues (Lawrence et al., 
1999) or influence aspects of each others’ organisational culture (Parker & Selsky, 
2004). “Hard measures” of individual organisational outcomes, as addressed by studies 
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based on a dispositional understanding are less frequently incorporated. In a way that 
through discourse alone, episodes of agency in partnerships appear somehow detached 
from other structuration processes, for example, in terms of resources and dispositions. 
Since a discourse analytical approach is commonly used to explain agency and 
influence by weaker partners (e.g. Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000), one has to be 
careful not to interpret the comparatively few empirical cases and the kind of data that 
inform these studies, to support a general assumption of equal opportunities in 
partnerships. Morse and McNamara (2006) give an example of how the interpretation of 
the same case can differ when looking at it from an episodic or a dispositional lens. 
Comparing Lister’s (2000) resource- and control-related to Hasting’s (1999) discourse 
analytic approach, Morse and McNamara examine how the power relations in a 
partnership between a donor and a recipient NGO developed over a time period of 35 
years. Their first conclusion is that trust was created and power mutually exercised by 
both sides: “[b]y exploring the evolution of changes in assumptions, values and practice 
that has taken place since the partnership was founded” (Morse & McNamara, 2006: 
325). Yet, even after the period of time of 35 years, the unequal foundation on which the 
collaboration was built persisted: “[T]he climax to this exercise of power was when the 
donor unilaterally decided on the sudden removal of most of its funding for DDA [the 
NGO]. DDA had no input into the process other than discussions with the evaluation 
team. Dialogue was conspicuously absent.” (Ibid: 322). 
This and other examples demonstrate that one needs to be careful when placing too 
much emphasis on discourse (Deetz, Newton, & Reed, 2007) in the analysis of power in 
partnerships. On the one hand, due to the dominance of a “pro-partnership rhetoric, 
whether sincere or not, that one is likely to encounter from all partners in the relationship 
for different reasons” (Morse & McNamara, 2006: 325). As well as the opposite, since 
“[…] there will always be a perception of unequal power relations even if these do not 
actually exist.” (Hemphill, McGreal, Berry & Watson, 2006: 73). Yet, next to the 
difficulties that arise from the specific nature of discourse analytical data on 
methodological grounds, scholars increasingly call into question the practical 
implications of these findings, e.g. whether repeated interactions, changing perceptions 
and partnership values alone are sufficient to guarantee effective participation and 
partnership (Ashman, 2000; Ashman, 2001a; Bryson & Crosby, 2005). Since, as long as 
partnerships base on unilateral resource dependencies and control, effective participation 
cannot be guaranteed. Instead, an adjustment of the structural conditions for 
organisational agency to occur in partnerships may be required, for example, by firmly 
entrenching safeguards and formal decision-making and/or veto-rights into their design 
and implementation (Elbers, 2010; Elbers & Schulpen, 2010). Even following an 
episodic understanding of power, at some point partnerships need to “walk the talk” 
(Austin, 2008:51) and ultimately become not only discursive spaces and episodes of 
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interactions but provide the organisational context for agency to translate into changes 
reflected in the underlying structures and power dispositions of partners.  
 
Network analytic approach   
Contrary to the constructivist interpretative stance of discourse analyses, network 
analytic approaches to the study of power in partnerships represent an attempt to 
objectify and visualise inter-organisational processes (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). 
This entails viewing partnerships as consisting of (multiple layers of) relational 
structures (Laumann & Pappi, 1976) that emerge from and affect the ongoing 
interactions between partners (Alter & Hage, 1993). Partners can exert influence on 
others from central positions in these structures, which are utilised as indicators for 
power in partnerships (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001a; Barnes et al., 2010). Through a 
variety of theories, scholars seek to explain, i.e. the emergence of organisational agency 
as a result of and derived from these positions of partners (Raab & Kenis, 2009). 
Notwithstanding the long history of the use of network analysis as an analytical tool, 
corresponding theory is only emerging (Provan et al., 2007). Network analyses are not 
informed by one unitary theoretical approach that specifies distinctive propositions, yet. 
Critiques have pointed out the ‘structural determinism’ that dominates network studies 
and the inadequate conceptualization of inter-organisational agency (Emirbayer & 
Goodwin, 1994; Galaskiewicz, 1985), which provides no coherent theoretical argument 
for the recursive relationship between agency, its outcomes and the structural pre-
conditions that facilitate its occurrence (Raab & Kenis, 2009). To date, understanding 
differences in the structural positions of partners is to understand power. 
The emergence of relational structures and the positions therein as well as their 
translation into influence and effective participation, are explained as proceeding from 
an instrumental view on partnerships. Related assumptions are of either naturally 
occurring horizontal relational structures, through functionally induced dependences 
between partners (Adler & Kwon, 2002), or, even though less frequently, (Boje & 
Whetten, 1981; Hills & Mahoney, 1978; Neumann, 1979; Huang & Provan, 2006) of 
hierarchical dependences that develop under the administrative control of some kind of 
lead organisation (O'Toole, 1997). In both scenarios, resource dependence and exchange 
theoretic perspectives (Galaskiewicz, 1985) posit that power is the inverse of 
dependence (Emerson, 1962). Since organizations need resources to achieve their 
individual and/or a partnership’s goal, it follows that partners will automatically interact 
with those others who control and/or access these resources. Thus, centrally located 
partners are potentially more powerful, since they have more exchange alternatives (Boje 
& Whetten, 1981) and/or are positioned closer to core-decision-makers and resource-
holders and therefore are more likely to get involved and are less constrained in their 
actions (Cook, 1977; Pfeffer & Leong, 1977). Though it has been acknowledged that 
central positions also pose constraints by confining the possibilities for agency (Gargiulo 
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& Benassi, 2000; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Kenis & Knoke, 2002; Uzzi, 1996, 
1997a, b), resources and structural positions of partners alike are for the most parts 
equated with power and influence.  
This equation however, bases on the assumption that partners share an understanding 
about what are critical or necessary resources and/or the common drivers or goals for 
collaboration;  be it the individual organisational resources and goals of partners, or the 
overall needs, objectives, and agendas of a partnership (Boje & Whetten, 1981). To 
some extent, this assumption may derive from and hold for the rather uniform empirical 
basis of network analytic studies to date (Raab & Kenis, 2009). This consists of studies 
involving single or a very few cases of uni-sector  partnerships, mainly business 
alliances (Provan et al., 2004a), and partnerships operating in specific issue areas, e.g. 
certain industries or public-sectors i.e health, education and other human services 
(Agranoff, 1991; Barnes et al., 2010; Boje & Whetten, 1981; Huang & Provan, 2006; 
Huang & Provan, 2007; Milward & Provan, 1995; Provan , Beyer, & Kruytbosch, 1980; 
Provan et al., 2009; Provan et al., 2004a) and within the European and North-American 
regions (Raab & Kenis, 2009). 
Such contexts and constituent bases suggest that potential resource needs, drivers and 
goals for partnering predicate upon somewhat common understandings, for example, in a 
market environment, where partners come together to seek gains in productivity from 
one another, or in the provision of human services in countries in which these service 
spheres are relatively well institutionalized (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Yet, it has been 
argued that even in those settings common understandings are dependent on the presence 
of several individual and partnership-level conditions (for a review of potential 
partnership-level influences see Provan & Kenis, 2008), viz. knowledge about the kind 
of resources accessed or controlled by partners, which may derive from previous shared 
collaborative experience (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997a, b). For example, Huang and Provan 
(2006) explain differences in the centralisation and density of relational structures of a 
publicly funded health partnership by the nature of the resources involved. Defined on a 
continuum from tangible resources, such as contracts and budget, to intangible resources, 
such as information and reputation, it was found that tangible resources together with 
influence are centrally controlled by the for-profit lead organisation, whereas intangible 
resources are dispersed among the non-profit service providers, who are not permanently 
involved in all partnership-level decisions. The authors posit such segmentation of a 
professional and an administrative control domain as beneficial for partnership 
effectiveness (Huang & Provan, 2006: 450) under the favourable conditions of long-
standing previous shared collaborative experience within the professional and goal 
consensus between the two control domains, respectively. It remains unclear, though, 
how mutual control and influence are exerted and how the partnership copes with, 
particularly should there be conflict between the two control domains. When different 
views of appropriate ends and means between the non-for-profit and the for-profit 
Power in Partnerships: Literature Review and Integration 
38 
 
control domains collide (Provan et al., 2004a) and differences in the possibilities of 
partners to exert influence undermine the abilities to interact effectively.  
Brown and Ashman’s (1996) study of 15 development partnerships, with no shared 
collaborative past and initially strong contention among highly diversely resourced 
partners, suggests the need to facilitate the development of mutual control and effective 
partnership-level integration. Their findings show that balanced involvement and control 
developed only in those partnerships in which governance mechanisms were 
implemented that overlay the development of power relations and assist in the 
functioning of individual organisational resources as bases for involvement and effective 
participation. In contrast, partnerships with equally critical conditions but no such 
mechanisms in place developed relational structures that excluded partners with less 
tangible resources from partnership-level decision-making processes and often resulted 
in conflict, withdrawal, and partnership ineffectiveness. In a similar vein but proceeding 
from a situation in which diversely resourced partners were equally strongly involved in 
decision-making processes, Derkzen and Bock (2007) demonstrate how such favourable 
positions alone are no guarantee for effective enactment of resources and/or effective 
participation, either. This came about as consequence of constructing professionalism in 
a regional partnership by some partners over the resources of others, in this case the local 
knowledge of the affected communities. The latter resource was effectively devaluated, 
resulting in only the marginal impact of the groups that accessed them on core decisions. 
Several comparable cases (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Barnes et al., 2010; Gray & 
Putnam, 2005; Marfo, 2006; Peuhkuri, 2002) document how perceptions about resources 
fail in translating into effective participation. Hence, favourable structural positions 
cannot by implication be equated with power and influence in partnerships if perceptions 
and beliefs about mutually valuable potential contributions and gains are not shared. In 
this event, when partners hold favourable positions, communication, mutual influence 
and joint learning (e.g. Brown & Ashman, 1996; Lewis, 1998) may aid partners in 
making use of their positions.     
The need for partnership-level governance and guidance mechanisms to address 
differences in power and assist partners in making partnerships productive, are of much 
discussion. This is particularly so by literature dealing with highly diverse-resourced 
partnerships that spill over traditional boundaries of sectors, groups and nations, and 
address multifaceted issues (see for reviews: Bryson et al, 2006; Selsky & Parker, 2005; 
Van Huijstee et al, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2002a). Scholars employing network analysis, 
e.g., in the study of public-service networks, have only very recently started to pay 
attention to such mechanisms and primarily to those facilitating effective administration 
and control rather than enabling interventions. First promising theory developments in 
this direction (see for a review and conceptual framework: Provan & Kenis, 2008) 
propose different governance modes to effectively govern partnerships in the presence or 
absence of various partnership-level conditions. Such preliminary theoretical claims 
Power in Partnerships: Literature Review and Integration 
39 
 
however, have not yet received much empirical back-up from systematic analyses of 
complete partnership data and across cases (Provan et al., 2007). Specifically, power 
differences as a partnership-level condition that requires specific interventions in the 
design and the implementation of partnerships have not been incorporated into such 
frameworks yet.  
 
 
2.5  Future directions 
The first conclusion one can draw from the review of the present literature is that there 
are not many empirical findings on power in partnerships to date. Secondly, existing 
findings and theoretical approaches seem divided into two seemingly exclusive 
understandings of power in partnerships, these being either dispositional or episodic and 
applying related various conceptualisations of power at different levels of analysis. The 
preceding sections presented and discussed the strengths and weaknesses of both 
understandings and it seems premature at this point to analyse the extensive theoretical 
literature beyond what has been presented. Rather, it seems advisable to build on what is 
known and discuss a possible integration of both understandings in those areas where 
gaps can be identified and future research can most fruitfully proceed from. Consistent 
with the structure of the review so far, this section will summarise the most pervasive 
arguments, preliminary findings and shortcomings of both perspectives. Followed by a 
discussion of what are seen as the primary methodological issues that must be overcome 
if progress is to be made on developing greater understanding of this topic.  
 
Power dispositions and partnership outcomes 
The relationship between power dispositions and partnering outcomes is the most 
extensively researched aspect of power in partnerships (e.g. Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; 
Gazley & Brudney, 2007; LaFrance & Lehmann, 2005; Millar, Choi, & Chen, 2004; 
Warhurst, 2001). Despite all we know to date about seemingly powerless or powerful 
individual partners, there are many questions that have not been adequately addressed, 
especially with regard to the generalisability of findings across specific actors and 
groups and across specific partnership settings incorporating variation in partnership-
level influences on the relationship between dispositions and outcomes. 
The underlying assumption of a dispositional understanding in partnerships is that 
differences in power dispositions between partners relate to variation in partnering 
outcomes. Moving beyond descriptive accounts of powerless versus powerful partners or 
groups, the question that needs to be answered is: Why are some partners more powerful 
than others? A systematic analysis may encompass, based on the preceding review of 
the literature, the following sub-questions: 
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- Are certain resources and/or positions, more effective bases of power in 
partnerships than others?   
- If so, what precisely are the effects of differences in dispositions in partnerships? 
For example, are so-called ‘discursive’ resources perceived as less valuable, are 
less likely to translate into favourable positions in the interactions between 
partners, and/or into effective participation and goal attainment of partners? 
 
The primary methodological issue that has to be addressed to answer these questions is 
the operationalisation of resources and related partnership-level outcomes. This is 
required to be undertaken in a way capturing these relationships for all partners and truly 
operationalising inter-organisational power as a relational concept, beyond in this sense 
static power proxies that may exist between sectors or groups, ‘outside’ of the context of 
a partnership (Phillips et al., 2000). In addition to being suitable to examine the 
resources and outcomes of all partners, such operationalisation needs to analytically 
distinguish between potential power and its outcomes in partnerships (Provan, 1980). 
Only through such a distinction can the question, why some partners are more powerful 
than others, be explained, for example by the relationships that may or may not be 
empirically established between resource perceptions and process-related gains, such as 
a favourable position in the relational structures of a partnership and influence and 
effective partnership participation. Ultimately, the relationships between these instances 
of power in partnerships require validation, e.g. through comparative analyses across 
different constituency bases and partnership settings and in their development over time. 
 
(Episodes of) power in partnerships  
The preceding review of the literature revealed two major analytic approaches to the 
analysis of episodes of power in partnerships, a discourse and a network analytic 
approach. Despite the rich insights into partnership-level interactions and processes 
obtained, both approaches build upon similarly under-researched preconditions for 
organisational agency and episodes of power in partnerships to occur, not least with 
respect to power dispositions and outcomes. Discourse analysis predicates upon the 
assumption of a relatively balanced involvement of partners in partnering processes and 
remains vague about partnering outcomes other than discursive gains and perceptional 
changes. Network analytical studies predicate upon the assumption that relational 
structures and reciprocal control evolve relatively autonomously from shared 
understandings, viz. of resources, resource needs and dependencies and partnering goals. 
Despite all that is known, at this point, about processes of social construction and 
contestation, as well as about the evolution of relational structures in partnerships, there 
are many questions that have not been adequately addressed yet. These questions in 
particular address the generalisability of findings across partnerships under consideration 
of differences in power dispositions and outcomes between partners on partnership-level 
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processes and outcomes. The underlying assumption of an episodic understanding is that 
power is inherently relational and derives from the ongoing interactions between 
partners. Moving beyond descriptive accounts of partnership processes, the question that 
needs to be answered is: Why are some partnerships and processes more effective than 
others? A systematic analysis based on the preceding review of the literature 
encompasses the following sub-questions: 
 
- Are certain partnerships and processes more effective than others? 
- If so, what precisely are the effects of differences in power dispositions between 
partners on partnership processes and outcomes? For example, are partnership 
processes more effective when mutual resources are known and perceived as 
potentially valuable or when involvement and/or influence and control are 
balanced? 
 
The primary methodological issue that has to be addressed to answer these questions is 
the operationalisation of power and other partnership-level conditions, in a way allowing 
for the assessment of differences in power dispositions among partners that is 
comparable across cases and this way build the nexus between the individual partner and 
partnership-level of analysis. Different to other partnership-level properties, for example 
the overall budget or size of a partnership, power differences between partners may be 
extrapolated and aggregated as a partnership-level condition but still require the analysis 
of the partners and the interactions and relationships between them. Whole partnership 
data, meaning data including the mutual assessments of all partners involved in a 
partnership can be extremely costly to gather depending on the size of the partnership, 
let alone cross-case comparisons by the means of a number of cases. As Provan et al 
(2007) propose generalisability would require a number of around 30 comparable 
partnership cases. Such quantities are most likely to be obtained from large-scale 
governmental or donor-led partnering initiatives and databases (Van Huijstee et al., 
2007). These partnerships however, to most parts operate beneath the radar of scholarly 
attention (Selsky & Parker, 2005). This may be due to the difficulties one faces when 
trying to access and process such data and at the same time demonstrate independence 
from the institutional interests of funding parties and obtain useful data.  
 
Cross-cutting questions and themes 
Following seemingly contradictive understandings of power in partnerships, the 
precedent analysis of the literature and the subsequent discussion of remaining 
theoretical and methodological gaps demonstrates that dispositional and episodic 
perspectives can not only usefully complement each other, but in fact that  theoretical 
claims put forward in one, needs to be verified by the other perspective to hold. We will 
demonstrate this mutual dependence by the exercise of a theoretical testing of the most 
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fundamental arguments of both understandings. A subsequent presentation of cross-
cutting themes and questions will conclude this section.  
Firstly, one can argue that differences in power outcomes are attached to differences in 
the power resources between partners. If supported by the data, this would confirm the 
null hypothesis in favour of the traditional dispositional understanding of power. Yet, 
only when partnership-level resource assessments remain stable, meaning across 
partnerships the assumption holds that significant differences exist between resources in 
their translation into favourable perceptions and thus positions and/or effective 
participation. In this case, one would find no reason to assume that, for example, a 
participative design of a partnership enabled partners to nonetheless gain a favourable 
position and/or a stake in partnership processes and pursue their goals. Further, only 
when objective (e.g. kinds of resources and favourable position) and perceived measures 
(e.g. resource value and influence gained) alike point into this direction, can we conclude 
that resource differentials might have caused the outcome. Should this positive relation 
between objective and perceived resource measures and influence differentials remain 
stable across a number of partnerships, then and only then can we argue for a systemic 
resource (dis-)advantage in partnerships that may be further extrapolated to certain 
partners or groups.  
Secondly, differentials in outcomes can derive from partnership-level perceptions and 
structural positions regardless of differences in the kind of resources of partners. Yet, 
this claim can only be substantiated when no significant differences in the relations 
between resources in their translation into several of the instances of power in 
partnerships, as stated in the above, can be found. Furthermore, as has been discussed for 
the discourse and network analytic approach, both the potential power indicators of 
resource perceptions and positions in the relational structures of partnerships are 
necessary to adequately operationalise the possibility for a recursive relationship 
between structure and agency to occur. In an episodic manner, agency in partnerships 
must be assessed in its relationship to structural pre-conditions and outcomes.        
Both, the dispositional and the episodic arguments are equally essential and neither 
one alone is comprehensive enough for an understanding of power in partnerships. When 
combined, concepts derived from both can inform strategies to address the issue of 
power at the partner/partnership interface (Provan et al., 2007). From the perspectives of 
partners or groups, there have been a few studies taking a comparative angle (Andrews 
& Entwistle, 2010; Ashman, 2001a; Hardy et al., 2003) by looking at the impact of 
differences in partnership-level structures and processes on effective participation and 
over time (Cho & Gillespie, 2006; Huang & Provan, 2007; Morse & McNamara, 2006; 
Poncelet, 2001; Rodriguez et al., 2007). They have suggested a number of directions that 
the study of power in partnerships might proceed:  
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- Are partnership-level power differentials in one or more of the above stated 
instances more likely to influence individual organisational chances for and 
effective participation? For example, are perceptional differences in resource-
related potential power more likely encountered when partners engage in 
collaboration with ‘non-traditional’ or partners with no shared collaborative past, 
where it is less likely for their resources to be acknowledged?        
- How effective are various strategies of engagement (Hanke et al., 2002; Hardy & 
Phillips, 1998; Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005) employed by individual or groups of 
organisations across partnerships displaying different partnership-level conditions 
of power differentials, in one or more of the above stated instances? For example, is 
it more effective for unacquainted partners to push for and invest in creating the 
necessary pre-conditions and safeguards for trustful interactions before taking the 
risk to engage in a partnership? In particular, if not directly involved in the design 
of partnerships themselves, how effective are less powerful partners to strengthen 
their position in partnerships through alternative strategies (e.g. by bringing in like-
minded allies, Ashman, 2001a)?         
 
At the partnership-level of analysis, very few studies have systematically operationalised 
differences in actor attributes and outcomes and inquired into their relationship to other 
partnership-level structures, properties, processes and outcomes (see for overviews of 
studies following a discourse or network analytic approach: Provan et al, 2007 and 
Hastings, 1999 or Gray, 1991, respectively}. In particular, opinions about effective 
measures that moderate the impact of power differentials on partnership effectiveness 
vary tremendously, dependent on the respective operationalisation of the latter two 
concepts. While the prevailing argument is made in favour of broad participation, mutual 
influence and shared power (Alter & Hage, 1993; Bryson & Crosby, 2005; Huxham, 
2003; Huxham & Vangen, 1996; Lewis, 1998). The reviewed studies demonstrate that 
such partnership-level conditions cannot be taken for granted or assumed to 
automatically emerge and persist in partnerships but that instead partnership-level 
governance interventions and mechanism to address these issues may be required. Yet, 
such interventions may vary in the degree to which they effectively tackle power 
differentials and can be costly to bring about and maintain in partnerships and conflict 
with dominant interests or efficiency concerns (Brown & Ashman, 1996; Provan & 
Kenis, 2008; Rochlin et al., 2008). The following issues are proposed for which a study 
of power in partnerships might proceed:  
 
- Do power differentials in one or more of the above stated instances interact with 
partnership-level governance interventions in bringing about effective collective 
action? For example, can governance interventions absorb the potentially 
detrimental effects of power differentials on partnership effectiveness?  
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- If so, how effective are various partnership-level governance interventions in 
balancing power differences? For example, are interventions targeting the 
structural design of a partnership more or less effective than those efforts aiming at 
relationship building and changing perceptions? Or, are combinations of these and 
other interventions most effective?  
 
 
2.6  Conclusion and discussion 
This review set out to give a comprehensive overview of research on power in 
partnerships. In sharp contrast to the abundant theoretical debate about the issue, the 
review stresses the meagre empirical base on which the present debate on power in this 
empirical context builds. The study outlines the existent theoretical fragmentation and 
methodological inadequacies in terms of the operation and related interpretation of 
power in this context. Connecting theoretical understandings, the analytical levels 
addressed and methodological strengths and weaknesses of the reviewed articles, a 
distinction between studies following a dispositional and an episodic understanding of 
power in partnerships is identified as the main source of fragmentation. Proceeding from 
a summary of questions raised but left unanswered by the most pervasive approaches to 
power following these two understandings, the review concludes by arguing that both 
are not mutually exclusive but dependent on each other.     
The findings of the present study suggest that rather than trying to address questions 
independently, future research on power in partnerships should draw upon many of the 
theoretical and methodological advances and insights gained from both understandings. 
For instance, the issues associated with effective management and governance of power 
relations in partnerships with very diverse membership and operating in less 
institutionalised but contested issue areas, should provoke efforts validating preliminary 
theory developments, as it has been suggested for the emerging field of network theory 
(Raab & Kenis, 2009). For this, it is equally important for the study of partnerships to 
emancipate itself from previous constraints regarding incomparableness and novelty of 
the subject and start engaging in theory development and empirical advances towards 
cumulative knowledge building across individual partners or groups and partnership 
settings. 
Although this review has focused on theoretical and empirical issues relevant to the 
study of power in partnerships, partnerships are increasingly utilised in all kinds of issue 
areas and service spheres and future research should be guided by the practical 
implications derived from the findings of this review. One of the most daunting but also 
promising issues in this respect seems to be the governance of power in and across 
diverse partnership settings. The impact of several governance aspects may be analysed. 
Insights gained with regard to interventions aiming at relationship and capacity building  
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may be contrasted with structural ones that target the design and control infra-structure 
of partnerships. Notwithstanding the practical relevance of such research the present 
review also shows that different theoretical claims and practical implications are 
informed and confined by actors’ perspectives. For example, tailored to the needs of 
public agencies, donors and other initiating parties, the emerging field of network theory 
focuses on questions about how partnerships can best be governed. In contrast, many of 
the studies reviewed here argue from the perspective of ‘partners’ and focused on 
balancing power via relationship building, making the most of their potential within the 
straightjacket of the donor-recipient relationships. At present, scholars from various 
disciplines have only a marginal understanding of power and its governance in the 
context of partnerships, despite the eminent role of this issue in these literatures. 
Enhancing this knowledge is clearly a challenge. Yet, addressing power at the nexus 
between the partner- and the partnership-level of analysis, this way integrating 
dispositional and episodic understandings of power provides a promising starting point. 
On a cautionary note, despite the attempt to present a comprehensive review of the 
literature on power in partnerships, the present work has clear limitations. Admittedly, 
the search procedure used narrowly focused on publications in academic journals, 
excluding an extant body of practitioners’ literature, field and evaluation reports and not 
at least edited volumes and books chapters on this topic. Still, the methodology of this 
review serves as a means to contrast the relative dearth and descriptive nature of 
empirical literature with the considerable and fierce but fragmented conceptual 
discussion of this topic. The findings presented should provide useful insights for future 
research choosing either to deliberately focus on one or to tackle the challenges of more 









Bases of Power and effective Participation in Development 






Differences in organisational bases of power are commonly argued to lead to a tacit and, 
at times, explicit distinction between the powerful and powerless partners with respect to 
their effective participation in partnerships. Yet, this argument is often build upon an 
understanding of power as ‘centred’ within individual organisations or groups to be read 
off from the resources they ‘have available’, that is resources these organizations access 
or control ‘outside’ of a specific partnership. Bases of power rarely are operationalised 
potentially diverse and yet ultimately defined by the context of a partnership; and 
analysed in their functioning across partnership cases. Applying exchange theoretic and 
public-administrative understandings of how inter-organisational power relations in 
partnerships unfold, this cross-sectional study of 175 organisations involved in 
development partnerships explores the effects of organisational bases of power on 
effective participation. The findings show that while some resources are effective 
relatively invariantly to partnership-level perceptions, others are perceived as valuable 
yet do not translate into power. Beyond a mere demarcation of powerful and powerless 
partners, the findings attempt to explain why these differences occur and make a case for 
the need of governance interventions to enable effective participation and thus 
significantly alter the way inter-organisational power relations in development 
partnerships unfold. 




Inter-organisational partnerships increasingly gained importance in international 
development cooperation as the institutional imperatives of bilateral inter-governmental 
aid changed (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2006; Robinson et al., 2000). Development 
agendas carried partnership as a managerial imperative to all parts of the world, where 
all kinds of organisations nowadays find themselves in the positions of managers of and 
participants in such inter-organisational relations (Rochlin et al., 2008). With their 
extremely diverse constituent bases, however, development partnerships in particular 
(Hastings, 1999), face grand challenges in governing inter-organisational power relations 
in order to enable effective participation and partnering processes (e.g. Brown & 
Ashman, 1996; Fowler, 1998).  
Yet, this course of events has gone rather unnoticed outside of the development 
domain (Brinkerhoff, 2002b), by scholars of inter-organisational relations and networks 
(Raab & Kenis, 2009). Despite the valuable insights that have been generated by this 
research (Huang & Provan, 2007; Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Provan & Gassenheimer, 
1994; Provan, 1980; Provan  et al., 1980), they almost solely derive from partnerships 
operating in relatively uniform contexts, such as markets, industries, or the public 
service sectors of European and North-American countries (Hasnain-Wynia et al., 2003; 
Huang & Provan, 2007; O'Toole Jr & Meier, 2004; Provan  et al., 1980; Zakus, 1998). 
Consequently, Raab and Kenis (2009), in a recent review of the literature, emphasise the 
need for an “external” validation of findings in other domains of partnership operation. 
Development scholars have paid attention to the specific challenges associated with 
effective partnerships in the specific context of (international) development cooperation. 
In particular, they have pointed out the difficulties and needs for governing seemingly 
inherently unequal power relations and provided in-depth insights into their complex 
nature in development partnerships (Lister, 2000; Morse & McNamara, 2006). 
Notwithstanding the valuable insights gained from this research, its majority to date has 
only little been informed by theory (Brinkerhoff, 2002b) and based on the study of only 
single or a small number of cases which hardly allow for any generalisations and 
cumulative knowledge building beyond specific cases (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Research on 
one of the rare existing comprehensive data sets21 has found differences in the proportion 
to which groups of actors, e.g. from the global South/North, governments, business, and 
civil society organisations (Andonova & Levy, 2003; Hale & Mauzerall, 2004) are 
represented among the partners. Yet, certain partners or groups of partners are not 
powerful or powerless in all partnerships and politics of inclusion or exclusion represent 
only one mechanism of power through partnerships (cf. Derkzen, Franklin & Bock, 
2008). Lacking a level of specification applicable to the organisational level and 
                                                 
21 See: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/partnerships.htm 
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comparable across partnership cases, previous work cannot explain or generalise if and 
how those power proxies impact upon the functioning of power in partnerships. 
The operations, the processes, relational dimensions and bases on which power 
enfolds once a partnership commences its operations, are core to the study of inter-
organisational relations and the sociologically oriented management disciplines 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985). This study tests a conceptual framework that builds upon an 
understanding of the functioning of bases of organisational power within inter-
organisational coordinative systems (Entwistle et al., 2007) and tests their applicability 
in the context of development partnerships. The question that guides this inquiry is 
formulated as follows: How do organisational bases of power relate to effective 
participation in development partnerships?   
The contributions of this paper are twofold: First, it adds an inter-organisational 
perspective to the literature on power in development partnerships, which so far has 
largely been neglected (Ashman, 2000; Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Secondly, by analysing the 
relationship between bases of power and effective participation the study explores 
starting points for practical interventions and partnership governance. 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical background  
There is not one specific theoretical framework, which focuses on inter-organisational 
power in internationally operating partnerships but there are two bodies of literature 
relevant for such an inquiry. The first is on the study of inter-organisational power 
(Cook, 1977; Cook, 1978; Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 1998; Huxham & Beech, 2003; 
Medcof, 2001; Provan, 1980) and the governance of collaborations, partnerships and 
networks (Gray, 1989; Gray & Wood, 1991; Huang & Provan, 2007; Jones et al., 1997; 
Kickert et al., 1997a; Provan  et al., 1980; Raab & Kenis, 2009). The second is on 
international development management (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2006; Cooke, 2003; 
Cooke, 2004; Thomas, 2007) and partnerships therein (Ashman, 2001a, b; Awortwi, 
2004; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 1999; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 
2004; Brinkerhoff, 2002a, b; Dolan & Opondo, 2005; Johnson & Wilson, 2006; Morse 
& McNamara, 2006; Patel, 2001). 
To pave the way for a theoretical integration of the literature, first the main 
assumptions about bases of inter-organisational power and their functioning in 
partnerships will be outlined. The main rationale for partnership stated in the literature 
can be summarised as that of bringing together a diversity of organisations with a wide 
array of resources and capabilities (Blockson, 2003; Gray, 1989; Gray & Wood, 1991; 
Waddell, 2000, 2005) that provide the base for making the achievements of goal-
oriented processes possible. This “instrumental” perspective (Stewart & Gray, 2006) 
relates to an understanding of partnerships as merely “facilitating” interaction, 
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collaboration as well as conflict (Gray & Putnam, 2005) in a way that “partners can best 
leverage their resources and capabilities so that goal-oriented processes can take place” 
(De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1997; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997b).  
This understanding of partnerships received critique because it seems to hypothesise 
several aspects, in particular, a preliminary acceptance of effective exchange, joint 
decision-making and interactions between equals. Those assumptions are cast into doubt 
when considering how partners come to the table with all kinds of power inequalities 
(Stewart & Gray, 2006). Ignoring this essential part of the reality of in particular 
development partnerships (Thomas, 2007) is argued to lead to ineffective processes. This 
is because it produces conflict, power struggle and partnership failure when partners end 
up “clashing” (Crane, 2000) and bargaining about power and basic rights instead of 
exploring mutual interests (Eweje, 2007: 21). By the same token, imposed partnership 
goals and processes often result in a lack of ownership and ineffective processes 
(Fowler, 1998).  
Acknowledging this reality of development partnerships, i.e., Thomas (1996) argues 
for partnership governance to go beyond facilitating but “creating” the conditions under 
which effective collaboration can take place. At this point, however, one is left with the 
question about how the power inequalities that suggest avowing an enabling and 
empowering governance approach can be defined and how these conditions can be 
“created”. In the literature on inter-organisational relations, the conditions for effective 
partnering build upon some tenets about the functioning of organisational bases of 
power, largely derived from two distinct perspectives (O'Toole, 1997):   
Firstly, research on partnerships in the for-profit world, and a related exchange 
theoretical understanding of inter-organisational power relations (Emerson, 1972) posits 
that one organisation’s power resides in another’s dependence (Emerson, 1962). 
Dependencies arise when organisations control or access resources which are needed by 
others (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Knowledge of resource needs and dependencies is 
assumed to lead organisations towards partnering in the first place (Oliver, 1990) and to 
subsequently drive the development of functionally induced dependencies (Huang & 
Provan, 2006) and relational structures that coordinate and sustain effective participation 
and collaboration (Jones et al., 1997). 
Public-administrative models instead emphasise the need for coordination and control 
of inter-organisational activities (Agranoff, 2006; Provan & Milward, 2001) and 
utilisation of a diversity of potentially valuable organisational resources, services, 
products and capabilities for the achievement of the development task (Thomas, 1996). 
In such administrative decision making (Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; 
Provan  et al., 1980), power derives from vertical dependencies and the extent to which a 
partner’s services, resources and capabilities potentially benefit and are effectively 
coordinated and employed for the achievement of the development task. 
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The first model describes the development of horizontal and the latter one the 
structuring of vertical inter-organisational power relations (Entwistle et al., 2007). Both 
models specify different functions of power but none of them seems to imply a need for 
“enabling” governance interventions as is proposed by development scholars (Thomas, 
1996). The underlying mechanism on which both models build, however, require 
empirical validation in the context of development partnerships. The assumption that 
common goals and joint decision-making are no prerequisites for effective exchange 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985) or that power is contingent on a partner’s potential to benefit the 
achievement of the partnership task (Provan & Milward, 2001) are the theoretical 
linkages that will be explored in the first part of this study. If such a link cannot be 
established this would give the indication of a need to “create” the conditions for 
effective collaboration (Thomas, 1996).  
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows: After presenting a conceptual 
model for the analysis of inter-organisational power in partnerships, the conceptual 
framework, the hypotheses, independent and dependent variables of this study are 
defined. Thirdly, the data collection, measurements and methodology are described. 
Finally, the empirical findings are presented and discussed in light of their implications 




3.3 Conceptual framework 
Core to a definition of inter-organisational power in partnerships is the premise that the 
potential power of partners is not always enacted (Provan, 1980) and that agency and 
upward influence are part and parcel of organisational life (Phillips, 1997). These ideas 
derive from the assumption of certain bases of power which can be accessed, utilised and 
enacted by an organisation (Benson, 1975) or work indirectly (Provan, 1980). As 
summarised by Emerson (1962: 32): “power will not be of necessity observable in every 
interactive episode between A and B, yet we suggest that it exists nonetheless as a 
potential to be explored, tested and occasionally employed by the participants”. The 
bases of the potential power of organisations that can be utilised in such efforts or 
function implicitly have been studied extensively (Clegg, 1989a; Cobb, 1984; Cook, 
1977; Cook, 1978; Dahl, 1961; Hardy, 1994) and can be summarised as resources and 
positions. 
 
Resources as bases of power 
The focus on resources as an essential component of an organisation’s power emanates 
from a long history of research on inter-organisational exchange relations (Cook, 1977). 
Resources, in their function as bases of inter-organisational power, can be regarded as 
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anything that partners need for carrying out their activities, may create dependencies for 
others (Zeitz, 1980) and maybe utilised for the fulfilment of a partnership’s task 
(Waddell, 2003, 2005). Resources can be more (e.g. financial and production means, 
Lodahl, 1973; Marfo, 2006),  less or intangible or symbolic (Huang & Provan, 2006; 
Rogers, 1974). For all the many typologies and classifications of resources that exist 
(Alexander, 1996; Rogers, 1974), those are of a heuristic value only to the purpose of 
this research. The effective functioning of resources as bases of power cannot be read 
from differences in resources between partners that may exist ‘outside’ of partnerships 
but depend on the perception and assessment among partners. Those are relational in 
nature, change over time and vary across the constituent bases and contexts of 
partnerships (Gray, 1985). Further, resources build only one component of the potential 
power of an organisation and cannot be set equal to power and influence in partnerships. 
For example, Derksen and Franklin (Derkzen et al., 2008) describe how a governmental 
agency refrained from enacting its authority to decide unilaterally but left main decisions 
about the course of a partnership to its partners. In contrast, resources may potentially be 
accessible to partners but cannot be enacted in partnerships. Brown and Ashman (Brown 
& Ashman, 1996) demonstrate how indigenous and grass-root organisations exhibited 
potentially useful resources, such as their social capital in the affected communities. Yet, 
these resources were only possible for those organisations to enact in those partnerships 
in which their involvement in decisive decision-making processes was endorsed by the 
initiators. Hence, resources are important prerequisites for power in partnerships but no 
resource guarantees involvement and/or effective participation in all processes (Huang & 
Provan, 2006) or partnerships (Hardy et al., 2003). 
 
Positions as bases of power 
Despite the type and the extent to which partners access and control certain resources, 
partners need to be in a position to bring their resources to bear. Positions are defined by 
the “power infrastructure” (Huxham & Beech, 2003) of a partnership and indicate the 
level of involvement in partnership processes, interactions, negotiations, exchanges and 
decision-making processes. The same argument that applies to resources also holds for 
favourable positions in partnerships: both are analytically distinct from effective 
participation in partnerships. For example, Derkzen and Bock (2007) describe how 
limited effective community participation in partnership negotiations can be, when local 
knowledge and thus local say in these processes is not considered equally valuable to the 
technical and scientific expertise of the “professional” partners. 
 
Bases of power and effective participation: Hypotheses 
Together, the two bases of potential inter-organisational power: resources and positions; 
and their interplay in bringing about effective participation in partnerships, are analysed. 
The two analytical concepts and their theoretical relation to effective participation, in an 
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exchange or public-administrative coordinative model, provide the bases for the 
hypotheses that guide this research. The first part of the study will answer the question to 
what extent resources, via the horizontal and vertical dependencies they create, lead to 
an advantageous position and/or effective participation in partnerships. Resources and 
the organisations that control and/or access them gain importance, as hypothesised by 
exchange theorists, when they are perceived as valuable by others (Emerson, 1962). In 
this event, partners become involved in interactions and gain advantageous positions in 
the relational structures of a partnership, which increase their chances for effective 
participation. In the administrative model, the functioning of bases of power is 
contingent upon the potential contribution of resources to the achievement of the 
development task (Thomas, 1996). A partner is considered and involved by decision-
makers to the extent to which a partner’s resources are recognised as valuable to the 
fulfilment of this task.   
In internationally operating development partnerships we can hypothesise such 
dependencies to exist, e.g. between foreign and local partners. On the one hand, foreign 
partners may depend on their local partners to identify and tailor partnership goals and 
processes to local needs (James, 2001), harness private investment (Kolk, Van Tulder, & 
Kostwinder, 2008), and leverage other ‘local’ (social) capital, community commitment 
and ownership to the partnership (Sanyal, 2006). What in turn increases their own 
chances for future funding (Robinson et al., 2000). On the other hand, local 
organisations may depend on the technical expertise, management skills, and not least of 
all the financial means channelled through and provided by foreign partners (Lister, 
2000). Based on such dependencies, one would assume that  
 
H1: The extent to which an organisation can potentially contribute resources to a 
partnership that are valuable to others and/or are considered important for the 
achievement of the partnership task, positively relates to its position in a 
partnership. 
 
H2: The extent to which an organisation can potentially contribute resources to a 
partnership that are valuable to others and/or are considered important for the 
achievement of the partnership task, positively relates to its effective participation in 
a partnership. 
 
So far, the argument has been that resources, via the inter-organisational resource 
dependencies they create and via their utility for the performance of the partnership task, 
lead to an advantageous position and thus a greater potential power and chance for 
effective participation. By proposing an analytical distinction between the two bases of 
potential power and by distinguishing between potential, enacted power and effective 
participation, we have already suggested that potential power is not always enacted but 
Bases of Power and effective Participation 
54 
 
in fact that both bases of power may interact in defining a partner’s chances for effective 
participation. Provan  et al., (1980) highlight that it is as important to consider that 
neither one component of potential power, resources or an advantageous position alone 
is sufficient and that power cannot be enacted or perceived unless potential power is 
present. With regard to the two components, one can assume two ways of interactions. 
First, as demonstrated by Brown and Ashman’s (1996) example of grass-root 
participation in partnerships, one could argue that resources alone are not sufficient for 
effective participation when organisations are not in the position to enact them. We 
hypothesise that: 
 
H3: The extent to which a partner potentially can contribute resources to a partnership 
that are valuable to others and/or are considered important for the achievement of 
the partnership’s task, only positively relates to effective participation when at the 
same time the partner is in the position to enact them. 
 
On the contrary, as demonstrated by Derkzen and Bock’s (2007) example of community 
participation in partnerships, one would assume that an advantageous position in a 
partnership becomes useful only in the event that partners show the necessary resources 
to make use of their position. Phillips describes that as making own claims and decisions 
“stick” (Phillips, 1997:44). Related to the previous hypotheses, one can assume that: 
 
H4: The extent to which the partner holds an advantageous position in a partnership 
only positively relates to effective participation when at the same time the partner 
has the potential to contribute resources to a partnership that are valuable to 
others and/or are considered important for the achievement of the partnership’s 
task. 
 
Effective participation: The dependent variable 
Potential power, derived from alone or in combination, the resources and positions of an 
organisation in a partnership can result in effective participation. The literature on inter-
organisational collaboration is fuelled with accounts of a variety of strategies and tactics 
that organisations can employ to pursue their goals and gain a stake in partnerships22, for 
example, by using different negotiation tactics, frames and other discursive elements. In 
the present framework, these strategies and tactics are separately conceptualised as 
representing expressions of enacted power in partnerships (Provan, 1980), and not 
further accounted for here.  
                                                 
22 An overview of the literature on “enacted” power in partnerships is provided in 
Chapter 2 of this volume. 
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Effective participation of partners is indicated by the stake partners gain in the 
exchanges, negotiations and discursive struggles over partnership-related issues (Kim et 
al., 2005) and by the degree to which they attain their individual organisational goals in 
partnerships (Hardy et al., 2003). Both influence measure and goal attainment are 
considered in the present study. On the one hand, because resource diversity and 
coordination may not always involve all organisations in all decision-making or 
exchange processes (Huang & Provan, 2006) and on the other hand, because partners 
may not always need to take influence (Provan  et al., 1980) to pursue their goals. Saying 
this, a systematic analysis of effective participation, as distinct from its preconditions 
(potential power) becomes even more important to prevent one from misleadingly 
interpreting a lack of influence as being powerless, or to attach too much importance to 
episodes of agency in partnerships. Ultimately, only a separate analysis of both 
components of potential power and their relation to effective participation can reveal the 
implications of their interplay and identify points for intervention.  
 
 
3.4 Data collection, measurement, and methodology 
In order to obtain information with regard to the concepts discussed above, survey data 
were collected from 175 organisations, 67 European and international organisations 
(IOs) and 108 local organisations involved in development partnerships. The 
partnerships, operating in and across 19 different African and Caribbean countries, 
derived from two financing instruments of the European Union: the European Union 
Water (EUWF) and Energy Facilities (EUEF).   
The data collection has been conducted as follows: first, all 274 organisations which 
successfully applied for partnership funding were contacted and asked for participation 
explaining the purpose and procedure of the study. Forty-nine of the so-called 
intermediary organisations indicated their interest, which resulted in an initial response 
rate of almost 20%. In the case that interest was indicated, the intermediary organisations 
were asked to provide the contacts of all their partner organisations involved in the 
funded project partnership. This procedure resulted in a preliminary number of 249 
participant organisations. 
Second, all organisations of which the contacts were obtained were approached and 
asked for participation. If interested, the respondents could choose between three 
options: i) complete an online questionnaire which was provided in English and French; 
ii) receive a printed version of the questionnaire via post; or iii.) indicate a time and date 
and preferred language for a telephone interview, for example in case of unstable or no 
internet access. Questionnaire and interview guidelines were provided to each 
organisation and each partnership individually (see the full questionnaire in Appendix 
II). This was required due to the relational measures used in this study to be satisfied by 
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both the personalisation of all questions and the obtaining of the individual perspective 
of each responding organisation about all its partners. Another consequence of this 
approach is that only those partnerships could be included which showed full 
participation, meaning, all partners completed the questionnaire or participated in the 
interviews. Eventually, full data was obtained for 175 organisations. After the first round 
of the data collection, the data was analysed and complemented by follow-up telephone 
interviews, which were conducted with ten organisations. Since only those participants 
were included of which the intermediary organisations provided the contacts, non-
response analysis at the partner-level of analysis could not be conducted. For the 
partnerships included however, confirmation of participation by the intermediary and the 
respective partners suggests complete partnership data (see Appendix III). 
 
Power has been conceptualised in the study of partnerships in a variety of ways (see 
Chapter Two of this volume). Different measures are not strictly comparable (Provan  et 
al., 1980). When trying to capture more than one dimension of the concept, in order to 
allow for systemic instead of generic interpretation, it is importance to be explicit about 
the measures used (Provan  et al., 1980). 
Resources. The concept of resources was operationalised following an approach 
presented by Jacobson and Cohen (1986). Resources were measured presenting the same 
list of 18 resources23 at two points in the questionnaire/interviews. First, the respondents 
were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale (to “extremely important”) the 
significance of each resource for their own organisation and/or the accomplishment of 
the partnership’s task. Later in the questionnaire, the same list was presented again but 
this time the respondents were asked to indicate for their own organisation and their 
partners, to what extent they can potentially contribute each listed resource (again on a 
five-point Likert-scale, to “very high potential”). The average of the self- and others-
perceived scores for each resource represented the objective resource measure. 
Resource utility. From the first resource assessment, the total sum of the utility scores 
ascribed to a resource by all partners was divided by the total sum ascribed to all 
resources in a partnership. This partnership-specific percentage was taken as a weight 
representing the utility of a resource. The objective resource scores of each resource 
were then weighted and the sum represented the individual resource utility score for 
each partner. 
Position: The concept of position was measured in two ways: involvement in 
interactions with partners and in decision-making processes.   
Interactions. Egocentric measures of the involvement of partners in the activities of the 
partnerships were used. Each respondent was asked to indicate for each partner, with 
whom the own organisation is most frequently involved with in four partnership-related 
                                                 
23 A description of the development of this list is provided in Appendix I. 
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activities. The activities were operationalised two-ways directed (giving/receiving, or 
both): reporting, resources, advice, and support. Because the focus was on the most 
eminent relations between partners, only confirmed linkages were counted (Marsden, 
1990). The obtained in- and out-degree centralities for each activity were normalised, 
controlling for differences in the size of the partnerships. Despite the loss of data, this 
conservative approach was required, since no direct observations were obtained (Huang 
& Provan, 2006). 
Decision-making. Involvement in the decision-making processes of a partnership was 
measured through involvement in the decisions about ten24 partnership-related issues. 
For each issue it was asked to indicate own and other partners’ involvement. Following 
these criteria, the data were aggregated and new variables were created. A percentage 
measure was derived from all issues for which involvement was indicated by the 
respondent organisation relative to the total number of issues. 
Effective Participation. Effective participation was measured by two dependent 
variables: goal attainment and influence. 
Goal attainment. Goal attainment was measured by two items. The respondents were 
asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale (to “”far above expectations”). The 
averaged sum represented the overall measure for goal attainment. 
Influence. The level of influence of an organisation was measured by using the same set 
of ten partnership-related decision-making issues as described for involvement. For each 
issue it was asked to indicate whether the own organisation or any of the other partners 
have been influential on the decision about this issue. This measure represents an issue-
specific adaptation of Huang and Provan’s (2006) influence measure. Again, only those 
issues were counted as “influential” for which influence was confirmed by at least one 
partner. A percentage measure was created for confirmed influence relative to the total 
number of issues.  
Before testing our hypotheses, three groups of variables were factor-analysed: the 
objective resource measures, the in and out-degree centralities in the four partnership-
related interactions and the involvement in the decision-making. A principal component 
analysis (PCA) with subsequent orthogonal rotation and varimax solution was chosen 
for. When conceptually and statistically reasonable, sub-scales were created and the 
obtained regression scores were used in the following analysis25. The final list of 
variables measuring each concept is displayed in Table 3.1. 
                                                 
24 A description of the development of this list is provided in Appendix I. 
25 The results of the factor analyses can be reviewed in Tables IV.I-V of Appendix IV. 
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Table 3.1: Variables and definitions 
Variable Definition 
Resources: 





Regression score for factor one, representing the objective measure of seven resources: 
negotiation skills, relations to committees, reputation and reach, personal relations to 




Regression score for factor two, representing the objective measure of four resources: 
technological and scientific knowledge, project management experience, administrative 
capacities, financial means 
 Authority 
Regression score for factor three, representing the objective measure of three resources: 




Averaged self- and others perceived potential 








Averaged self- and others perceived potential 
Resource utility 
Sum of self-and others-perceived resource scores, each weighted by the partnership-





Normalised (for each partnership) confirmed in- and out degree centrality measures in the 
five partnership-related activities, described below: 
 Control 
Regression score for factor three, representing four centrality measures: in-degree 
reporting, out-degree resources, out-degree support, out-degree advise 
 Resources 
Regression score for factor four, representing four centrality measures: in-degree 






Percentage of an organisation’s confirmed involvement in the decision-making about the 
following five issues: partner selection, external monitoring, goal definition, resource 




Percentage of an organisation’s confirmed involvement in the decision-making about the 
following five issues: tasks and responsibilities, outcomes, internal monitoring, ownership 
and maintenance, definition of beneficiaries 




Percentage of an organisation’s confirmed influence on the decisions made about the 
following five issues: partner selection, external monitoring, goal definition, resource 




Percentage of an organisation’s confirmed influence on the decisions made about the 
following five issues: tasks and responsibilities, outcomes, internal monitoring, ownership 
and maintenance, definition of beneficiaries 
Goal attainment  
Averaged perception of individual  organisational productivity and goal attainment in the 
partnership. 
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3.5. Empirical results 
The descriptive statistics and mean comparisons for the whole sample are displayed for 
the partners and the intermediary organisations separately in Table 3.2. The results of the 
initial bivariate analysis testing the four hypotheses are presented in Tables 3.3. Each 
variable is listed in one of the groups representing the hypothesised concepts. 
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics and mean comparisons between partner and 
intermediary organisations 
 
 Intermediaries Partners    
 N = 38 N = 137    
Variable Mean Min Max S.D. Mean Min Max S.D. s.e. m.d. Sig.3 
Resources:            
Resources 
(unweighted) 
2,86 2 4 0,505 2,59 1 4 0,577 0,103 -0,270 n.s.1 
Relational 0,301 -3,984 2,001 1,193 -0,083 -4,118 2,230 0,926 0,181 -0,385 0,0352 
Administrative 0,685 -0,910 1,996 0,816 -0,190 -2,887 1,692 0,964 0,171 -0,875 0,0001 
Authority 0,233 -1,578 2,142 1,021 -0,064 -2,319 2,936 0,987 0,182 -0,297 n.s.1 
Production 
means 
2,27 0 4 0,867 2,51 0 5 1,107 0,194 0,236 n.s.1 
Manpower 2,54 0 4 0,977 2,72 0 5 1,175 -0,235 0,208 n.s.1 
Local knowledge 2,04 0 5 1,048 3,10 0 5 1,029 0,191 0,353 n.s.2 
Beneficiaries 2,07 0 4 0,957 2,73 0 5 0,935 0,169 0,264 n.s.2 
Resources utility 28,53 20 38 4,793 26,69 10 39 6,094 0,806 -1,84 n.s.2 
Positions:            
Involvement in 
interactions: 
           
Control  1,129 -1,126 6,635 1,212 -0,315 -1,590 3,129 0,647 0,204 -1,444 0,000 2 
Resource 0,062 -2,106 3,797 1,282 -0,017 -2,166 3,143 0,910 0,222 -0,079 n.s.2 
Involvement in 
decision-making: 
           
Design 0,836 0,25 1,00 0,198 0,562 0,20 1,00 0,275 0,046 -0,274 0,000 2 
Implementation 0,796 0,25 1,00 0,203 0,605 0,17 1,00 0,270 0,043 -0,192 0,000 2 
Effective 
Participation: 
           
Influence:            
Design 0,907 0,33 1 0,1607 0,389 0,00 1 0,359 0,040 -0,518 0,000 2 
Implementation 0,679 0,00 1 0,2743 0,573 0,00 1 0,346 0,053 -0,106 n.s. 2 
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Table 3.3: Correlation matrix: Whole sample 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Resources:         
1. Resources (unweighted) --        
2. Relational ,619** --       
3. Administrative ,497** ,000 --      
4. Authority ,457** ,000 ,000 --     
5. Production means ,532** ,095 ,272** ,089 --    
6. Manpower ,566** ,223** ,141 ,069 ,578** --   
7. Local knowledge ,427** ,163* -,018 -,069 ,137 ,351** --  
8. Beneficiaries ,325** ,004 -,013 ,142 ,093 ,305** ,479** -- 
9. Resource utility ,724** ,362** ,547** ,322** ,318** ,577** ,496** ,459** 
Positions:         
Involvement in interactions:         
10. Control ,169* ,100 ,297* ,098 ,035 -,147 -,041 -,149* 
11. Resources ,019 -,021 -,071 -,026 , 134 ,175* ,217* ,215 
Involvement in decision making:         
12. Design1 ,148 ,139 ,172* -,021 ,093 ,038 ,029 -,103 
13. Implementation1 ,197 ,105 ,180* -,015 ,129 ,122 ,125 -,015 
Effective Participation:         
Influence:         
14. Design ,273** ,114 ,298** ,089 ,038 ,032 ,100 ,059 
15. Implementation ,215** ,047 ,095 ,009 ,250* ,266** ,239** ,169 
16. Goal attainment ,156 ,212* ,134 -,035 ,001 ,134 ,171* ,140 
 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Resources:        
1. Resources (unweighted)        
2. Relational        
3. Administrative        
4. Authority        
5. Production means        
6. Manpower        
7. Local knowledge        
8. Beneficiaries        
9. Resource Utility --       
Positions:        
Involvement in interactions:        
10. Control ,200** --      
11. Resources ,233** ,597** --     
Involvement in decision making:        
12. Design1 ,168 ,167 ,260 --    
13. Implementation1 ,285** ,323** ,266** ,365** --   
Effective Participation:        
Influence:        
14. Design ,408** ,306** ,266** ,365** ,356** --  
15. Implementation ,261** ,308** ,417** ,479** ,336** ,415** -- 
16. Goal attainment: ,174* ,122 ,119 -,012 ,116 ,095 ,090 
*: significant at the 10% level 
**: significant at the 5% level 
***: significant at the 1% level 
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The descriptive statistics and mean comparisons between the intermediary and partner 
organisations show that the two groups significantly differ in the kinds of resources they 
potentially contribute and the activities they are involved. No significant differences 
were found with respect to the unweighted score and the resource utility score, and the 
level of influence on decisions about the implementation of partnerships and the level of 
goal attainment. One initial implication for the testing of our hypotheses is that 
intermediary organisations in partnerships are powerful in the sense that decision 
making, at least about the design of partnerships, seems to be to a large extent in their 
hands. Since the design of partnership entails i.e. the selection of partners and resource 
allocations, the eminent role of intermediaries in these decisions seems to indicate that 
the translation of resources into favourable positions, is subject to administrative 
decision-making rather than to horizontal, “functionally induced” dependencies (Huang 
& Provan, 2006).    
The first two hypotheses posited that the resources an organisation can potentially 
contribute to a partnership confer power through the dependencies created for other 
organisations and/or the fulfilment of the partnership task. The bivariate results show 
that the partnership specific measure of resource utility displays a stronger correlation 
with the positional measures and effective participation than the unweighted resource 
score. Significant are those differences for centrality in the control-related activities (α = 
5%, z = 2,643) and influence on the design of partnerships (α = 5%, z = -2,583). These 
findings demonstrate the more accurate data obtained from the partnership-specific 
perceptional measures and suggest resources to relate to advantageous positions and 
effective participation. The means comparisons show that intermediary organisations 
contribute the very resources that strongly correlate with the utility measure in the 
bivariate analysis. Both, their advantageous position as well as their resources hence, 
seem to strengthen the power of intermediary organisations relative to that of partners. 
Despite the difference in the nature of the resources potentially contributed by 
intermediary and partner organisations, their weighted resource utility scores do not 
significantly differ. Looking at the correlations between the resources and the utility 
score it appears that administrative resources, local knowledge, the representation of 
beneficiaries and manpower more strongly relate to the utility score than to the un-
weighted resource score. These resources and the partners who can access or control 
them hence, seem to benefit most from partnership-specific utility perceptions. Yet, only 
administrative resources, manpower and local knowledge at the same time show a direct 
significant positive relation to the positional measures and effective participation. In 
contrast, the representation of beneficiaries relates to none of the positional measures or 
to effective participation. Hence, this resource not only benefits from being perceived as 
valuable but also seems to most strongly depend on such a perception. Relational 
resources, authority, and production means display stronger correlations with the un-
weighted resource score than with the utility score and none of them directly relates to 
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one of the positional measures but yet to effective participation. The effect of these 
resources on effective participation, thus, seems relative invariant to utility perceptions 
and the need for enactment.  
In summary, the utility ascribed to resources seem to mediate the power of partners. 
However, different resources seem to relate to different degrees to favourable positions 
and effective participation. The potential of partners to capitalise on the utility of their 
resources in predominantly administrative decision-making contexts of the partnerships 
under study will be analysed in the following. To test our first two hypotheses, the direct 
effects of the unweighted and the weighted resource utility scores on all other variables 
were tested for only the partner organisations. This was done to control for the 
interaction between the resources and advantageous position induced by the intermediary 
organisations. Because the sample consisted of only 38 intermediary compared to 137 
partner organisations, it was not possible to test these assumptions on two equally sized 
groups. Table 3.4 displays the direct effects of the unweighted resource scores. 
The results of the multivariate analysis for only the partner organisations give a 
different picture of the relationship between resources and the positional and 
effectiveness measures, compared to the bivariate results including the intermediary 
organisations. None of the resources shows a direct significant effect on involvement in 
the decision-making processes but on favourable positions in the interactions among 
partners and on direct influence on decisions related to both, the design and the 
implementation of partnerships. While this does not mean that partners are not involved 
in decision-making processes, their resources show almost no discriminating effect. 
Administrative resources, authority and local knowledge show a slightly positive effect 
on involvement in the design of partnerships, and local knowledge and production means 
on involvement in decisions about the implementation of partnerships. The 
discriminating effect of the other resources on influence on these decisions seems to be 
indirect, that is without showing an equally strongly discriminating effect on 
involvement. For example, manpower shows no effect on involvement but on influence 
in the decisions about the implementation of partnerships. While the effects of relational 
resources, authority, and production means appear relative invariant to utility 
perceptions, those seem to explain the direct effects of the other resources. Thus, it was 
chosen to more rigorously test the mechanism that underlies these observed relationships 
via the inclusion of resource utility as the mediator variable26. Mediating models are 
tested for an effect of resource utility on each of the nine direct significant effects of the 
utility dependent resources (Table 3.5). 
                                                 
26 For an overview of further testing strategies applied to latent constructs See Baron and Kenny’s 




Table 3.4: Multiple regression results and zero-order correlations of positional measures and effective participation on all resources (only partners) 
  Independent variables: Resources   









Resource utility: beta ,078 ,496*** ,105 ,083 ,357*** ,242*** ,214** ,816*** ,648 
 R ,214 ,560*** ,102 ,389 ,566*** ,409*** ,305   
Positions:           
Involvement in interactions:           
Control beta ,061 ,212*** ,100 ,171 -,138 ,330*** -,270*** ,386*** ,102 
 R ,046 ,134 -,009 -131 -,134 ,129*** -,131***   
Resources beta -,105 -,119 -,056 -,162 ,325*** ,052 ,197** ,415*** ,127 
 R -,010 -,107 -,042 -,020 ,246*** ,240 ,307**   
Involvement in decision-making:           
Design beta ,061 ,235 ,226 ,013 ,013 ,215 -,107 ,342 ,017 
 R ,148 ,242 ,220 ,096 ,103 ,216 ,025   
Implementation beta ,052 ,125 -,092 ,129 ,015 ,175 ,036 ,283 ,009 
 R ,132 ,105 -,103 ,165 ,174 ,195 ,066   
Effective Participation:           
Influence:           
Design beta ,002 ,289* ,038 ,071 -,028 ,239* ,004 ,306* ,042 
 R ,038 ,227* ,019 ,118 ,138 ,270* ,196   
Implementation beta -,024 -,047 -,065 ,116 ,221* ,189* ,006 ,408*** ,119 
 R ,098 ,052 -,068 ,243 ,342* ,297* -,002   
Goal attainment beta ,106* ,204 -,053 ,155 ,108 ,216 ,027   
 R ,136* ,208 ,027 ,101 ,090 ,201 ,102   
* Underlined betas are in the hypothesised direction 
*     significant at the 10% level 
**   significant at the 5% level 
*** significant at the 1% level 
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Table 3.5: Mediating effect of resource-utility perception on the direct relationship 
between resources and positions and effective participation (only partners) 
 
Independent variable Dependent variable Effect beta s.e. Sobel Z 
XM 3,538 ,450 
Administrative resources Control 
XMY ,185 ,641 
0,288 
XM 3,538 ,450 
Administrative resources Influence: Design 
XMY ,304 ,345 
0,876 
XM 2,935 ,368 
Manpower Resources 
XMY ,231 ,892 
0,258 
XM 2,935 ,368 
Manpower Influence: Implementation 
XMY ,356 ,326 
1,079 
XY 2,425 ,465 
Local knowledge Control 
XMY ,172 ,642 
0,267 
XM 2,989 0,235 
Local knowledge Influence: Design 
XMY 0,398 0,189 
2,077 
XM 2,425 ,465 
Local knowledge Influence: Implementation 
XMY ,448 ,211 
1,964 
XM 2,395 ,522 
Representation of beneficiaries Resources 
XMY ,332 ,329 
0,314 
__  significant at the 5 % level (Sobel, 1982) 
 
The findings show that their utility, only significantly mediates the direct effect of the 
resources of local knowledge on influence in the design and the implementation of 
partnerships. The other direct resource effects remain significant with only marginal 
mediating effects. 
In summary, we can confirm our first two hypotheses. The extent to which partners 
are perceived to potentially have access to and control valuable resources has a positive 
effect on their power in partnerships. However, this effect holds only for some and not 
all resources and seems to follow different patterns. The utility attributed to the resources 
of partners was found to mediate their power, but only for some resources and not with 
regard to their involvement in the decision-making processes.  
While previous work found similar relations and discriminative effects of resources 
and involvement in the interactions between partners (Huang & Provan, 2006), further 
inquiry is needed to explain why no significant impact was found on the involvement of 
partners in decision-making processes. One explanation might be that utility perceptions 
are only one-sided. This could mean that partners who potentially access useful 
resources recognise them as such, whereas this perception is not shared by those who are 
in the position to involve them. It could also mean that although the utility of the 
resources of partners is acknowledged by others, the partners themselves do not share 
this perception. Since data was obtained from both sides, from the partners and the 
intermediary organisations in each of the partnerships, the average weights given to each 
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resource by the partners and by the intermediary organisations were compared through a 
paired sample test. 
 
Table 3.6: Paired samples test of resource utility assessments by partners and 
intermediaries 
 Partners Intermediaries 
Resource Rank Rank 
Financial means 3 6 
Production means 2 9 
Manpower 1 8 
Coercive power 18 16 
Licensing power 13 17 
Reputation/reach 17 14 
Beneficiaries 15 2 
Regional/local knowledge 4 7 
Administrative capacities 8 5 
Negotiation skills 6 12 
Project management experience 11 3 
Relation to decision-makers 12 10 
Relation to committees 10 13 
Relations to the public/media 14 15 
Personal relations to partners 7 4 
Political support 5 11 
Regional knowledge 9 1 





The utility scores ascribed to the resources significantly differ across the two groups. 
Intermediary organisations ascribe significantly higher utility to local resources and in 
particular to local knowledge and the representation of beneficiaries than partners do. 
Partners instead assign equally high levels of utility to the resources potentially provided 
by the intermediary organisations, but not in particular to their own resources and/or 
those valued highly by the intermediary organisations. This finding might explain why 
confirmation exists of a direct effect of resources on the level of influence of partners, 
but not on involvement. On the one hand, one could argue that resources can only confer 
power when they are perceived as such by those who can potentially enact them and 
demand to be involved in decision-making processes. On the other hand, one might 
apply a path-dependence argument and state that only when partners have experienced 
that their resources grant them favourable positions and control, do they recognise them 
as such in the future. 
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From the testing of the first hypotheses, it became clear that partners can be influential 
on the decisions about partnership design and implementation, although their resources 
show no discriminating effect on the participation in the decision-making processes. 
Intermediary organisations instead, display high levels of involvement in decision-
making processes but not always equally high levels of influence, in particular, not on 
decisions related to the implementation of partnerships. These findings strongly support 
a distinction between potential (preconditions) and enacted power and influence and/or 
goal attainment (Provan, 1980), and directly refer to our last two hypotheses about the 
interaction between resources and positions in their potential to impact on the effective 
participation of partners. To test these hypotheses the partner organisations were divided 
into groups on two counts: Firstly, according to their resource-related potential power, 
and secondly, with respect to their position, that is their involvement in the decision-
making processes of partnerships. 
The third hypothesis states that resources can convey power only if the organisations 
that can access them are in a position to enact them. We already know, however, that 
some resources confer influence to partners without their involvement in the decision-
making process. The question then becomes if involvement in partnership-related 
interactions and decision-making processes can still increase the chances for effective 
participation of partners. Following our hypothesis, the four positional measures should 
have a strong impact on the level of influence and the extent to which an organisation 
can attain its individual goals. To test this assumption, the weighted resource utility 
scores of all participants were normalised for each partnership and all partners were 
divided into two groups, with low and high potential resource power, respectively. The 
indicators for effective participation were regressed on the positional measures for each 
group separately. The unstandardised regression coefficients were compared across the 
two groups (Blalock, 1965).  
The findings displayed in Table 3.7, show that the positional measures significantly 
increase the chances for effective participation for both groups. However, advantageous 
positions seem to increase effective participation in partnerships, in particular for 
resource-wise less powerful groups. This is most likely because resource powerful 
partners already show high levels of influence and/or goal attainment, since their 
resources are acknowledged already. Resource-wise less powerful partners instead may 
increase the chances for their resources to be acknowledged by interaction and 
involvement in partnering processes. Specifically, a central position in the control-
related activities and involvement in the design of partnerships significantly increase the 
effectiveness of participation of resource-wise less powerful organisations. Resource-
wise powerful organisations seem to benefit from a central position in the resource-
related activities and in the implementation of partnerships, in which potentially less 




Table 3.7: Cross-sub-sample comparisons of regressions of effective participation on positions, between partners with high versus low 
resource power 
  Low potential power High potential power 
  N=72 N=64 
  Influence: Design 
Influence: 
Implementation 




Positions:        
Control /3 0,072 0,009 0,813 0,053 -0,051 -0,340 
 b 0,110 0,014 0,159 0,118 -0,127 -0,076 
 s.e. 0,077 0,075 0,401 0,061 0,050 0,443 
Resources /3 0,014 0,113 0,222 -0,069 0,104 0,126 
 b 0,032 0,260** 0,060 -0,196 0,335** 0,034 
 s.e. 0,055 0,054 0,479 0,055 0,041 0,537 
Involvement: Design /3 0,269 0,167 1,512 0,146 -0,022 1,218 
 b 0,386*** 0,240** 0,288** 0,187 -0,031 0,147 
 s.e. 0,081 0,079 0,649 0,114 0,092 1,204 
Involvement: Implementation /3 0,147 0,179 1,246 0,198 0,229 1,354 
 b 0,189 0,229* 0,189 0,192 0,251* 0,108 
 s.e. 0,101 0,099 0,867 0,161 0,131 1,894 
R  0,514*** 0,536*** 0,438** 0,336 0,500** 0,219 
Adjusted R2  0,264 0,288 0,192 0,113 0,250 0,048 
s.e.  0,308 0,308 2,459 0,353 0,287 3,707 
*     significant at the 10% level 
**   significant at the 5% level 
*** significant at the 1% level 
___ Indicates significant differences (p < .05) between parallel coefficients in the two sub-samples (Blalock, 1965) 
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The last hypothesis states that advantageous positions in partnerships result only in 
effective participation if partners access the decisive resources to substantiate their 
position (Jacobson & Cohen, 1986). To test this assumption, all partner organisations 
were again divided into two groups according to their involvement in the decision-
making processes of partnerships. This time all weighted resources were regressed on 
effective participation, for both groups, involved and not involved.  
 
Table 3.8: Cross-sub-sample comparisons of regressions of effective participation on 
potential resource power, between partners with and without positional power 
  Not involved Involved Not involved Involved 
  N= 59 N=70 N=31 N=89 
  Influence: Design Influence: Implementation 
Relational resources /3 ,109* -,024 ,007 -,016 
 b ,289* -,076 ,024 -,046 
 s.e. ,040 ,059 ,067 ,035 
Administrative 
resources 
/3 ,065 ,072 ,099 -,037 
 b ,177 ,221 ,265 -,124 
 s.e. ,071 ,049 ,122 ,038 
Authority /3 ,052 ,028 -,071 ,015 
 b ,139 ,084 -,185 ,049 
 s.e. ,058 ,042 ,088 ,032 
Manpower /3 -,061 ,110** ,178** ,009 
 b -,172 ,428** ,451** ,038 
 s.e. ,062 ,052 ,067 ,039 
Production means /3 -,106 ,119** -,057 ,088** 
 b -,260 ,477** -,133 ,353** 
 s.e. ,080 ,042 ,111 ,033 
Local knowledge /3 ,007 ,121** -,021 ,114** 
 b ,073 ,408** ,080 ,284** 
 s.e. ,052 ,012 -,068 ,038 
Beneficiaries /3 ,010 ,170* -,013 -,014 
 b ,027 ,207* -,035 -,046 
 s.e. ,058 ,052 ,092 ,038 
R  ,487* ,493** ,552 ,491** 
Adjusted R2  ,104* ,243** -,004 ,173** 
s.e.  ,305 ,296 ,370 ,251 
*     significant at the 10% level 
**   significant at the 5% level 
*** significant at the 1% level 
___ Indicates significant differences (p < .05) between parallel coefficients in the two sub-samples (Blalock, 1965) 
 
 
The findings displayed in Table 3.8, indicate that indeed resources have a 
discriminating effect on the effective participation of those partners involved in the 
decision-making processes. However, not all resources have this effect. While local 
knowledge, the representation of beneficiaries and production means show such an 
effect, when partners are involved administrative resources. Authority and relational 
resources display no or even slightly negative effects in case of involvement. In addition, 
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relational resources show a strong positive effect in the case of no involvement in the 
decisions about design, while manpower displays the same effect on the implementation 
of partnerships. This finding further supports the initial assumption that so-called 
“discursive resources” gain weight by interaction and involvement, whereas already 
“institutionalised” resources remain effective bases of power, regardless of their 
involvement and enactment in partnering processes.  
 
 
3.6. Conclusion and discussion 
This study set out to examine some of the basic tenets and underlying mechanisms of 
inter-organisational power in the empirical context of development partnerships. The 
findings confirm that the two main components of potential power, resources and 
positions, both represent bases for effective participation in partnerships. At the same 
time, the findings reveal several limitations to the present understanding of the 
functioning of bases of power, in particular in their interplay in the specific context of 
development partnerships. 
Following the structure of this chapter, it will first discuss the two main findings 
presented in the first part of the analysis. The potential of partners to gauge power via 
their resources turned out to have discriminating effects on their positions in partnership-
level interactions and on their effective participation. Yet, no comparable effects were 
found for their involvement in the decision-making processes; and this despite their 
acknowledgement as valuable for other partners and/or for the partnership task. Similar 
to previous studies (Huang & Provan, 2006) the findings indicate that involvement and 
favourable positions in the interactions between partners partially depend on the kind of 
resources they bring to a partnership. In the present study, factor analysis showed that 
partnership-level interactions can be divided. On the one hand, into activities related to 
resources acquisition, receiving support and advice. On the other hand, into activities 
aiming at gaining control, while giving resources, support and advice. This finding 
seems to describe the rather “typical” pattern of interactions between foreign 
intermediaries and local partners. Yet, central positions in the control-related interactions 
were not only explained by administrative resources, such as financial means, project 
management capacities and experience, but also by local knowledge, thus a divide 
between local and foreign partners with respect to their involvement in control-related 
activities is not supported.   
Seen in the light of the overall population of organisations involved in the study 
however, it becomes apparent that the initiatives target and attract specific groups of 
local partners, by being largely directed at co-financing and harnessing private capital 
for development27. Other local resources, which showed comparably high utility scores, 
                                                 
27 See: EUEI (2003) and EUWI (2006) 
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such as the representation of beneficiaries, displayed a significant negative effect on 
involvement in the control-related activities and almost no effect on involvement and 
influence on the decisions about neither the design nor the implementation of 
partnerships. These findings demonstrate that although resources may be recognised and 
acknowledged as useful and valuable in partnerships, an effective translation into 
positions and effective participation does not come true for all resources, e.g. beneficiary 
representation. Since knowledge exchange and capacity building of recipients are seen as 
decisive for partnership effectiveness when such groups are involved (Brinkerhoff, 
2002b; Brown & Ashman, 1996; Derkzen & Bock, 2007; Thomas, 1996), the findings 
lead to the question where governance interventions may best address the functioning of 
bases of power of such groups in development partnerships.  
The second part of this study hypothesised the possible effects of governance 
interventions on the effective participation of partners through the interplay between the 
two components of potential power, resources and positions. Controlling for the 
resource-related potential power of partners, the findings showed that involvement in 
partnership processes indeed increases the chances for effective participation, in 
particular for resource-wise less powerful partners. This finding indicates that in the case 
of a lack of resource knowledge and institutionalisation (Entwistle et al., 2007) amplified 
interactions and involvement in partnering processes, in particular in the control-related 
activities and in the decisions about the design of partnerships can increase the chances 
for effective participation. On the contrary, when controlling for actual involvement, it 
was demonstrated that resources, which most strongly depend on their perception as 
valuable do not automatically lead to advantageous positions and effective participation 
but benefit most from their involvement and probably enactment in decision-making 
processes.  
The implications for governance interventions aiming at creating the conditions for 
effective partnerships are twofold. First, contrary to what was expected based on the 
findings about broad but ineffective participation, the present findings show that once 
partners get involved in decision making processes, less institutionalised resources can 
be successfully enacted and show a discriminating effect on effective participation. 
Second, since involvement and favourable positions do not automatically evolve from 
valuable resources, addressing this issue by governance interventions that enable broader 
and systematic involvement in particular in decisive processes, such as control-related 
activities and decision-making about the initial design of partnerships, can be seen as an 
adequate governance response. More generally, such a response represents an important 
contribution to an institutionalisation of bases of power in diversely resourced 
partnerships and inter-organisational domains (Gray, Bougon, & Donnellon, 1985). 
Resources may be seen as valuable. Yet, such perceptions are of only limited use if 
resources do not function as bases of power and translate into favourable positions for 







Governing Development: A qualitative comparative 
Analysis of the Relationship between Partnership-level 








In theory, the adoption of certain ways of governing inter-organisational partnerships 
depends on several factors. For practitioners, past experience, personal preferences and 
discretion in their decisions may determine this choice. On the other hand, this choice 
may depend on the conditions practitioners encounter in partnerships, such as its size, 
the extent to which trust and goals are shared and compatible among participants, and 
the magnitude of environmental and task-related requirements. In the context of 
international development cooperation, it is emphasised that challenges that arise from 
unbalanced power relations and the complexity of a partnering environment require 
adequate governance responses.  
This qualitative-comparative analysis explores the relationship between the presence 
and absence of these conditions and the governance forms adopted by development 
partnerships. Going beyond the analysis of single cases, the findings confirm that 
different partnership-level conditions relate to different governance modes across 38 
development partnerships. The combined presence or absence of these conditions mark a 
distinction in particular with respect to the adoption of shared over brokered governance. 
Part of the explanation for this distinction can be derived from considerations of 
effectiveness in the context of international development cooperation, which, at the same 
time, are reflective of changes in the potential constituencies and actor-configurations in 
this field of partnership operation today. 
 
                                                 
28 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Academy of Management Annual 
Conference 2010 in Montreal, Canada. 




Approximately 18% of the world population have no access to safe drinking water, more 
than double that figure lack adequate sanitation (Rowan, 2009) and around 1.6 billion 
people do not have access to electricity with the vast majority of these people living in 
developing countries (Thirlwall, 2007; UN, 2007). In 2002, at the Johannesburg World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), governments restated their support for 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to halve the number of people lacking 
access to safe water, adequate sanitation and energy by 2015. 
In the past, such large-scale international efforts usually were undertaken by bilateral 
and multilateral agreements between states (Stewart & Gray, 2006). Yet, since the birth 
of modern “development management” in the fifties and sixties (cf. Robinson et al., 
2000) partnerships between a wide array of organisations, non-governmental, non- and 
more recently for-profit organisations, from the global South and North, became the 
prevalent means for implementing development efforts. Nowadays, nearly one third of 
official development assistance (ODA) is allocated to such partnership initiatives 
(Rochlin et al., 2008). While the over-arching goals are still being directed by bilateral 
and multilateral frameworks for cooperation (Dearden & Salama, 2003; Hope, 2003) the 
implementation of partnerships is set and done on-site by the partners (Mommers & Van 
Wessel, 2009). 
Previous research has demonstrated the challenges that arise from building and 
sustaining effective partnerships, given on the one hand, the differences between 
partners in organisational skills, resources, cultures, and agendas (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; 
Fowler, 1998; Mahanty, Yasmi, Guernier, Ukkerman, & Nass, 2009) and on the other 
hand, the challenges posed by highly uncertain operational environments (Brinkerhoff, 
2002b). Little is known however, about how partnerships are designed, implemented and 
governed by practitioners in order to tackle these issues (Bornstein, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 
2002b). This is partly due to the fact that apart from donor and funding requirements 
(Abers, 2007) almost no legal imperatives for the governance of partnerships exist 
(Provan & Kenis, 2008). Yet associated with pronounced pressures to enhance 
partnership accountability (Rochlin et al., 2008) and effectiveness (Brinkerhoff, 2002a), 
questions about their governance have increasingly gained attention.  
One of the most recent arguments in the public-management literature is that different 
partnership governance modes vary in the extent to which they represent adequate 
responses to different partnership conditions (Provan & Kenis, 2008). This preliminary 
argument of a relationship between governance fit to partnership-level conditions, 
however, has so far not been applied to partnerships in the context of international 
development cooperation yet. Since the criteria for defining adequate governance 
responses, in this area of operation as in any other area, are an evolving subject among 
practitioners and scholars alike (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Rochlin et al., 2008), the primary 
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concern of the present study is to explore the relevant conditions that may result in the 
adoption of a specific governance form. The study seeks to answer the following 
question:  What are the relevant partnership-level conditions that can explain the 
adoption of a particular governance forms by development partnerships? 
 
 
4.2 Theoretical background 
The focus of the present study is on field-level partnerships in international development 
cooperation. In this context, development partnerships are inter-organisational 
collaborations, involving all kinds of organisations, from the global North and South, to 
implement development efforts on the ground29. Development partnerships mostly 
derive from the initiatives of larger donor and governments (cf. Robinson, Hewitt & 
Harriss, 2000) aiming to (co-)finance the development initiatives of NGOs, businesses, 
local or other national governments that seek to jointly address or develop 
complimentary or shared development goals. Development partnerships typically entail 
many kinds of partners and address many kinds of issues, ranging from small dyadic 
projects (e.g. Ashman, 2001a), to large-scale national or cross-border infra-structure 
projects, involving several public and private parties (Bell & Park, 2006; Carter & 
Danert, 2003; Gentry & Fernandez, 1998; Maviya & Munyai, 2005; Muller, 2003; 
Sherwill et al., 2007; Suleiman, Van Well, & Gustafsson, 2008). Inherently diverse in 
the issues addressed and the actors involved, partnerships in international development 
cooperation nonetheless share some common characteristics and challenges to effective 
collaboration that require adequate governance responses as in any other area of 
partnership operation, such as the co-existence of different individual-organisational and 
over-arching development goals, interests and resources (e.g. Brinkerhoff, 2002b). 
Hence, the concepts operationalised in this study are drawn from two bodies of 
literature. Firstly, there is the governance of collaborations, partnerships and networks 
(Gray, 1989; Gray & Wood, 1991; Huang & Provan, 2007; Jones et al., 1997; Kickert et 
al., 1997a; Provan  et al., 1980; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Raab & Kenis, 2009). The 
second is specifically on international development cooperation (Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff, 2006; Cooke, 2003; Cooke, 2004; Thomas, 2007)30 and the governance and 
management of partnerships therein (Ashman, 2001a, b; Awortwi, 2004; Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 1999; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 
2002a; Dolan & Opondo, 2005; Johnson & Wilson, 2006; Morse & McNamara, 2006; 
Patel, 2001). 
                                                 
29 Distinct to multilateral and bilateral partnership agreements (e.g.. EPAs). 
30 All four facets of development management as ‘means to institutional agendas’, ‘toolkit’, 
‘process’ and ‘values’ (cf. Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2005) are acknowledged and 
incorporated where possible in the conceptual thinking of this dissertation. 
 




The concept of partnership governance is used in many different ways including 
informal and formal rules, agreements, structures and norms as well as leadership-styles 
and interventions (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Armistead et al., 2007). Following Simon’s 
(1946) plea for an empirical approach rather than using pre-defined typologies and 
classifications, the combination of two, a structural-analytical (see for instance: Jones et 
al., 1997) and a governance perspective (Ansell & Gash, 2007), as proposed by Provan 
and Kenis (2008), was found to be the most coherent way of accessing the concept. The 
latter perspective draws attention to different leadership styles and interventions in the 
design and implementation of partnerships (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001a; Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003; Ashman, 2000; Bryson & Crosby, 2005; Derkzen et al., 2008). The 
former perspective offers the incorporation of structural partnership-level characteristics 
as analytical devices which can be utilised to evaluate variation in the structures that 
underlie partnership interactions and decision-making processes (Milward & Provan, 
1995). In combination, both perspectives can systematically be employed for a 
comprehensive evaluation of different governance modes and to explore their adoption 
in the presence of different partnership-level conditions. 
Proceeding from this combined approach, Provan and Kenis (2008) distinguish three 
“ideal” forms of partnership governance; shared governance, a lead-organisation model 
and the NAO form along the two dimensions. First, the structural dimension indicates 
the level of brokerage as the extent to which decision-making, coordination, interactions 
and control are shared/decentralised and or centralised/concentrated among partners. 
Second, the governance dimension encompasses several interventions on behalf of 
practitioners, for example, whether the partnership is participant governed by one of the 
direct partners or externally governed by an extra organisational entity or partnership 
brokers that are specifically assigned with the governance task (Warner, 2003). While 
shared and lead-organisation governance can be regarded as the two extremes of the 
structural dimension (cf. Figure 4.1), the NAO form introduces several governance 
interventions that may supplement and/or explain the occurrence of structural relations 
in partnerships.    
 
Governance structures 
Shared governance is described as the collective of partners themselves governing the 
partnership and its external representation, with no distinct governing body or brokering 
staff involved. Although some activities may be performed by only some members, 
decision-making power is more or less balanced among the majority of partners. Lead-
organization governed partnerships instead, show asymmetric internal governance 
relations (cf. Figure 4.1). Main activities are coordinated and decided by one or only a 
few leading organisation(s) who administer the partnership’s operations and facilitate the 
collaborative process towards the partnership’s goals that ergo are often closely linked to 
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their own organisational goals (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The lead-organisation’s 
responsibilities may include budget raising and administration and taking responsibility 
for liabilities towards external donors (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Lead organisations may be 
selected by partners or mandated by these external instances.  
In theory, shared governance is most strongly promoted by development scholars and 
practitioners alike (Fowler, 1998). On the one hand, since shared governance reflects 
upon values of equality in partnerships (Thomas, 2007). On the other hand, because 
shared governance is seen as an effective catalyst for capacity building (James, 2001), 
knowledge transfer (Johnson & Wilson, 2006) and therefore argued to increase 
ownership among partners and the sustainability of outcomes (Abers, 2007; Brown & 
Ashman, 1996; Craig & Mayo, 1995). Yet, albeit an intrinsic theoretical value ascribed 
to this governance form, in particular in development (Finsterbusch & Van Wicklin II, 
1987), its core principles may in practice run counter to control-oriented, effectiveness 
and not-least efficiency considerations (Ingle & Shpresa, 2007). The lead organisation 
governance model instead frequently evolves directly from funding requirements or from 
the bottleneck function of intermediary organisations that channel funds from donors to 
recipients through partnerships (Sanyal, 2006). Although such clearly contoured funding 
and control relations to only one or a few organisations are desirable for donors, 
questions arise about how lead organisations share power and control and facilitate 
capacity-building and exchange among partners (Brinkerhoff, 1999). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Shared versus lead-organisation governance31 
 
Governance interventions 
The first two forms, shared and lead-organisation governance describe two extremes of 
the structural dimension. The third, the NAO form of governance instead, posits some 
interventions that directly target the design and herewith the development of those 
underlying relational structures of partnerships. This form is characterised by a network 
                                                 
31 Adapted from Kenis & Provan (2008) 
Partnership-level Conditions and the Adoption of Governance Forms 
76 
 
administrative organisation (NAO) that is an entity specifically assigned with or set up 
for the purpose of governing the partnership. A NAO may be a separate organisational 
body or just one or a few partnership-brokers (Rondinelli & London, 2003; Warner, 
2003). All partnership-level operations and decisions are centralised around this entity, 
supplemented by reciprocal monitoring structures, for example, with respect to 
partnership-level strategic as opposed to operational decisions, which are left to the 
NAO (Provan & Kenis, 2008). In contrast to the first two governance forms hence, the 
NAO form introduces several interventions into the conceptual framework, e.g. a 
separation of operative from strategic partnership-level decisions, a centralisation of the 
management and coordination of external partnership representation and relationships 
and a supplementation of the governing entity by reciprocal control structures. In a 
development context, such external governance bodies are often established by donors or 
governments for the purpose of coordinating numbers of or larger sized partnership 
initiatives (Abers, 2007), for example, for sector-wide aid programming and integration 
(e.g. Bornstein, 2003; Mommers & Van Wessel, 2009).  
Yet, while the interventions introduced by the NAO governance form in Provan & 
Kenis’ (2008) framework put a strong focus on control-related measures, development 
scholars emphasise the need for “enabling” interventions aiming at relationship and 
trust-building in partnerships (e.g. Ashman, 2000), through e.g. learning, knowledge 
transfer and capacity building (Jakimow, 2008; Johnson, 2007; Johnson & Wilson, 2006; 
Marra, 2004; Porter, 2003). Those kinds of interventions have largely been neglected by 
public-administrative models of partnership governance (Bryson et al., 2006) but have 
received a great deal of attention as a governance response in the development literature 
(Hastings, 1999), in particular in the face of often vast differences in power between 
partners (e.g. Ashman, 2000).      
Yet, the structural forms and interventions described in the above merely represent 
“ideal” type of governance responses, which can be adopted in practise, alone or in 
combination for a variety of reasons. Without knowing the specific situation that 
practitioners will encounter in a partnership, no single model can be regarded as the 
ultimate choice (Provan & Kenis, 2008). However, partnership design and 
implementation frequently are pursued at some degree of discretion by development 
practitioners (cf. Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Rochlin et al., 2008) who may base their choice for 
a specific governance form or intervention on their experience and their evaluation of the 
presence or absence of certain partnership-level conditions.  
 
Partnership-level conditions 
A multitude of factors have been proposed in the literature to potentially influence the 
adoption of governance modes by practitioners within the realm of recommendations for 
‘best partnership practice’ (Rochlin et al., 2008). Yet, comparative data across a number 
of partnerships are mostly compiled by larger donor agencies and governments looking 
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at favourable factors of what Brinkerhoff (2002a) calls the ‘indirect partnering 
environment’, such as the choice for recipient countries (Collier & Dollar, 2004) on the 
basis of their economic, political and socio-cultural stability and relation to donors’ 
interests (Migdal, 1988). Rarely however, such data comes under scrutiny for systematic 
scholarly assessment (Selsky & Parker, 2005) of the influence factors that reside at the 
inter-organisational-level and may inform the governance of inter-organisational 
relations (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). 
A multitude of potential influence factors can be generated from the literature (for an 
overview see: Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Provan and Kenis (2008) establish such linkages for 
four conditions: partnership size, trust, goal compatibility and consensus and the need for 
partnership-level competencies. Development scholars identify, in particular, differences 
in power between partners (Ashman, 2000; Thomas, 1998) as an internal factor and the 
complexity of the operational environments of partnerships (Brinkerhoff, 2002) as 
external challenges that require adequate governance responses. On this basis, the 
conditions examined in the present study are presented and their theoretical linkages to 
the governance forms and interventions are explored.  
 
Size 
Even though myriads of potential development partners, such as international agencies, 
local and foreign NGOs, community organisations, private and state-owned providers 
and public agencies, result in high levels of complexity characterising even smaller or 
dyadic partnerships (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Eweje, 2007; Ashman, 2001a; Ashman, 
2001b), this further increases by the number of partners involved (Faerman, McCaffrey 
& Van Slyke, 2001). At a certain size, face-to-face contacts become less feasible, in 
particular in international development cooperation, where partners are geographically 
widely spread and shared decision-making and horizontal interactions result in high 
transaction costs and partnership inefficiency (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Hence, the more 
general argument in the literature is made in favour of the adoption of brokered 
governance forms when size, organisational diversity and geographic diversification, 
increase complexity and at the same time decrease the chances for horizontal 
coordination (Faerman, McCaffrey & Van Slyke, 2001). 
 
Trust 
The relational concept of inter-organisational trust (cf. Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 
1998) has so far mainly been applied to the dyadic level (e.g. Gulati & Nickerson, 2008) 
where high levels of trust imply that not all partners trust all other partners but those with 
whom they share previous partnering experience (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). 
Conceptualised at the partnership-level, Provan and Kenis (2008) argue that if trust is 
found pervasive throughout a partnership, shared governance will be chosen, since 
autonomous governance forms are more likely to emerge from voluntary commitments 
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(Rondinelli, 2003) and shared collaborative pasts (Gulati, 1998; Li, Eden, Hitt, & 
Ireland, 2008). In addition, it is argued that shared governed partnerships are less 
formalised through control structures compared to brokered ones (Milward, Provan, 
Fish, Isett, & Huang, 2009). Control structures may function as a substitute for low or 
fragmented trust in partnerships (Reed, 2001). Yet, if trust is present, they may be 
considered unnecessary (Tomlinson, 2005). 
 
Goal agreement 
The extent to which goals are compatible among partners and with the overall objective 
of a partnership is crucial for the definition of a partnership’s governance task (Nijhof, 
de Bruijn, & Honders, 2008; Provan et al., 2004a; Provan, Veazi, Teufel-Shone, & 
Huddleston, 2004b). Partnering processes are more easily coordinated and governed and 
partners are more likely to be involved and committed when there is a general agreement 
on the goals of the collaborative endeavour (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Yet, development 
partnerships are often sites of contestation and resistance (Bornstein, 2003) characterised 
by differences in values and involving deeply held beliefs (Thomas, 2007). Hence, even 
when organisations work on the same issue partners may disagree not only over how to 
best pursue the partnership’s objectives, but also more fundamentally, over how these 
objectives are precisely understood and defined to function as “resources for collective 
action” (Gray et al., 1985:85). The extent to which a partnership builds on an alignment 
of interests and goals or to which partnership governance needs to facilitate processes of 
co-definition makes different governance forms more or less suitable. When goals and 
interests are less clear and there is only little consensus, leadership may be provided by 
brokered governance rather than by autonomous forms (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Yet, 
authentic processes of co-defining goals and objectives require mutuality and reciprocal 
control (Bryson & Crosby, 2005) as proposed by shared governance and the NAO form. 
 
Power 
Previous research has shown that there are challenges in building and sustaining 
development partnerships given differences in, e.g. organisational skills, resources and 
assets; or what some refer to as power differentials between partners (Fowler, 1998; 
Lister, 2000; Mahanty et al., 2009; Provan et al., 2004a). Power relations apply and 
manifest at many different levels and stages of a collaboration (cf. Chapter 2 of this 
volume) and their governance can take various forms. Scholars distinguish interventions 
aiming at changing perceptions of mutuality and equality among partners through 
relationship and trust building from those that address structural barriers to mutuality 
(Ashman, 2000) through rights-based approaches that grant involvement, voice and 
control to partners (Bryson & Crosby, 2005; Bryson et al., 2006; Cooke & Kothari, 
2002; Craig & Mayo, 1995; Dar & Cooke, 2008; Elbers, 2010; Elbers & Schulpen, 2010; 
Ingle & Shpresa, 2007). With respect to the two-dimensional governance 
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conceptualisation of Provan and Kenis (2008) power differences between partners seem 
to require both, enabling interventions, relationship and trust building and horizontal 
coordination, mutual decision-making and reciprocal control. Horizontal structures 
characterise the shared governance model. Yet, to arrive at such structures in the face of 
power differences mechanism and interventions seem to be required that make power 
sharing possible in the first place (Bryson & Crosby, 2005, 2006). Such interventions 
may be more likely be introduced and sustained by a broker or governing instance 
separate from the direct partners such as proposed by the NAO rather than by the lead 
governance model. 
 
Need for partnership-level competencies 
Apart from the abovementioned internal factors, the nature of the task and its external 
environment define another essential part of the conditions that need to be considered 
when designing and implementing a partnership. Previous research highlighted, in 
particular, the management of external funds as a major source of environmental 
uncertainty (Milward & Provan, 1995). Proceeding from the argument that in the face of 
high funding uncertainty, centralised coordination much easier and faster responds to 
donor requests and pressures, choice may be made for brokered governance rather than 
shared governance. In particular, when the aim is to create centralised external 
representation to convey reliability and enhance external perceptions of partnership 
legitimacy and accountability (Provan & Milward, 2001). 
Though frequently desired by governments and donors, especially in the development of 
sector-wide service structures, research has shown (e.g. Mahanty et al., 2009; Mommers 
& Van Wessel, 2009) that it is rather difficult to build such legitimate external 
representation (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004). On the one hand, difficulties can arise 
from a lack of internal acceptance of a central entity by the partners (Provan & Kenis, 
2008). On the other hand, several studies point out factors of the development context 
that may be ‘hostile’ rather than conducive to effective partnering (Brinkerhoff, 
2002b:25-46), such as a lack of embeddedness of the partnership’s objectives into local 
development agendas (e.g. Ndandiko, 2006), a general absence of strong public and/or 
private sector institutions (Adams & Hastings, 2001; European Commission, 2002; 
European Council, 2002), an unsystematic and ad-hoc introduction of partnerships and 
replacement of existing governance structures (e.g. Bontenbal, 2009; Desai, 1998; 
Ebrahim, 2004) and resulting uncertain or even hostile rather than cooperative 
relationships with beneficiary communities (e.g. Franks & Cleaver, 2007). Until a 
necessary level of legitimacy is established by the partnership or by a central entity 
representing the partnership, existing relations of individual partners with external 
stakeholders may be enhanced and strengthened, rather than replaced by a centralised 
partnership representation (Elliott, 1987). 
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Two more general arguments can be derived from previous study into the adoption of 
governance structures and interventions in the face of different partnership conditions 
(cf. Provan & Kenis, 2008). First, the more challenging the conditions that describe a 
partnership, for example, when goals are not specified or trust is not widely dispersed, 
the more likely seems the adoption of brokered instead of shared governance. Second, 
between brokered governance forms, the NAO model seems more sustainable in face of 
challenging conditions, since a separate entity or broker provides coordination, decreases 
the likelihood for conflict between partners and between partnership-level and individual 
interests and at the same time by supplementing reciprocal control structures  increases 
mutuality and autonomy within the partnership.   
These straightforward assumptions however, seem to be challenged by the specific 
context of partnerships in international development cooperation. On the one hand, by 
the likely presence of power differentials and the fundamental intricacies of the 
operating environments of development partnerships, and on the other hand, by the 
strong emphasis on governance interventions aiming at mutuality through learning, trust 
and relationship building. A systematic assessment of partnership-level conditions may 
help gaining a more nuanced understanding of the relevant drivers for the adoption of 
specific form of partnership governance. Further, it can be assumed that not the presence 
or absence of only one of the proposed partnership-level conditions or governance 
structures and interventions alone but their interplay explains the adoption of a specific 
governance form (Provan & Kenis, 2008). For example, while power imbalances in 
partnerships may object to the idea of consensus and shared goals, reciprocal control 
granted to partners may gauge ownership, avoid conflict and merely a directive of 
objectives (Stewart & Gray, 2006). Alternatively, depending on the issue area what is 
being attempted by a partnership may not be the subject to overwhelming controversy 
and power play so that installing a brokering instance (Ashman, 2001a) may be 
considered unnecessary even between unequal partners (Thomas, 1998). The focus of 
the present study hence is on the combination of factors that can explain the adoption 
and choice for a certain partnership governance form over another. To explore and 
identify these configurations, 38 development partnerships have been analysed via a 
comparative case analysis. Institutional background on the sample, the data collection 













Case comparisons across 38 partnerships were conducted via a comparative qualitative 
analysis in order to accomplish the goal of the inquiry of the chapter that is, seeking to 
devise partnership-level explanations of the phenomenon of the adoption of partnership 
governance forms.  
 
Institutional background 
Inter-organizational collaboration receives peculiar attention in contemporary aid 
policies and practice (Robinson, Hewitt & Harriss, 2000). It has been argued that 
infrastructure and national and cross-national resource management and service 
provision, in particular, will increasingly be implemented by inter-organizational 
development partnerships (Bayliss, 2003; Bell & Park, 2006; Sherwill et al., 2007; 
Suleiman et al., 2008). The EU, collectively, the world’s largest provider of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) (i.e. Rowan, 2009), states that while for some funds 
mandatory, generally, “[F]orming strategic partnerships is recommended as a first and 
key step in ensuring innovative and effective project design and implementation” 
(EUWI, 2006:1). 
In 2005, the EU committed itself to doubling its current level of ODA by 2010 and 
spent EUR 6.2 billion on the delivery of development aid. At the same time, the EU and 
its member states signed the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (OECD, 2005) and 
endorsed a tripartite development policy, the European Consensus on Development (EU, 
2005). In its annual aid strategy, the EU stated its objective to scale up its contribution to 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). By 2004, as part of this objective, the 
allocation of a total amount of € 500 million to an EU Water Facility in the ACP 
(African-Caribbean-Pacific) region was decided to be financed by the conditional €1 
billion from the Ninth European Development Fund (EDF). Via two tender competitive 
calls for proposals, in 2005 and 2006, this facility co-financed with a total € 420 million, 
175 partnerships concerning issues of sustainable water generation, provision, and 
sanitation. Through the first call32 for another facility, this time dedicated to the 
development and provision of sustainable energy in the ACP region, in total 75 
partnership projects were co-financed by the EU with a total budget of € 220 million in 
2005. 
The data for this study were drawn from 38 of the partnerships that received financing 
from the two facilities. We focused on these partnerships for reasons of comparability: 
Firstly, there is comparability in terms of the issue areas the partnerships operate in, 
since water, sanitation and energy, all closely relate to service delivery and national and 
cross-border resource management (Rowan, 2009). Secondly, this way we were able to 
ensure a main donor design, since “the diversity of partnership approaches is less 
                                                 
32 A new call for proposals was launched by the Energy Facility on the 30th of November 2009. 
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indicative of the varied developing country contexts than it is of the numerous, often 
overlapping, and sometimes contradicting donor initiatives promoted” (Brinkerhoff, 
2002b: 13). Thirdly, the choice lies with respect to the duration of the partnerships from 
their inception (2004-2006) to the point of data collection (September 2008-May 2009), 
since variation can be assumed to affect the adoption of and changes in governance form 
(Milward et al., 2009). Finally, the choice lies with respect to the organisations involved, 




In order to obtain information with regard to the concepts of partnership conditions and 
governance, data was collected from 38 development partnerships operating in and 
across 19 different African and Caribbean countries. All 250 applicant organisations 
which had successfully applied and were eligible for funds21 from the two facilities, the 
EUWF and the EUEF, were contacted and asked for participation, explaining the 
purpose and procedure of the study. Forty-nine of those direct implementing partners34 
indicated their interest resulting in an initial response rate of almost 20%. These 
intermediary organisations were asked to provide the contacts of all their local and 
foreign partner organisations participating in the specific project. The total of 249 
organisations were contacted, asked for participation and, if interested, requested to 
choose between three ways of taking part in this study: i) to complete an online 
questionnaire which was provided in English and French ii) to receive a printed version 
of the questionnaire or iii) to indicate a time and date and preferred language for a 
telephone interview. Questionnaire and interview guidelines were provided for each 
organisation and each partnership individually. The collection of relational data was 
required to individualise most of the items. Of further implication from this process is 
that only those partnerships can be included of which all partners completed the 
questionnaire or participated in the interviews (Provan et al., 2007). Eventually, such 
complete data sets were obtained for 38 partnerships, involving in total 175 
organisations, which is a sufficient number for the first step towards generalising 
findings across partnerships (Ibid.). 
This conservative approach results in the response rate of only 15,2% (of the total 
number of 250 partnerships that received EU co-financing) for this study, which is not 
surprising however, in the face of generally low response rates from quantitative studies 
                                                 
33  For a detailed description of funding requirements and an overview of all selected proposals see 
for the Energy Facility:  
     http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/energy/index_en.htm 
     and for the Water Facility: 
     http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/water/index_en.htm 
34  Distinctive from operational partners with no direct funding obligations (Mommers & Van  
Wessel, 2009) 
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in a development context (Brunetti et al., 1998; Bulmer & Warwick, 2001; Devereux & 
Hoddinott, 1992; Warren et al., 2000). Moreover, the extensive reporting requirements 
of study participants receiving publicly provided funds understandably limited their 
willingness to get involved in yet another inquiry. A non-response analysis conducted on 
the base of the data published by the main donor showed no significant selection effects 
with respect to the region of operations of the partnerships, their budget size, or the 
regional affiliation and type of the intermediary organisations (see Appendix III for an 
overview of the results of this analysis). 
Multiple sources were employed to gather case information (Yin, 2008). After the first 
data was collected and analysed, this information was complemented by document 
studies on the basis of publications and project reports, resulting in a detailed case 
description for each partnership. When further questions arose, these documents were 
used to guide follow-up telephone interviews, which were conducted with ten 
organisations. The vast majority of data, however, originated from the organizational 
questionnaire and telephone interviews. Originally in English, the items were translated 
into French and four other languages (Italian, Spanish, Arabic and Amharic) for the 
telephone interviews.  
 
Measurements 
In this study, the concepts of partnership governance and partnership conditions are 
measured for each partnership through the perspectives of the intermediary and all their 
partner organisations. Even though the two perspectives may sometimes diverge, by 
combining both, the aim is to gain a more complete understanding of the proposed 
conditions and the adoption of governance modes.  
 
The dependent variable: partnership governance 
Partnership governance is measured via two components: structures and interventions. 
Governance structures are evaluated through the network-analytic part of the survey, 
which is presented and answered by all participants. Those are then supplemented by 
adding a set of items which are administered only to the intermediary organisations, 
asking about specific governance interventions, such as, is there one present, the lead 
and administrative organisation’s status, and if support and assistance were given to 
partners to be able to fully participate in the partnership. 
Partnership integration and centralisation. First, the structural governance properties 
of the partnerships are analysed. For this exercise, two complementary sub-concepts are 
evaluated based on the network analytic data: partnership integration and centralisation; 
which are computed, following Milward and Provan (1995), separately for the 
partnership (integration) and for the most central organisation (centralisation), 
respectively. 
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Four partnership-related activities define the relational structures of the partnerships: 
reporting, resource exchange, advice and support. Egocentric data is gathered by asking 
about each partner’s involvement in these activities with all other partners. The items are 
formulated two-ways directed, viz. none, giving or receiving, or both. Since the focus is 
on the most eminent of these subjective and non-contractual relations between partners, 
only those linkages that are confirmed by the two partners at the sending and receiving 
end of the linkage are considered (Marsden, 1990). Again, despite the loss of data, this 
approach is required since no direct observations were obtained (Huang & Provan, 
2006).  
Partnership integration or density measures the overall connectedness among actors in a 
partnership and partnership centralisation measures the extent to which the network is 
clustered around one or a few actors. Whereas density indicates the extent of 
involvement among partners, centralisation demonstrates if involvement in the 
partnership activities is clustered around one or a few partners (Huang & Provan, 2006: 
442). Partnership integration is computed by the average mean organizational link 
density score. This is done by dividing the total number of linkages between all partners 
by the total number of participants. Partnerships with high density scores are referred to 
as integrated (Provan & Milward, 1995). Comparing density scores across partnerships, 
however, is only possible if partnerships are comparable in size. Since the partnerships 
included in the present study vary in size between 2 and 16 partner organisations, density 
measures are normalised across all partnerships.  
Partnership centralization indicates the ratio of the sum of actual differences between 
the degree centrality of the most central partner and that of all other partners in a 
partnership and the maximum possible sum of differences in actor degree centrality 
(Freeman, 1979). Centralisation scores vary between 0<1, when all partners have 
exactly the same centrality indices to one partner being linked to all other partners but no 
other partner is connected to another. 
Decision-making power. The concentration of influence and control is another 
measure of partnership integration (Milward & Provan, 1995) and is evaluated through 
the involvement in and the actual influence and control of partners on the decision-
making processes of a set of partnership-relevant issues. For each issue35, inquiry is 
made asking if partners perceived themselves as having been involved and/or influential 
in the decision-making process and using a complete list of all partners, to select those 
partners who have had been most influential on its decision. Employing an issue-specific 
adaptation of Huang and Provan’s (2006) influence measure, influence refers to the 
extent to which one partner’s views and actions are taken into consideration by its 
partners. Whereas for involvement, own perceptions are seen as sufficient, only those 
issues were counted as ‘influential’ for which influence of the respondent is confirmed 
                                                 
35 A description of the development of this list is provided in Appendix I. 
Partnership-level Conditions and the Adoption of Governance Forms 
85 
 
by at least one partner. The data is aggregated and a percentage measure is obtained for 
each respondent from all issues for which involvement and/or influence is indicated 
relative to the total number of issues. Subsequently, for both percentage measures, the 
most frequently involved and the most influential partner organisation(s) are determined 
for each partnership and the distribution of involvement and influence among those and 
the remaining partners (average) were determined (Milward & Provan, 1995).  
Influence. A partnership is described as concentrated in influence when the average of 
the remaining partners show less than half the influence score of the most influential 
organisation.  
Control. A partnership is described as concentrated in control when the remaining 
partners show less than half the perceived involvement score of the most frequently 
involved organisation.  While the concentration of influence is taken as an indicator for 
the distribution of decision-making power in partnerships, involvement in those 
processes is utilised as a measure for the distribution of control. That is, partnerships 
with dispersed involvement offer the possibility for control to partners over the decisions 
made regardless of whether partners eventually are influential (Jacobson & Cohen, 
1986).      
 Governance interventions. In addition to the structural properties of the partnership 
governance forms, a set of six items is administrated to the intermediary organisations. 
Encompassing questions about the characteristics of and interventions applied in the 
partnership, the intermediary organisations are asked whether these characteristics 
(external governance/representation) were present (“yes”/”no”) and interventions 
(formalisation, goal clarification, conflict mediation, and assistance and support) were 
applied in the partnership (on a 5-Likert scale, to “strongly agree”). Once the data is 
collected, the four interventions are factor-analysed (Principal Component Analysis) 
resulting in each intervention measuring a separate dimension of governance 
intervention.   
 
The independent variables: partnership-level conditions 
The five partnership conditions; size, trust, goal agreement, power and the need for 
partnership-level competencies are measured as follows: 
Size. Myriads of potential partners, such as international agencies, local and foreign 
NGOs, community organisations, private and state-owned providers, other businesses 
and governmental agencies, result in high levels of complexity to characterise even 
smaller or even dyadic development partnerships (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Eweje, 2007; 
Ashman, 2001a; Ashman, 2001b). This factor is constant in the present sample, since all 
partnerships include foreign and local partners and encompass, grouped with respect to 
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their organisational type36 and compared for each partnership, more than one and on 
average three different types of organisations. Hence, the variable size is measured by 
the number of participants in each partnership. 
Trust. Although Provan and Kenis (2008) propose the density of trustful relations as 
an indicator for trust as a partnership-level condition, density derives from relational 
data, which is in the present study only applied to the evaluation of governance forms. 
Instead, trust is measured by four items, which were administrated to all participants. 
The items are taken from the short-form of the OTI (Organisational Trust Inventory, 
Cummings & Bromirley, 1996 in Nyhan & Marlowe, 1997) and measure perceptions of 
faith-based and confidence-based trust, respectively37. A factor analysis is conducted to 
verify the existence of two dimensions as proposed by the original scale. After the factor 
analysis results in only one dimension of trust measured by the four items in the present 
study (for the results of this analysis see Table IV.IV of Appendix IV), the average and 
standard deviation of trust are computed for each partnership. 
Goal agreement. Goal agreement is separately measured at the organisational and the 
partnership level, since both do not have to be identical (Provan & Kenis, 2008), but 
known to partners (Nijhof, De Bruijn & Honders, 2008), in order to function as devices 
for collaborative action (Gray et al., 1985). Hence, two items measured on a 5-Likert 
scale (to “strongly agree”) the perceptions of partners about i) the extent to which the 
organisational goals and interests of their partners are known to them; and ii) their 
perception of agreement with their partners on the goals of the partnership. The average 
level of goal clarification and agreement is computed for each partnership. 
Power. The concept of power is measured via two concepts: a perceptional measure of 
resource-related power differentials and an ‘objective’ measure that indicates the degree 
of equity financing in a partnership.  
Power differential. First, an assessment of the same list of 18 resources38 is conducted at 
two points in the questionnaire/interview. In the first instance, the respondents are asked 
to indicate on a five-Likert scale (to “extremely important”) the significance of each 
resource for their own organisation and/or the accomplishment of the partnership’s task. 
In the second instance, the same list is presented again but this time the respondents are 
asked to indicate for their own and each of their partner organisations to what extent the 
organisation can potentially contribute the listed resources (again on a five-Likert-scale, 
to “very high potential”). The average of the self-perceived and others-perceived scores 
for each resource represents the objective resource measure, specific for each resource 
and partner. From the first resource assessment, the total sum of the importance scores 
                                                 
36 The categories were defined as follows: IOs and foreign national governments, national local 
governments,  regional local government, foreign NGO, foreign energy/water operator, local 
operator, local NGO, research institute. 
37 As in the original scale, all items were measured on a 5-Likert scale (to “strongly agree”) 
38 A description of the development of this list is provided in Appendix I. 
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ascribed to a resource by all partners is divided by the total sum ascribed to all resources 
in the partnership. This partnership-specific percentage is taken as a weight for the 
objective resource scores and their sum represents the resource-related power score of 
each partner. The standard deviation is computed for each partnership indicating the 
perceived resource-related power differential.  
Equity financing: A second standard deviation is computed among partners based on 
their financial contribution relative to the total share of the partnership’s budget, which is 
financed internally by the partners themselves (excluding the percentage financed by 
external donors). This measure is coded reversely to indicate the level of equity 
financing of a partnership. 
The need for partnership-level competencies is measured via two variables: 
environmental and separately, funding uncertainty. 
Environmental uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty, namely uncertainty conveyed by 
the operational partnering environment, is measured deriving from three aspects: the 
local political environment, the resource environment and the level of acceptance and 
support by the targeted group of beneficiaries (five-Likert scale, to “strongly agree”). 
Since a factor analysis confirms that the three items measure one dimension of 
uncertainty, the average value is computed for each partnership. 
Funding uncertainty. Another aspect of environmental uncertainty is measured 
separately as the level of funding uncertainty (Milward & Provan, 1995). Based on the 
publications by the main donor39, funding uncertainty is operationalised via two 
indicators: the percentage of the total partnership budget financed by external parties and 
the number of these external funding sources (Milward & Provan, 1995). 
 
Eventually, additional data was gathered. This was information about the type of the 
partnership following a typology proposed by Rochlin and colleagues (2008) that 
distinguishes between service-delivery and rules and standards setting partnerships and if 
participation in the partnership is mandated. Furthermore, the duration of the partnership 
by the time of the study was obtained and whether the scope of the project is national or 
cross-national, since trans-boundary resource management is argued to require much 
stronger political skills and conflict management capabilities (Castro, 2008a; Castro, 





                                                 
39 For the Energy Facility, see: 
    http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/energy/index_en.htm;  
    for the Water Facility, see: 
    http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/water/index_en.htm 




For all but three standard-setting partnerships, the primary objective was specified as 
service-delivery. Largely within the timeframe determined by the three calls for 
proposals of the two facilities (in 2005 and in 2006), the average duration of the 38 
partnerships is 42 months from the point of their inception to the time of the data 
collection (ranging from 15 to 94 months, including two partnerships with a duration of 
94 and 81 months). Seven partnerships operate across countries and five partnerships are 
mandated by donors.  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Min Max S.D. F % 
Partnership governance:       
Interaction:       
Integration 0,5531 0,23 1,00 0,248   
Centralisation1 0,4014 0,10 1,00 0,278   
Decision-making power:       
Influence2 0,523 0,10 1,00 0,240   
Control2 0,430 0,10 1,00 0,239   
Interventions:        
External governance     9 0,24 
Centralised external representation     11 0,29 
Formalisation 3,37 0 5 1,076   
Goal clarification 3,66 0 5 0,966   
Conflict mediation 2,71 0 5 1,354   
Assistance and Support 3,79 0 5 0,875   
Partnership conditions:       
Size (MEAN) 4,58 2 16 3,019   
Trust (MEAN) 3,751 2,06 4,75 0,508   
Goal agreement (MEAN) 3,759 2,50 4,83 0,511   
Power:       
Resource differential (S.D.) 4,264 0,08 9,64 1,926   
Equity financing (S.D.) 31,148 0,00 70,71 18,68   
Need for partnership-level 
competencies: 
      
Environmental uncertainty 3,158 1 5 1,431   
Funding uncertainty       
% of external funding 0,619 0,05 0,95 0,209   
No of funding sources 1,50 1 4 0,862   
1    This is the in-degree centralisation score 
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Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all concepts and for all partnerships. The 
descriptive statistics show that partnership-level structural measures, such as integration 
and centralisation of interactions, are relatively high (Freeman, 1979) partially due to the 
four dyadic partnerships. The difficulties one encounters by including dyadic 
partnerships are acknowledged, for example partnership-level structural measures such 
as the network measure of density, differ considerably between dyadic and partnerships 
of say 16 partners (Scott, 1999). This is, i.e. why the inclusion of dyadic partnerships is 
not in accordance with the definition of networks, consisting of a minimum of three 
partners. Yet, the dyadic partnerships are purposefully not excluded, since they represent 
a common and important part of the reality of partnership practice in development 
cooperation (Ashman, 2001a; Robinson et al., 2000), in particular between foreign and 
local partners.  
The findings of this study are presented in three steps. First, the different partnership 
governance forms are identified and the sample is grouped accordingly. Secondly, the 
findings of the qualitative comparative analysis are presented for each group with respect 




The structural component of the three “ideal” governance forms proposed by Provan and 
Kenis (2008) serves as the starting point for the identification of governance forms. All 
partnerships are grouped with respect to their interactions and decision-making 
structures. The extent to which a governance form is considered shared or 
centralised/concentrated is decided on the basis of a combined assessment of the 
distribution of involvement in the interactions between partners and their influence on 
partnership-level decisions. To give an example, when neither involvement in the 
interactions of a partnership is de-central (centralisation score =>0.50), nor is influence 
shared among partners (average score of influence on partnership-related decisions 
<0.50% of the most influential partner), then the partnership is considered centralised 
and concentrated. These steps result in the identification of four different groups.  
Frequency and mean comparisons were conducted to assess differences between the 
four structural types with respect to the seven governance interventions (see Table 4.2). 
No significant differences are confirmed to exist between the groups with respect to the  
first four interventions. Yet, governance interventions aiming at the clarification of 
goals, tasks and responsibilities, and measures of giving assistance and support to 
partners are found slightly stronger among the brokered governance forms than the 
shared governance forms. Surprisingly, the shared form shows almost equally high 
levels of formalisation as the two brokered forms with centralised activity structures.  
Three additional interventions have been evaluated: On the one hand, all intermediary 
organisations are asked, i) whether the partnership was participant governed or by an 
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external entity; ii) if the external representation of the partnership was centralised; and in 
addition, it was evaluated via the data obtained for all partners about their involvement 
in the partnership-related decision-making processes, iii.) whether control, meaning the 
involvement of partners in partnership-related decision-making, was concentrated or 
shared (average score of involvement was >0.50% of the most frequently involved 
partner). The findings demonstrate significant differences between the four structural 
governance forms with respect to shared control and a centralised external 
representation. Whereas, in parts, shared control seems to condition shared influence, the 
choice for participant versus externally governed partnerships seems to predicate on 
influences other than structural partnership properties.      
 
















   






Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank    
Formalisation 19,19 14,79 22,32 21,25 2,308 3 05111 
Goal 
clarification 
14,50 20,64 20,22 20,13 0,841 3 0,4871 
Conflict 
mediation 
13,09 24,39 22,19 12,76 3,124 3 0,4281 
Assistance 
and support 
16,78 21,07 21,05 23,38 2,190 3 0,5341 
        
Shared control 5(6) 1(4) 6(2) 1(1) 10,327 4 0,035**2 
External 
governance 




0(5) 5(3) 2(2) 4(1) 11,115 3 0,011**2 
1Kruskal-Wallis-Test 
2Fisher’s Exact Test: significant  at ά=0.05 
 
In summary, the four governance forms identified here partly reflect on the three “ideal” 
types, proposed by Provan & Kenis (2008). Specifically the shared and the centralised 
form with concentrated influence seem to resemble the shared and the lead-organisation 
model, respectively. Less clearly assigned are the three governance aspects proposed for 
the NAO form, viz. central governance by a separate entity that represents the 
partnership externally and is supplemented by control structures that allow for 
“representative participation for key strategic issues“ (Ibid: 243). Yet, only three cases 
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Box 4.1: Case-descriptions of governance forms40 
Shared governance 
Goal: Provision of un-served poor households in five districts with off-grid energy devices 
Partners: local research institutes, European and local energy companies 
All energy providers, local and European ones, are financially involved in the partnership to almost equal shares. 
Their individual organisational goals are agreed by contract and resemble the overall goals of the partnership. 
Involvement of the research institutes is co-financed by external sources to leverage expertise and experience 
gained from previous off-grid pilot projects in that region, of which companies can make use against payment. 
Partners decide autonomously yet individual efforts are concerted through contracts and regular meetings.   
Decentralised interactions and concentrated influence 
Goal: Implementation of small-scale water systems in nine villages and communities in one rural region 
Partners: local national and European Ministry of Water and the Environment, Federation of European water 
companies, European public utility companies, local village councils 
Partnership-level decisions are made by the National Directorate of Water in collaboration with the European 
Federation of companies. While those decisions are reported to the companies, the Federation decides on their 
behalf. The companies have equal investments in the partnership and organise their operations in accordance with 
the National Water Directorate via the Federation. Operative decisions are made directly by the companies, who act 
as liaisons between the partnership and beneficiary communities, thereby providing trainings to local staff to assist, 
e.g. in the monitoring of services and maintenance of the pipes. The village councils monitor the services and 
report via external public resource agencies to the Ministry. 
Centralised interactions and shared influence 
Goal: Provision of portable water to twelve rural communities 
Partners: European NGO, local community initiatives, local public users (hospitals, schools, etc.) 
Partnership operations centre around the European NGO. Its European office acts as a liaison between donors and 
the partnership, while the local office governs the partnership onsite. In this role, the local office coordinates the 
initiatives in each community, moderates interests, organises trainings and workshops for specific user groups and 
facilitates the exchange and supply of teaching material to schools and hospitals (related to hygiene, sanitation, etc.). 
All partners and their related sub-initiatives are represented by a spokesperson in regular meetings in which strategic 
decisions are made. Although operating rather autonomously in each community, all initiative and the European 
NGO have to report to all other partners during these meetings. Depending on the issues raised, meetings are open to 
external stakeholders (e.g. local government and manufacturers) and future action plans and initiatives are designed.           
Centralised interactions and concentrated influence 
Goal: Securing access to safe and portable water for four communities  
Partners: European NGO, local NGO 
The partnership is funded by the European NGO and implemented onsite by the local NGO, who works together 
with the communities. The communities themselves are not directly involved in the partnership. That is their 
representatives are not involved in partnership-level decision making and communication with the European NGO 
happens via the local NGO. Communication and control between the European and the local NGO is rather one-
sided. The local NGO is assigned with the implementation of the partnership but has no influence on the design and 
broader strategy for implementation (e.g. selection of relevant partners or content of educational material and 
training), which is stipulated by the European NGO. Reporting and monitoring is equally one-sided and the local 
NGO and the communities have no information to keep track of funding flow.   
                                                 
40
 The descriptions derive from the document studies and interviews with the respondents.  
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Together, the structural characteristics and related interventions of the four governance 
forms are displayed in Table 4.3. In the following sections, their adoption will be 
discussed in the light of the presence of absence of the proposed partnership-level 
conditions. 
 
Table 4.3: Overview of governance forms 















Interaction Decentralised Decentralised Centralised Centralised 
Decision-making power Shared Concentrated Shared Concentrated 
Externality of the 
governing entity 
Absent Frequent Frequent Frequent- 
Centralised external 
representation 
Absent Frequent Frequent Frequent 
Shared control Frequent Rare Frequent Rare 
Formalisation Moderately high Moderately low Moderately high Moderately high 
Goal clarification Moderately low Moderately high Moderately high Moderately high 
Conflict mediation Moderately low Moderately high Moderately high Moderately low 
Assistance and support  Moderately low Moderately high Moderately high Moderately high 
 
 
Governance forms and partnership-level conditions 
The interplay between single and combined partnership-level characteristics and the 
adoption of one governance form over another are analysed employing the qualitative-
comparative approach, first outlined by Charles Ragin in 1987 (cf. Ragin, 1998). QCA 
applies Boolean logic to analyse the necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome 
based on set-theoretic relations. For example, all partnerships with large power 
differentials also display shared governance or all shared governed partnerships show at 
the same time large power differentials. QCA methodology was chosen for two reasons: 
On the one hand, because the relatively small number of cases studied here represents 
only a first step towards the generalisation of findings across cases (Provan et al., 2007) 
but does not yet permit inference statistical analyses (Lijphart, 1971). On the other hand, 
theoretically complex configurations of partnership-level conditions rather than single 
factors are assumed to explain the adoption of one governance form over another (Ragin, 
2002). Boolean sets, indicated by the presence or absence of certain conditions in the 
parallel presence of the four governance forms, require the re-coding of the empirical 
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indicators for the partnership-level conditions into dichotomous sets (0, 1). Because 
already the governance forms, to simplify the analysis, are coded dichotomously, the 
same approach was applied to the partnership-level conditions, as outlined below41:  
 
Size. There is no fixed threshold for the number of partner organisations that indicates 
when a partnership is considered large in the sense of increasing the complexity of the 
governance task. Yet, Provan and Kenis (2008) refer to small-group research (Faerman, 
McCaffrey & Van Slyke, 2001), when considering partnerships up to six organisations  
as small. In the present sample, partnerships range in size from dyadic relations to 
sixteen participant organisations and are divided into two groups: a value of “0” is 
ascribed to all dyadic and partnerships with up to eight participants and a value of “1.00” 
to those with more. 
 
Trust. Standard deviation and average level of trust are aggregated for each partnership. 
Since the distribution of trust is considered as more important for the definition of the 
governance task than the actual level of trust (Provan & Kenis, 2008), cut-off values are 
determined at 50% of the sample for each measure. The sample is divided into two 
groups, as follows: the value “0” (no membership) is ascribed to partnerships with very 
low and highly centralised trust or high but centralised trust and the value of “1.00” to 
partnerships with dispersed but low levels of trust or with high and widely distributed 
trust. 
 
Goal agreement. Goal agreement and individual organisational goal clarification are 
aggregated and the sample divided into two groups, as described for trust before with a 
preference given to partnership-level goal agreement rather than goal clarification 
(Ibid.), e.g. the value “1.00” is ascribed to all partnerships with high levels of goal 
agreement. 
 
Resource-related power differential and equity financing. For the two indicators of 
power in partnerships, the standard deviation for each partnership is obtained, cut-off 
values at 50% of the two scores are determined and all partnerships are divided into two 
groups for the presence and absence of resource-related power differential and of equity 






                                                 
41 The membership values of each case are displayed in Appendix V.  
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Need for partnership-level competencies. The determinants of a need for partnership-
level competencies are coded as follows:  
Environmental uncertainty. The average score of environmental uncertainty across all 
partnerships is taken as the threshold and the sample is grouped accordingly.  
Funding uncertainty. The two measures of funding uncertainty, the percentage of 
external funding and the number of sources are regarded as equally important (Provan & 
Milward; 1995). However, since no partnership is entirely self-financed by only the 
partners both criteria are aggregated following the same procedure as for trust and goal 
agreement but giving preference to the number of external funding sources (e.g. 
Brinkerhoff, 2002b). 
 
Combinatory set-theoretical solutions 
Having identified the four governance forms in the above, those are analysed in their 
relation to the combinations of partnership-level conditions. By the means of a so-called 
truth-table analysis (Ragin, 2002), an algorithm is employed that obtains a measure of 
consistency in an inductive fashion, based on membership in a combination of conditions 
equal with membership in one of the governance forms (Ragin, 2006). 
For each governance form, the complex and the parsimonious solutions are obtained. 
The complex solution represents all combinations of conditions that appear in the 
positive instances of an outcome in the present data. A counterfactual analysis of absent 
cases, or remainders (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005), is not undertaken. The parsimonious 
solution displays the combinations of core conditions for an outcome. Most aggregated, 
the occurrence of more than one parsimonious solution is a strong indicator for the 
existence of different pathways to arrive at an outcome. Boolean logic implies that the 
parsimonious solutions are contained in the complex solutions. Differences in the 
parsimonious solutions and corresponding complex solutions are displayed (cf. Ragin, 
2002). An additional benchmark indicates the chances for producing random models, 
based on the proportion of variables relative to cases (Marx, 2006: 19). Raw coverage 
measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained by each single term 
of the solution, computed for each term from the membership values by dividing the sum 
of consistent membership in the solution by the sum of membership in the outcome. 
Unique coverage measures the proportion of membership in the outcome explained 
solely by each individual solution term (memberships that are not covered by other 
solution terms). Table 4.4 reports the complex solutions for each governance form by 
highlighting the parsimonious combinations as core conditions42: 
The findings indicate two different pathways to shared governance (see the two 
columns of model one and two). One pathway shows the combination of core-conditions 
addressing internal partnership-level characteristics, the presence of equity financing and 
                                                 
42 The full truth table for this analysis is displayed in Table VI.I of Appendix V. 
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trust in combination with the peripheral conditions of the presence of size, but the 
absence of perceived resource-related power differentials. The second pathway describes 
the combination of two external conditions, the absence of funding and the presence of 
environmental uncertainty, in combination with the contributing condition of a presence 
of power differentials. Trust, in shared governed partnerships seems to be strongly linked 
to equity financing agreements (Model One). This may be further reasoned in the 
unlikely parallel presence of equity financing and perceived resource-related power 
differentials. The finding of the two pathways indicates that both internal and external 
core contingencies do not have to be present in combination for shared governance to 
occur. 
 
Table 4.4: Combinatory solutions for each governance form  













 N = 16 N = 22 N = 11 N = 7 N = 4 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII 
Size ●    ●   
Equity ●   Ѳ  Ѳ Ѳ 
Trust ●     ●  
Goals    ● ● ● ● 
Power 
differential Ѳ ●  ● Ѳ ● ● 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
 ● ●  ●  Ѳ 
Funding 
uncertainty 
 Ѳ ●  ●  ● 
        
Probability of 
random model 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Raw coverage 0,625 0,376 0.817 0,542 0,545 0,571 0,75 
Unique coverage 0,625 0,376 0,590 0,591 0,545 0,143 0,75 
Consistency 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
 ●= Core causal condition present  
Ѳ = Core causal condition absent 
● = Contributing to causal condition present 
Ѳ = Contributing to causal condition absent 
 
   > 0 
   1<10%  
   >10<33% 
   >33% 
= Models developed on the basis of this specification  are valid 
= Model-specification will almost always be valid 
= Significant possibility of finding valid model 
= Models could also be generated ad random 
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Two pathways were also identified to explain the presence of brokered governance 
forms (see columns of Model three and four). One pathway allows for explanation by the 
parallel presence of the core characteristics of environmental and funding uncertainty, 
and the second by combining the absence of equity financing with the presence of goal 
agreement and perceived power differentials. These two pathways are further specified 
by the three individual brokered models. Brokered partnerships with centralised activity 
structures display the core contingencies of an absence of equity financing and a parallel 
presence of goal agreement. Alone the group of brokered partnerships with dispersed 
activity structures showed the combination of the presence of both factors, funding and 
environmental uncertainty, similar to the first path (Model three) of the “all brokered” 
models and the second path (model four) of the shared governed form.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion and discussion 
The findings demonstrate that indeed variation exists among the combinations of 
partnership-level conditions that describe the adoption of one governance form over 
another by development practitioners. These differences are most pronounced in the 
combinatory conditions that describe shared governed compared to brokered 
partnerships. The interplay between the three instances that are evaluated in this study, 
governance structures and interventions and the partnership-level conditions, however, 
suggests a more nuanced picture of governance responses than initially assumed by the 
conceptual frameworks adapted by this study. 
The first assumption that the more complex the situation in a partnership encountered 
by development practitioners the more likely is the adoption of brokered governance 
(Provan & Kenis, 2008) is only partly confirmed by the findings of this research. Neither 
the partnership-level conditions, nor the governance response of shared-compared to 
brokered governed partnerships can be described as more or less complex. In fact, shared 
governed partnerships display many of the conditions and interventions that are similarly 
found for brokered partnerships. On the one hand, shared governed partnerships display 
conditions that are usually assumed to characterise complex governance tasks. For 
example: they are relatively large in size and show high levels of external uncertainty, 
conveyed by their operational environments. On the other hand, shared governance is 
characterised by interventions similar to those of the brokered models, for example by a 
comparably high level of formalisation. Both, the conditions encountered and the 
governance responses of shared-governed and brokered partnerships are not more or less 
complex but resemble rather different intricacies. In particular, the incorporation of the 
two conditions of power differentials and the extension of the concept of environmental 
uncertainty, comprising not only the funding but also the operational partnering 
environment convey this more nuanced picture.  
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For the clearly distinct conditions of the parallel presence of trust and equity financing 
and for the external condition of high levels of uncertainty conveyed by the operational 
environment, shared governance seems to be a reasonable response. High levels of trust 
and equity financing convey the picture of inter-organisational relations at eye level with 
governance interventions asking for equal responsibility and reciprocal control in 
partnership-level decision-making. Equity financing that is operationalised as a 
partnership-level condition in the present study, has been discussed as a governance 
measure that enhances the stability of business alliances (cf. Muthusamy & White, 2006) 
but not for development partnerships, so far. Partially, this may be reasoned from a 
traditional view on development partnerships as largely publicly financed principal-
agent donor-recipient relations. Yet, the prominence of the combined presence of equity 
financing and trust and the absence of funding uncertainty of shared governed 
partnerships in this study, can be seen as an indicator for an increased involvement of 
financially equally, or at least comparably strong parties (e.g. Dhanarajan, 2007) in 
development partnerships. Financially strong(er) constituent bases may be a 
consequence of donor policies utilising partnerships as co-financing instruments through 
which private capital is leveraged for development (Kolk et al., 2008). Since 
partnerships among non-traditional development partners may to a lesser extent be able 
to draw back on long-standing mutual collaborative experiences as sources of trust, the 
present finding may further signify a need to pay stronger attention to equity financing as 
a potent governance mechanism for development partnerships in the future. 
In contrast to what has been suggested by the literature, shared governed partnerships 
respond to high levels of environmental uncertainty with a decentralised and not a 
centralised governance approach (Milward & Provan, 1995; Milward & Provan, 1998; 
Provan & Kenis, 2008). This discrepancy may be explained by the rather narrow 
conceptualisation of external uncertainty for partnerships operating within rather 
uniform contexts, which has been rather narrowly confined to only the funding 
environment (cf. Milward & Provan, 1995; Provan et al., 2004a; Provan, Nakama, 
Veazie, Teufel-Shone, & Huddleston, 2003) instead of to the multiple dimensions of the 
operational environment in a development context. The present findings suggest that 
interactions with external groups, apart from donors, play an equally important role in 
defining the governance task of development partnerships. Depending on the contacts of 
local partners, the adoption of a decentralised approach to the management of external 
relations to those groups seems to be a reasonable response by development 
practitioners. Specifically, this is significant in the case of larger partnerships that affect 
a number of groups larger than those directly involved in the partnership (Lane, 2009), 
and when partners, such as the energy or water providers in the present study have their 
own service provision liabilities to their customers (Prasad, 2006; Rowan, 2009; 
Sherwill et al., 2007). The transfer of those liabilities and responsibilities to the 
partnership, albeit desired by donors and governments (Suleiman et al., 2008), is 
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identified as one major challenge faced by partnerships (Provan & Milward, 2001). This 
is in particular in a development context (Walker, 2009) where partnership practitioners 
are frequently confronted with rather weak public and/or private sector institutions, 
which may not provide the institutional environment to absorb the potential risks of 
partnering (Awortwi, 2004; Ndandiko, 2006).  
One essential means to legitimise a partnership and its governing entity in the eyes of 
its defined constituencies, is to allow for reciprocal control and give partners the 
opportunity to exert influence on partnership-level decisions (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). 
However, and in contrast to Provan and Kenis’ (2008) conception of the NAO 
governance form, in only four of the nine and three of the eleven cases, in which 
partnerships are externally governed and/or external representation was centralised, are 
control and/or influence shared, respectively. This is surprising, considering the fact that 
at the same time brokered partnerships most strongly display perceived resource-related 
power differentials and consequently interventions aiming at giving assistance and 
support to partners to effectively participate in partnering processes. Yet, at the same 
time, the majority of brokered partnerships (fourteen out of in total 22 partnerships), 
most clearly exemplified by the four partnerships of model six, describe relationships in 
which control was not shared and structural barriers to mutuality continue to persist (cf. 
Ashman, 2000). Hence, the conclusion can be drawn from the present findings is that the 
majority of brokered governed partnerships still resemble the more traditional 
implementation model of development cooperation in which the nature of participation 
and the allocation of power depends on the courtesy or as Thomas (1996:99) put it, the 
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It has recently been emphasised that partnership governance enhances the accountability 
and legitimacy of partnerships. Yet, its impact on partnership performance in face of 
different partnership-level conditions has not been explicitly addressed. By the means of 
a comparative case analysis of 38 development partnerships, drawing on development 
theory and practice and the emerging field of network theory, the effect of governance fit 
on partnership effectiveness is explored. Looking at those partnering conditions under 
which different governance modes are effective, three main challenges to effective 
partnering are specified: the absences of trust and goal agreement and the presence of 
power resource-related power differentials between partners. Centrally governed 
partnerships with shared influence and control are identified as most effective under 
these conditions. The findings are discussed in the light of previous theoretical thinking 
on partnership governance and effectiveness. 
 
 




Associated with pronounced pressures for enhancing aid accountability (Rochlin et al., 
2008) and impact (Burnside & Dollar, 2004; Collier & Dollar, 2004), increasing the 
effectiveness of development efforts (Brinkerhoff, 2002b) is regarded a main reason for 
the ever increasing proportion of development efforts being implemented through inter-
organisational partnerships (cf. Robinson et al., 2000). Partnerships, for that matter, 
promise to provide an effective means of developing strategic direction and coordination 
at a scale and integration of resources, reach, interests, and services that cannot be 
provided by any actor alone (Thomas, 2007). Yet, both a blessing and a curse, previous 
research has identified a multitude of challenges that arise from building and sustaining 
effective partnerships in the face of such diversity in organisational skills, resources, 
cultures, and agendas (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Fowler, 1998; Mahanty et al., 2009). Albeit 
that a similar trend towards partnership can be observed in other issue areas and service 
spheres (Milward & Provan, 2000), the need for and the challenges associated with 
effective partnering, become most pronounced in achieving sustainable development, 
since sustainable development efforts predicate on the equally strong request for ‘good 
governance’ (Brinkerhoff, 2002b:25).  
For all that, scholars and practitioners alike realise that partnerships are no panacea for 
sustainable development and have started to look at the circumstances and factors that 
make them effective. Development scholars have paid primary attention to the 
identification of environmental obstacles and success factors, for example in the national 
and local operating contexts (Awortwi, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Fiszbein & Lowden, 
1998; Fowler, 1998; Ndandiko, 2006). In contrast, researchers in the emerging field of 
network theory (Milward & Provan, 1995; Milward & Provan, 1998; Milward et al., 
2009; Provan et al., 2007), have started to tackle the question about how the governance 
of inter-organisational relations may best respond to certain partnering conditions for 
collective endeavours to become effective.  
In an early attempt to set out a preliminary theory of partnership effectiveness, 
Milward and Provan (1995) explained variation in the performance of partnerships by 
differences in the degree of structural integration of services and the distribution of 
influence among participants. Provan and Kenis (2008) further developed this idea. 
Keeping the structural angle at the core, this is supplemented by a governance 
perspective that incorporates different interventions, such as designing a partnership as 
external or participant governed, into their conceptual framework. This way, they arrive 
at a typology of partnership governance forms and propose their performance to be 
contingent on their fit to four partnership-level conditions: size, trust, goal agreement, 
and the extent to which partnership-level competencies are required that go beyond what 
can potentially provided by the participants themselves. Development scholars in 
addition, emphasise the need for relationship-building and enabling governance 
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interventions for partnership governance to account for and adequately respond to the 
particular challenges posed by power differentials between partners (e.g. Brown & 
Ashman, 1996; Thomas, 1996), and by the complexity of their local operational 
environments (Choi & Brower, 2006; Krishna, 2003; Mohan & Stokke, 2000; Parker, 
2001; Syrett, 1997). 
Building on this work, the present qualitative comparative analysis of development 
partnerships is guided by the question: which combinations of partnership-level 
conditions and governance forms that being the governance-fit, are effective? The 
remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: First, the concepts of partnership 
governance and its theoretical linkage to the proposed partnership-level contingencies 
are presented, resulting in the introduction of the concept of ‘governance fit’ and related 
hypotheses towards partnership effectiveness. After data collection and methodology are 
described, the findings are presented and discussed in the light of previous works. 
 
 
5.2 Theoretical background 
The theoretical framework of the present study derives from previous thoughts and 
empirical findings on the effectiveness of public-service networks, incorporating insights 
gained from research on partnerships in international development cooperation. The 
framework proceeds from the threefold argument that the fit between partnership-level 
conditions and governance form impacts upon partnership effectiveness. The empirical 
grounds in which light this argument is examined are development partnerships, a type 
of inter-organisational partnerships that perform development efforts on the ground43. 
Development partnerships consist of various organisations, which are legally separate 
but linked to each other through contracts, social, and/or exchange relations that are 
sustained over a period of time in order to jointly achieve some common or 
complementary development goal(s) (Alter & Hage, 1993).  
 
Partnership governance 
The idea, that different ways of governing inter-organisational systems impact upon their 
performance, is not particularly novel (cf. Galaskiewicz, 1985; Milward & Provan, 
1995). Yet, since in the initial promotion of the concept towards various potential 
partners it seemed more conducive to put stronger weight on its collaborative notion than 
on considerations related to governance and control (Brinkerhoff, 2002a), the latter re-
gained scholarly attention only very recently (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001b; Provan & 
Kenis, 2008; Provan & Milward, 2001; Rochlin et al., 2008). 
Early studies on partnership effectiveness have proposed the performance implications 
of various governance aspects. For example, following a network analytic approach, 
                                                 
43 Distinct to multi- and bilateral partnership agreements (e.g. EPAs) 
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scholars have focused on the relational structures of partnerships and set out a 
preliminary theory of their effectiveness that explained superior performance by 
centralised administrative structures and decision-making (cf. Milward & Provan, 1995). 
Others instead (e.g., Ansell, 2007; Bryson, 2006), in particular in the field of 
development studies, have, together with the institutionalisation of the partnership 
concept, started to advocate participative and enabling governance measures, contrary to 
prior donor-induced approaches (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Any development effort, which in 
its goal, design, or implementation is externally imposed, is seen as ultimately counter-
productive (Cooke, 2004) since such efforts neglect and hence cannot truly address the 
needs of the people affected. To make greater participation through partnerships also 
meaningful (Derkzen & Bock, 2007), enabling governance interventions have been 
proposed as the practical way to facilitate effective participation (Ashman, 2001a), build 
local capacity and ownership (James, 2001) and this way ensure sustainable partnering 
outcomes (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). 
Although these idea have on their own strong intrinsic value, based on the present 
paucity of comparative partnership data (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Milward et al., 2009; 
Provan et al., 2007; Selsky & Parker, 2005), one cannot assume any one of them alone 
neither to suffice in defining the complex reality of governance practice, nor to be an 
unmixed blessing for all partnerships. Comparative research across a number of 
partnerships however, is extremely rare still and previous conceptualisations of 
governance have been fragmented, looking at the effects of specific aspects, e.g. 
structures and interventions, in the light of particular cases (Rochlin et al., 2008).  
In an attempt to develop a more holistic analytical framework, Provan and Kenis 
(2008) propose the integration of the two above mentioned perspectives. A governance 
approach that specifies interventions in the design and implementation of partnerships 
(Ansell & Gash, 2007; Berry et al., 2004) and a network analytic approach that utilises 
the relational structures of partnerships as analytic devices. By following this approach, 
it is not claimed to account for all possible aspects of a partnership’s governance that 
may potentially influence the effectiveness of partnerships. Still, it was demonstrated by 
previous explorative analyses (see Chapter Four of this volume) that both perspectives 
systematically link to each other and this way result in a rather comprehensive picture of 
partnership governance (Milward & Provan, 1998). Employing network analytic and 
partnership-level attributional data, different governance forms are identified along the 
two dimensions: from a structural perspective, the extent, to which the interactions 
among partners are centralised or decentralised, and whether decision-making influence 
and control are concentrated or shared among partners (Milward & Provan, 1995), are 
evaluated. Governance interventions such as if support and assistance are given to 
partners, and whether partnerships are participant-governed or coordinated by an 
external entity, among others, are examined in their relation to these structural 
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properties. This way, four different governance forms were identified by previous 
explorative analysis as they are presented in Table 4.3 of Chapter Four (p.:93).  
The first form describes shared governance, through the equal involvement in and shared 
control of partnership-level processes and decisions and external representation of the 
partnership by all or the majority of partners. The other three forms instead all involve 
some level of brokerage that applies to the centralisation of interactions and/or decision-
making power, e.g. centred around and/or held by only a single or a few partners. These 
governing entities or partnership brokers can further be direct participants or external 
entities, supplemented by reciprocal control structures, and may function as a liaison 
between the partnership and external stakeholders. Finally, the four governance forms to 
different degrees derive from and lead to the employment of governance interventions, 
such as the formalisation of relationships or the provision of support and assistance, 
conflict mediation and goal clarification to partners.  
Since the four governance forms are identified based on empirical analysis (see  
Chapter Four of this volume), one of the contributions of the present study is that it does 
not rely upon practitioners’ judgement for classification according to some a priori 
typology (Simon, 1946). Thereby, the goal of this inquiry is not to elaborate upon the 
ways and means by which different governance aspects can be built into partnerships, as 
it has been the focus of previous works (cf. Rochlin et al., 2008). Instead, the purpose is 
to further detail the factors, which in combination with a certain governance form, define 
governance fit and this way contribute to partnership effectiveness. 
 
Partnership-level conditions 
Recently, the argument has been made that the effectiveness of partnerships depends on 
the fit between governance form and partnership-level conditions. Provan and Kenis 
(2008) specify, based on their review of the literature on public-service partnerships, 
four such relevant conditions: size, trust, the extent to which goals are shared and the 
need for partnership-level competencies. Development scholars specify power 
differentials between partners (Ashman, 2001b; Buse & Harmer, 2004; Garvey, 2007; 
Haque, 2004; Lister, 2000; Mohan & Stokke, 2000; Thomas, 2007) and intricacies of the 
operational partnering environment (Adams & Hastings, 2001; Altenburg & Chahoud, 
2001; Awortwi, 2004; Ebrahim, 2004), as conditions that require adequate governance 
response for development partnerships to be effective.  
Differences in power between the myriads of potential development partners that 
come together in partnerships constitute a large part of the reality of development work 
(Thomas, 1996). Ignoring this aspect and merely passing over less powerful partners, is 
regarded as a major obstacle to partnership success (Bryson & Crosby, 2006; Ingle & 
Shpresa, 2007). Apart from negative consequences for individual (less powerful) 
partners (Ashman, 2001a; Lister, 2000), this may also alleviate the benefits of greater 
participation for the project itself. This may be the case, if partners lack the resources, 
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experience, skills or acceptance to effectively contribute and play their part in the 
partnership (Derkzen & Bock, 2007), or when less powerful partners are excluded from 
essential parts of the partnership-level processes. In such events, partners may indulge in 
fundamental clashes about rights and positions rather than focussing on the negotiation 
of mutual interests and gains (Bäckstrand, 2006; Brown, 1992; Brown & Ashman, 
1996). 
Equally challenging and prevalent in the context of international development 
cooperation are external uncertainties, conveyed by the direct operational and 
institutional environments of partnerships (Brinkerhoff, 2002b:25-46). Previously, 
external uncertainty as an influencing factor on partnership effectiveness, has mostly 
been defined by the funding environment (Milward & Provan, 1995), for example, by 
the extent to which a partnership is externally funded and on how many different and 
potentially conflicting donors it depends and needs to satisfy. Yet, in the context of 
international development cooperation, uncertainty conveyed by the operational 
partnering environment equally requests adequate governance response. Uncertainty 
may arise from weak local infrastructure, resource supply or a lack of local social capital 
and trustful relations (Brown & Ashman, 1996), or from weak public and private 
institutions (Ndandiko, 2006) and uncertain institutional and political environments, for 
example, when a partnership’s objectives run counter local development agendas and 
receive only little support (Fowler, 1998). Uncertainty ultimately arises when efforts are 
not embraced by the beneficiary communities whose needs the partnership seeks to 
address (Castro, 2008a; Chen, 2008; Muller, 2003). 
In combination, the following partnership-level conditions are incorporated in this 
study: size, trust, goal agreement, power differentials between partners, and the need for 
partnership-level competencies. With the latter being conceptualised as the degree of 
uncertainty conveyed by the funding and the external operative environment of 
partnerships. The partnership literature proposes a myriad of potential obstacles and 
“success factors” (e.g. Brinkerhoff, 2004; Selsky & Parker, 2005) and it is not claimed 
that this selection encompasses all relevant ones. Yet, it was demonstrated by the 
findings of a previous explorative analysis (see Chapter Four of this volume) that the 
adoption of one of the four governance forms over another involves configurations of the 
presence or absence of these conditions.   
 
Governance fit and partnership effectiveness 
The effectiveness of partnerships is a strongly value-laden and contested subject 
(Thomas, 2007). It is very much driven by interests and political agendas, inherently 
multi-dimensional and strongly discipline-bound. In a way that definitions range from 
successful top-down implementation and attainment of institutional agendas, over the 
provision of public goods and services, the creation and exchange of knowledge and 
values, to the facilitation of enduring processes of social transformation and change 
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(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2006). Nevertheless and keeping in mind its limitations, 
research on partnership effectiveness is of crucial importance for both, theory and 
practice (Provan & Kenis, 2008), and several attempts have been made to systematically 
access and empirically explore the concept. Some draw a distinction between objective 
and subjective indicators (Korssen-Van Raaij, 2006). Others specify different analytical 
levels at which effectiveness can be evaluated, e.g. at the individual organisational or 
partner-, the partnership-, or the beneficiary-level (Provan & Milward, 2001). Since, as 
reflected by the range of definitions applied, the concept of effectiveness is compounded 
by the reality that development partnerships entail processes of change (Brinkerhoff, 
2002b), again others set apart outcome from process-related indicators (Thomas, 2007). 
Despite this variety of possible operationalisations, empirical research on partnership 
effectiveness to date has mostly focused on the evaluation of individual organisational 
partnering outcomes (Selsky & Parker, 2005; Van Huijstee et al., 2007). As a notable 
exception have studies on partnerships in a development context paid a comparable 
strong attention to the broader effects of partnerships that go beyond the direct partners, 
most notably with respect to beneficiary communities (Altenburg & Chahoud, 2001; 
Awortwi, 2004; Bäckstrand, 2006; Thomas, 2007). Meanwhile however, this broader 
focus somewhat disregarded the inter-organisational aspects of effective partnering 
(Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Robinson et al., 2000). As it has been noted before (Provan & 
Milward, 2001), a sole focus on merely one dimension, does not suffice for an 
evaluation of partnership effectiveness in complex areas of partnership operation 
(O'Toole, 1997), such as international development cooperation. In the present study, 
partnership effectiveness has been conceptualised and measured at two, the individual 
partner and the partnership-level of analysis, by evaluating the subjective perceptions of 
individual organisational and of overall partnership effectiveness through all partners. 
Such complete data across a number of partnerships is extremely rare so far (Provan et 
al., 2004a). On the one hand, this is because of the difficulties of gathering full 
partnership data from all participants (Provan et al., 2007). On the other hand, because 
the diversity of disciplines that have approached partnerships to date, brought along a 
rather fragmented scholarly interest in the perspectives of only single actors (Hasnain-
Wynia et al., 2003; Thomson et al., 2007) or particular sectors or groups of partners 
(Elbers, 2004; Gazley & Brudney, 2007; Milne et al., 1996). Due to the geographical 
spread of the partnerships under study we are not able to obtain neither direct 
observational data (Korssen-Van Raaij, 2006), nor to include the perspectives of 
stakeholders, other than the direct partners involved Provan & Milward, 2001). Yet, the 
inductive evaluation of partnership effectiveness through all partners somewhat limits 
the subjectivity of the data (Provan et al., 2007) and includes the perspective of relevant 
actor groups, at least to the extent to which they are represented among partners.  
The threefold argument for a joint analysis of partnership governance and conditions 
in their relation to effectiveness derived from previous research on public-service 
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partnerships (Provan & Kenis, 2008) is that different combinations of the presence and 
absence of conditions imply different challenges to effective partnering and thus demand 
appropriate governance responses. A fit of governance structures and interventions to 
conditions is required in order for partnerships to be effective. One line of argument 
suggests that favourable partnership-level conditions, e.g. the absence of size and 
parallel presence of trust and goal agreement, low levels of funding uncertainty and only 
little need for partnership-level competencies, may be effectively dealt with by shared 
governance. Since close and frequent interactions are possible when partnerships are 
smaller in size this facilitates the development of trustful relations, which are a premise 
for effective joint decision-making and power sharing. Shared goals can guide collective 
action without the need for one partner or a governing entity to provide leadership, and 
externally, low levels of uncertainty may successfully be managed by the decentralised 
individual interactions of partners with their own contacts and affiliates, without the 
need for centralisation. Centralised interactions, partnership administration and decision-
making to different degrees displayed by the brokered forms instead, may effectively 
govern even partnerships that display more challenging conditions. Brokered governed 
partnerships may rather be effective in the coordination of larger numbers of partners, do 
not inevitably require widely dispersed trustful relations among all partners as a premise 
for joint action and can provide leadership and guidance even when goals are to a lesser 
extent clear or shared among partners. Externally, centralised representation may 
generate more stable communication channels and more efficient responses to external 
demands (Milward & Provan, 1995), such as to donors’ (Lane, 2009) and beneficiaries’ 
requests (Castro, 2008b; Prasad, 2006; Suleiman et al., 2008).  
By the same argument, the two conditions characteristic of a development context, 
power differentials between partners and uncertainty conveyed by the operative 
environment, require adequate governance responses for partnerships to become 
effective. Yet, both conditions have not been systematically incorporated in previous 
frameworks (e.g. Ashman, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2002a; Provan & Kenis, 2008), yet. In a 
precedent explorative analysis, distinct governance responses to the absence and 
presence of these conditions were identified (Chapter Four of this volume). Partnerships 
with power differentials between partners are less frequently governed by shared than by 
brokered forms. Shared governed partnerships instead are characterised by a presence of 
shared or equal financing arrangements. For brokered governance forms, which are 
characterised by power differentials, two ways of responding are specified: On the one 
hand, almost all brokered governance forms incorporate enabling interventions, e.g. the 
provision of assistance and support, conflict mediation, and goal clarification. In theory, 
such interventions are described as primarily aiming at relationship building and 
changing perceptions of inequality (Ashman, 2000) and contrasted with interventions 
aiming at overcoming structural barriers to mutuality, for example by granting shared 
participation and reciprocal control (Ashman, 2000; Bryson & Crosby, 2006; Elbers, 
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2010). The latter form of interventions are argued to be most likely implemented, when a 
partnership is externally governed (Provan & Kenis, 2008). That is by assigning an 
organisational entity or partnership broker specifically with the governance task, a 
separation of partners’ interests and partnership-level concerns is implemented. As a 
result resource-commitments and governance interventions are more likely to go beyond 
and may even run counter those of individual partners, in particular with respect to 
power sharing.  
Two distinct ways of governance response are identified to adjust to external 
uncertainty. On the one hand, shared governed partnerships with decentralised 
interactions respond to uncertainty in their operational environments by keeping the 
individual partners as liaisons between the partnership and contacts and relationships to 
external stakeholders. On the other hand, in particular the partnerships that faced funding 
uncertainty, responded by centralising their interactions and external representation. The 
two responses might arise from the difficulties encountered by partnerships when 
centralised external partnership representation instances or organisational entities are set-
up but (initially) lack the needed legitimacy to be effective (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 
2004). Hence until legitimacy is established, it may be advisable to strengthen existing 
relations of individual partners with their external stakeholders, rather than replacing 
them by centralised external representation (Elliott, 1987). Partnerships may more 
efficiently react to donors’ requests and in turn easily be overseen and controlled by 
those when decision-making power and external representation is centralised. For these 
reasons, it is proposed that among the brokered governance forms, those that show one 
or more of the abovementioned aspects, are rather effective, when partnerships face one 
or a combination of the abovementioned conditions. Table 5.1 displays the 
configurations of partnership-level conditions and governance forms that are proposed, 
based on the framework of Provan and Kenis (2008) and the previous explorative 
findings about the adoption of governance forms by development practitioners, to show 
a contingent effect on partnership effectiveness. 
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Table 5.1: Proposed ‘Governance Fit’ 

















    
Interaction Decentralised Decentralised Centralised Centralised 
Decision-making power Shared Concentrated Shared Concentrated 
Governance 
interventions: 
    
Externality of the 
governing entity 
Absent Frequent Frequent Frequent- 
Centralised external 
representation 
Absent Frequent Frequent Frequent 
Shared control Frequent Rare Frequent Rare 
Formalisation Moderately high Moderately low Moderately high Moderately high 
Goal clarification Moderately low Moderately high Moderately high Moderately high 
Conflict mediation Moderately low Moderately high Moderately high Moderately low 
Assistance and support  Moderately low Moderately high Moderately high Moderately high 
Partnership-level 
conditions: 
    
Size Ѳ ● ● Ѳ 
Power differential1 Ѳ Ѳ ● Ѳ 
Trust ● Ѳ ● Ѳ 
Goals ● Ѳ ● Ѳ 
Environmental 
uncertainty1 Ѳ ● ● ● 
Funding uncertainty Ѳ ● ● ● 
 
● = condition present  
Ѳ = condition absent 
 
5.3 Data collection and methodology 
To explore the proposed contingent effects of governance fit, 38 development 
partnerships have been analysed via a comparative case analysis. A detailed description 
of the institutional background of the partnerships, the data collection and methodology 
of the study are presented in the corresponding sections of Chapter Four of this book. At 
this point, only divergences and additions in the measurements applied in the present 
analyses, to the approach outlined in Chapter Four are described.   
 




In this study, the concepts of partnership effectiveness, and governance fit to the 
partnership-level contingencies are measured through the perspectives of the 
intermediary and all partner organisations, respectively. Even though the two 
perspectives may sometimes diverge, by combining both we aim at gaining a most 
comprehensive understanding of the contingent effects governance fit on partnership 
effectiveness. 
 
The dependent variable: partnership effectiveness 
Partnership effectiveness is measured at two levels, as individual organisational 
effectiveness, which is assessed via one item administered to all partners, and an extra 
set of three items, on the basis of which partnership effectiveness was evaluated by only 
the intermediary organisations. The first item assesses individual organisational 
effectiveness in the partnership by all partners. The second set of items asks only the 
intermediary organisations to evaluate the effectiveness of the partnership on the basis of 
three general project efficiency criteria, the impact of the partnership on beneficiary 
communities (goal attainment), and its expenses relative to its benefits and time 
efficiency (Finsterbusch & Van Wicklin II, 1987). The latter set of items is factor-
analysed and after obtaining confirmation for only one dimension measured, the 
average-level of both effectiveness-measures is computed for each partnership. 
 
The independent variable: Governance-fit 
Governance fit is operationalised via the two concepts, governance and partnership-level 
conditions. The applied measurements for both concepts are presented in detail in 
Chapter Four, with the exception of the indicator for power differential, which is 
aggregated for the present analysis, as follows:  
Power. The concept of power is measured via two concepts: a perceptional measure of 
resource-related power differentials and an ‘objective’ measure that indicates the degree 
of equity financing in a partnership. Since previous explorative analysis (see Chapter 
Four of this volume) revealed that both concepts, perceived resource-related power 
differentials and equity financing, occur mutually exclusively in partnerships, both 
measures are aggregated to one indicator for the present analysis, representing the 
resource-related perceived power differential in a partnership. 
 
Eventually, additional data was gathered about the type of the partnership, following a 
typology proposed by Rochlin and colleagues (2008) that distinguishes between a focus 
on service-delivery or rules and standards setting; the duration of the partnership by the 
time of our inquiry; whether the scope of the project was national or cross-national 
because trans-boundary resource management is argued to require much stronger 
political skills and conflict management capabilities (Castro, 2008b; Chen, 2008; Marfo, 
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2006; Mollinga et al., 2008; Sherwill et al., 2007); whether the partnership was 
mandated; and finally, whether, from the point of inception up until the time of the 
inquiry, the partnerships had experienced any cases of participant turnover. Finally, 
although specified as an influencing factor on effectiveness by previous studies (Provan 
& Milward, 1995), resource munificence is not explicitly evaluated, since sufficient 




For all but three standard-setting partnerships the primary objective is specified as 
service-delivery. Largely within the timeframe determined by the three calls for 
proposals of the two facilities (in 2005 and in 2006), the average duration of the 38 
partnerships is 42 months, from the point of the inception of their operations to the time 
of the study (ranging from 15 to 94 months, including two partnerships with a duration 
of 94 and 81 months). Seven partnerships operated across countries. Five partnerships 
were mandated by the EC and/or other donors, and only two partnerships reported upon 
a turnover of partners within the period from inception to the time of the data collection. 
The descriptive statistics are presented at this point only for the two effectiveness 
measures for the whole sample, as follows (again an overview and descriptive statistics 
of the measures applied for the concepts of partnership governance and each partnership-
level condition can be found in the corresponding Tables 4.1 and 4.3 of Chapter Four):  
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for partnership effectiveness 
Variable Mean Min Max S.D. 
Partnership effectiveness:     
Partner-level 3,4290 1,50 4,67 0,68214 
Partnership-level 3,5205 2,25 4,67 0,64392 
 
The presentation of the findings of this study follows the two steps of the analysis. The 
interplay between the two concepts, partnership conditions and governance forms, in 
relation to partnership effectiveness is analysed by utilising a heuristic for stepwise 
comparative research via qualitative comparative analysis (QCA; Ragin, 1998). A 
comparison between cases that differ in only one of the conditions or governance aspects 
(Mill, 1843) is ideal but not feasible due to the small number of cases in this study. 
Instead it was chosen to conduct the analysis of the effects of governance fit on 
effectiveness, following a step-wise comparative research design as presented by Levi---
Faur (2006). This was done for groups of cases that differ in the outcome, partnership 
effectiveness, and in one of the contingent factors, either in the governance modes, or in 
the partnership-level conditions, controlling for the other one, respectively. 
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To begin with, the combinations of partnership-level conditions are explored that 
characterise effective and ineffective partnerships, in the presence of each of the 
governance forms separately. This way, we answer the question under which 
combination of partnership level conditions each governance form is effective. In the 
second part of the analysis we approach the data from the reverse angle and ask which 
governance form is effective, given the presence of adverse partnership-level conditions. 
For the latter step, those partnership-level conditions that are identified to occur in 
parallel with an absence of effectiveness are utilised as selection criteria. All those 
partnerships that show one or a combination of these adverse partnership-level 
conditions are considered for further analysis, looking at which governance form is 
effective under these adverse circumstances. 
The relationships between the concepts are analysed employing the qualitative-
comparative approach, first outlined by Charles Ragin in 1987 (Ragin, 1998). QCA 
applies Boolean logic to analyse the necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome 
based on set-theoretic relations. For example, all partnerships with power differentials 
also display shared governance, or all shared governed partnerships show at the same 
time the presence of power differentials. QCA methodology was chosen for, for two 
reasons: on the one hand, because the relatively small number of cases represents only a 
first step towards the generalisation of findings across cases (Provan et al., 2007) and 
does not permit inference statistical analyses (Lijphart, 1971). On the other hand, 
because the concept of governance fit implies that theoretically complex configurations 
of partnership-level conditions and governance form, rather than single factors explain 
partnership effectiveness (Ragin, 2002). Rather than trying to discover the net linear 
effect of single independent variables, QCA assesses how each configuration of 
partnership-level conditions and governance forms compares to other configurations on 
their level of the dependent variable. A great deal of recent empirical work has shown 
that QCA is useful in studying causally complex configurations (for an overview see: 
Ragin 2000). Indeed, QCA is well suited to the study of contingency (i.e., equifinality 
and synergy) in the interplay between partnership-level variables. 
Boolean sets, indicated by the presence or absence of certain conditions and 
governance forms relative to effectiveness require recoding the empirical indicators for 
the partnership-level conditions into dichotomous sets (0, 1). Effectiveness, partnership-
level conditions and governance forms were coded dichotomously. The calibration 
process is described in detail for each condition and governance form in the 
corresponding section of Chapter Four of this volume and will be demonstrated at this 
point only for the concepts of partnership effectiveness and the condition of power 
differentials, which is used as an aggregated indicator in the present analysis44.  
                                                 
44 The membership values of each case are displayed in appendix V. 
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Power. After obtaining the standard deviation for perceived resource-related power 
differentials, a cut-off value of 50% of the deviation scores of all partnerships is 
computed and the sample is divided into two groups, depending on whether (“1”) or not 
(“0”) partnerships display a perceived resource-related power differential.   
Partnership effectiveness. Data on partnership effectiveness are obtained from two 
perspectives: the intermediary organisations and the partners, and conceptualised at two 
analytical levels, the individual organisational and the project-level. To allow for the 
evaluation of partnerships across the two perspectives, a cut-off value of 50% of the 
average scores for all partnerships is computed for both measures. The sample is then 
divided accordingly into four groups; not effective (12 partnerships), effective only at 
the individual partner-level (three partnerships), effective only at the partnership-level 
(five partnerships), and finally, those partnerships that are effective at both levels (18 
partnerships). Depending on the group, each partnership receives a value of “0” or “1”. 
At first sight, no difference became apparent between partnerships that were effective at 
either the partner or the partnership-level of analysis. To simplify the following analysis, 
both dimensions are aggregated and a more conservative definition of effectiveness is 
used, considering as effective only those partnerships that were effective at both levels 
(18 partnerships).  
 
Combinatory set-theoretical solutions  
In the following, combinations of the conditions and governance forms that together 
indicate governance fit, are examined in their relationship to partnership effectiveness 
from two different angles, answering the following questions: “under which partnership-
level conditions are certain governance forms effective?” and “given the presence of 
adverse partnership-level conditions, which governance form is effective?”  
To answer the first question, the partnerships are divided into four groups with respect 
to the governance form they displayed. By the means of a truth-table analysis (Ragin, 
2002), it is examined for each group, which combinations of present and absent 
partnership-level conditions sufficiently explain partnership effectiveness. For a truth-
table analysis, an algorithm is employed that defines a measure of consistency in an 
inductive fashion, based on membership in a combination of conditions that shows 
membership scores equal with membership in the outcome (effectiveness) for each of the 
governance forms (Ibid.). Combinations of sets are called configurations. For any 
configuration, coverage indicates the number/proportion of cases that at the same time 
are effective, relative to the total number of effective partnerships. The higher the 
coverage score of a certain configuration of partnership-level conditions, the higher the 
proportion of effective cases explained by this configuration. Consistency assesses the 
degree to which a subset relation has been approximated, whereas coverage assesses the 
empirical relevance of a consistent subset (Ragin 2006). Both, consistency and coverage 
are important, since in the face of only a limited number of cases, coverage may not 
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always be given but consistency still specifies the accuracy of the explanation given by a 
solution (Goertz & Levy, 2005).  
As the result of a truth table analysis, QCA specifies two solutions that together 
describe a complexity/parsimony continuum of obtained configurations. One end of the 
continuum privileges complexity, with the complex solution(s) specifying the whole 
range of combinations found in the data to explain the outcome; the other end privileges 
parsimony, with the parsimonious solution(s) describing those core elements of the 
explanation that apply to all instances of the outcome. While both are rooted in evidence 
(Ragin & Sonnett, 2004:14), the complex solution constitutes subsets of the membership 
in the parsimonious solution. Differences in the parsimonious solutions and contributing 
conditions obtained from the corresponding complex solutions are indicated (Ragin, 
2002). Because in particular, the brokered groups are relative small, additional 
benchmarks indicate the chances for producing random models, based on the proportion 
of variables relative to cases (Marx, 2006: 19). Raw coverage measures the proportion of 
memberships in the outcome explained by each single term of the solution, computed 
from the membership values by dividing the sum of consistent membership in the 
solution by the sum of membership in the outcome. Unique coverage measures the 
proportion of memberships in the outcome solely explained by each individual solution 
term (memberships that are not covered by other solution terms).  
Table 5.3 shows the complex solution(s) that explain effectiveness for each 
governance group, while displaying the parsimonious solution(s) as core conditions45. 
Comparing the proposed configurations of governance fit (Table 5.1) to the findings of 
the first configurational analysis, no clear support is found for the proposition that shared 
governance (see Models I to III) is less effective than brokered governance (see Models 
IV to XI), when partnerships are larger in size (see Models II and III). Size is only part 
of the effective solutions of the centralised brokered governance forms (see Models VII 
and X), yet as such even effective when partnerships are participant-governed (Model 
X). We found strong support for the assumption that trust and goal agreement are 
essential conditions for effective partnering. Less clear, however, is the evidence found 
for a proposed distinction between shared and brokered governed partnerships, with 
respect to their fit to these conditions. It is proposed that their presence is an essential 
prerequisite for effective shared governance and that brokered governed partnerships can 
be effective albeit their absence since brokerage can provide guidance when goals are 
not shared and trust must not be widely dispersed among partners when a brokering 
entity functions as a ‘hub’ (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Yet, none of the effective solutions 
for any of the governance forms include the parallel absence of goal agreement and trust. 
Nevertheless, slightly different configurations for each governance mode seem to 
support the assumption that goal agreement may be more important for effective 
                                                 
45 The truth table for the analyses is displayed in Table VI.II of Appendix VI.  
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brokered partnerships with centralised interactions between partners (see Models VII to 
XI) than trust, and vice versa for effective partnerships with decentralised interactions 
(see Models I to VI). 
The assumption that external uncertainty is a disadvantage for shared governance is 
confirmed in the face of uncertain funding but not uncertain operative environments (see 
Model II and III). Yet, only decentralised partnerships with concentrated decision-
making power, which, in contrast to the shared governed partnerships frequently display 
centralised external representation, are effective in face of uncertainty conveyed by both, 
the funding and operative environments (see Model IV). Among the brokered forms, 
some further evidence is found for the assumption that funding uncertainty are more 
effectively governed by partnerships with centralised interactions (cf. Models VII to XI). 
 
In the final step of the analysis, the reverse angle on governance fit is taken. If certain 
governance forms are more or less effective under different partnership-level conditions, 
then the reverse argument should equally hold. That is, different ways of governing 
partnerships should vary in their effects on potentially adverse partnership-level 
conditions. From this perspective, differences in the effectiveness of governance forms 
are explored given the presence of adverse partnership-level conditions. First, those 
combinations of conditions are identified that characterise ineffective partnerships, 
regardless of the presence or absence of any particular governance mode. As it had 
already been suggested by the findings of the first step of the analysis, the parsimonious 
solution for adverse partnership-level conditions confirms as such the presence of power 
differentials and the absence of goal agreement and trust (solution consistency = 0.89, 
solution coverage = 0.67). In total, 25 partnerships faced one or a combination of those 
adverse conditions: 17 of the 22 brokered and eight of the 16 shared governed 
partnerships. These 25 partnerships were selected and their effective solutions were 
obtained. Table 5.4. shows the findings of the analysis involving those 26 partnerships 
that faced one or more of the adverse conditions. 
The findings show that brokered partnerships with centralised activity structures and 
shared decision-making power are most effective even in face of adverse partnership-
level conditions, namely when perceived resource-related power differentials between 
partners characterise a partnership. However, the effective solutions specifying this 
governance form, at the same time displayed the presence of the presence of goal 
agreement and trust, respectively. Hence, although this governance form appears as the 
most suitable response in case partnerships face the existence of perceived resource-




Table 5.3: Combinatory solutions for the effectiveness of governance forms 
 Shared governance 
Decentralised activities/ 
concentrated decision-making power 
Centralised activities/ 
shared decision-making power 
Centralised activities/  
concentrated decision-making 
power 
 (N=16) (N= 11) (N=7) (N=4) 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X Model XI 
 Effective ~ effective ~ effective effective ~ effective ~ effective effective effective ~ effective effective ~ effective 
Size  Ѳ ● Ѳ ● ● ● ● ● ●  
Trust ● Ѳ Ѳ ●  Ѳ  ●   Ѳ 
Goals ● Ѳ   Ѳ ● ● ● Ѳ ● Ѳ 
Power differential Ѳ ● ● Ѳ ● ● ● ● Ѳ Ѳ ● 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
 Ѳ  ● Ѳ  Ѳ  ● Ѳ ● 
Funding uncertainty  ● ● ●   ● ● Ѳ Ѳ  
P of generating random 
model 1 
>1-10% >1-10% >1-10% >33% >33% >33% >33% >33% >33% >33% >33% 
Raw coverage 0,52 0,22 0,33 0,67 0,33 0,14 0,47 0,47 0,27 0,67 0,67 
Unique coverage 0,52 0,14 0,20 0,67 0,33 0,14 0,30 0,30 0,27 0,67 0,67 
Consistency 0,83 0,80 0,84 0,86 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,80 
Solution coverage  0,47  0,47 0,67    
Solution consistency  0,88  1,00 1,00    
 
●= core causal condition present  
Ѳ = core causal condition absent 
● = contributing to causal condition present 
Ѳ = contributing to causal condition absent 
 
1  > 0 
    1<10%  
  >10<33% 
  >33% 
= Models developed on the basis of this specification    are valid 
= Model-specification will almost always be valid. 
= Significant possibility of finding valid model 
= Models could also be generated ad random. 
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favourable conditions, trust and goal agreement, for partnerships to become effective. 
The net effect of this governance form on partnership effectiveness in face of power 
differentials cannot clearly be determined on basis of the present data because no 
counterfactual cases (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005) exist that are effective despite the presence 
of all three adverse partnership-level conditions. 
 
Table 5.4: Combinatory solutions in the face of adverse partnership conditions 
 Effective 
 Model  I Model II 
Trust  ● 
Goals ●  
Power differential ● ● 
Shared Ѳ Ѳ 
Decentralised/ Concentrated Ѳ Ѳ 
Centralised/ Shared ● ● 
Centralised/ Concentrated Ѳ Ѳ 
P of generating random model 1 >10-<33% >10-<33% 
Raw coverage 0,38 0,29 
Unique coverage 0,17 0,08 
Consistency 1,00 1,00 
Solution coverage 0,46 
Solution consistency 1,00 
 
●= core causal condition present  
Ѳ = core causal condition absent 
● = contributing to causal condition present 
Ѳ = contributing to causal condition absent 
 
1> 0 
  1<10%   
>10<33% 
  >33% 
= Models developed on the basis of this specification  are valid 
= Model-specification will almost always be valid. 
= Significant possibility of finding valid model 
= Models could also be generated ad random. 
 
The findings show that brokered partnerships with centralised activity structures and 
shared decision-making power are most effective even in face of adverse partnership-
level conditions, namely when perceived resource-related power differentials between 
partners characterise a partnership. However, the effective solutions specifying this 
governance form, at the same time displayed the presence of the presence of goal 
agreement and trust, respectively. Hence, although this governance form appears as the 
most suitable response in case partnerships face the existence of perceived resource-
related power differentials, it still seems to require the parallel presence of the other two 
favourable conditions, trust and goal agreement, for partnerships to become effective. 
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The net effect of this governance form on partnership effectiveness in face of power 
differentials cannot clearly be determined on basis of the present data because no 
counterfactual cases (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005) exist that are effective despite the presence 
of all three adverse partnership-level conditions. 
In a similar vein, and despite the conservative definition of effectiveness applied, it 
should be noted, that the findings do not suggest that power differentials are the only or 
most important adverse partnership-level condition that requires adequate governance 
response for partnerships to become effective. For example, no case in which trust is 
absent is effective at both, the individual partner and partnership-levels of analysis. In 
fact, the condition of a presence of power differentials merely displays the strongest 
variation in its relation to effectiveness, depending on the parallel presence of one of the 
governance forms. 
The only three cases in which there was no trust present but that showed effectiveness 
at least at one level, namely at the partnership-level, combine the presence of goal 
agreement in three cases with concentrated (one by the centralised and two by the 
decentralised form) and in one case with additional shared decision making power (cf. 
Appendix V). Although for these cases no systematic combinatory contingent effects in 
relation to any one of the governance forms are obtained from the truth table analysis, 
the findings suggest that partnerships facing the absence of trust may still be effective. 
Yet, effectiveness is confined to the partnership-level of analysis and occurs only in case 
goal agreement is present.  
Finally, in support of the contingent effects of brokered partnerships in face of power 
differentials, the proposition is that two governance aspects are decisive: the presence of 
shared control and influence, and the employment of enabling and supportive 
governance interventions. As demonstrated by the findings presented in Table 5.5, the 
presence of shared control and influence in partnership-related decision-making seem 
indeed crucial for partnerships to become effective in the face of the otherwise 
detrimental effects of power differentials. Notably, this finding does not imply that both 
governance aspects, shared influence and control, have to be present in any partnership 
to be effective. Yet, in case of perceived resource-related power differentials and a 
parallel absence of equity financing the combination of both aspects seems most 
effective. Less clear are the results obtained for enabling interventions, which are argued 
to facilitate meaningful participation and overcome imbalances that arise from perceived 
resource-related power differentials. Even though such interventions are to a lesser or 
greater extent applied by almost all brokered governed partnerships, all brokered 
partnerships with shared influence and control also apply these interventions. As a 
consequence, it can not be said if these partnerships would have been equally effective 
without these interventions. Rather, the findings suggest that these interventions alone do 
not produce a similar effect compared to if they are combined with structural measures 
of shared control and influence.    
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Further, one of the main arguments of Provan and Kenis’ (2008) framework, the 
proposition of benefits derived from a separation of operational and individual 
organisational from partnership-level governance and interests, finds no strong support. 
The argument is that brokered governed partnerships in which an entity or partnership 
broker is assigned with the governance task show a superior performance in face of 
adverse partnership level conditions, since such a separation would prevent a conflict of 
interests to arise. In the present data however, not all nine externally governed 
partnerships, but only those that at the same time showed shared influence and control, 
are effective. This finding suggests that neither the aspect of external governance per-se 
to contribute to effectiveness, nor a separation of individual organisational and 
partnership-level interests to per-se result in reciprocal control and influence. When 
instead both, influence and control are shared, nine out of thirteen partnerships (all either 
shared governed or with centralised interactions and shared influence) are effective. 
Nonetheless, when compared across the whole sample, partnerships are effective even 
though less frequently, without the parallel presence of shared control and/or influence. 
In case of the presence of only shared influence (among shared governed partnerships 
and partnerships with centralised interactions and shared influence but no shared control) 
five out of twelve partnerships are effective. Reversely, the two cases that displayed only 
shared control but not influence (two partnerships with concentrated influence) are both 
effective. This finding may give vague direction that shared control has a stronger effect 
than actual shared influence on enhancing effectiveness, yet needs further examination. 
Hence, demonstrated by the means of cases facing the potentially detrimental 
partnership-level condition of resource-related power differentials, neither a separation 
of partner- and partnership-level interests, nor efforts to support partners, alone, but their 
combination with enabling structural measures that facilitate shared control and 
influence, seem to show the most profound effect of governance fit on partnership 
effectiveness.   
 
 
5.5 Conclusion and discussion  
The present study demonstrated the contingent effect of governance fit on the 
effectiveness of 38 development partnerships, from two different angles. First, it is 
shown that the combined presence or absence of partnership-level conditions described 
situations in which governance forms are more or less effective. Subsequently, three 
partnership-level conditions, the absence of trust and goal agreement and the presence of 
power differentials, are identified as potentially adverse conditions for effectiveness. 
Based on an analysis of those partnerships that showed one or more of these adverse 
conditions, it is asserted that the brokered governance form with centralised interactions 
and shared influence and control is most effective, in particular in the face of power 
differentials. A full analysis and subsequent generalisation of the net effect of any of the 
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conditions or governance forms alone, however, is not possible, due to the unbalanced 
representation of conditions and governance forms by the sample and the consequently 
limited number of counterfactual cases. Hence, following a heuristic for stepwise 
comparative research, our findings show clear limitations in their generalisability. 
Strictly speaking, each governance mode or even each single governance aspect and 
partnership-level condition must be analysed in their combined effect on effectiveness, 
given the presence of a range or at least equal number of counterfactual cases. Such an 
analysis was not possible. Albeit the possibility to include hypothetical counterfactual 
cases in a QCA analysis (Ragin & Sonnett, 2004), this option was not utilised, since the 
specific configurations of governance fit, obtained from the present data can be regarded 
as a finding in itself. Yet, foremost demonstrating the need to broaden and diversify the 
empirical basis on which current thinking about effective partnership governance fit 
builds. 
In the course of this limitation of the present study, several findings must be 
interpreted with caution, when comparing them to previous studies in this field. First, the 
selection of relevant partnership conditions and governance interventions followed 
existent reviews and integrations of relevant concepts derived from the literature on 
both, public-service partnerships in a non-development (Provan & Kenis, 2008) and on 
partnerships in international development cooperation (see Chapter Two of this volume). 
The limitations in the interpretation of differences to previous findings in these fields 
will be briefly exemplified by the conditions of size and power differentials. A strong 
impact of partnership size on the superior contingent effect of in particular centralised 
administrative governance forms (Simons, 1984) was not supported by our findings. Yet, 
the insights gained with respect to size are generally limited, because the partnerships 
under study were relatively small compared to the inter-organizational networks 
analysed in previous studies (e.g. Milward & Provan, 1995; Milward et al., 2009; Provan 
et al., 2004; Provan et al., 2007). This characteristic of the present sample is also more 
generally disputable in terms of the employment of network analytical measures for the 
analysis of the governance form, including (in the present sample four) dyadic 
partnerships. Although we acknowledge the methodological argument that high density 
in a dyadic partnership is much easier to achieve than among say fifteen partners, from a 
practical and also theoretical point of view we see the inclusion of dyadic relations 
justified. First, dyadic partnerships, between Northern and Southern partners of various 
kinds, describe large parts of the reality of the phenomenon of partnerships in 
international development cooperation (Ashman, 2001; Awortwi, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 
2002a; Brinkerhoff, 2004; Sanyal, 2006). Secondly, the meaning of an absent tie in this 
context can be argued to be equally, if not more important, in dyadic governance 
relationships compared to more complex inter-organisational structures and makes the 
demarcation of governance modes for smaller and dyadic partnerships even stricter in 
the present study. Proceeding from this argument, the findings support previous 
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arguments of a superior performance of centralised compared to decentralised structures 
in case of larger partnerships. Among the partnerships with centralised interactions and 
concentrated decision-making power, only one and here the effective partnership was 
larger in size, while the remaining three partnerships, were dyadic and apart from one, 
all ineffective.  
Eventually, the main contribution of the present study to the existing literature on 
partnership governance may be the incorporation of power into a contingency 
framework. The partnership literature is fuelled with discussions about the impact of 
seemingly insuperable power imbalances on partnership processes and outcomes. Mainly 
however, of an advocating nature, and rarely empirically comparative but mostly based 
on single partners or cases existent research on power in partnerships seems almost in 
avoidance of establishing any link to effectiveness considerations. This way an 
apparently artificial gap is created between a self-constituted “critical” perspective and a 
“mainstream” focus on effectiveness. The present findings do not identify power as the 
only or most important condition that needs to be addressed by governance measures for 
partnerships to be effective. Yet, a more nuanced picture of the issue of power and its 
interaction with other partnership-level conditions is given, most notably with 
governance interventions. Power imbalances represent a challenge to effective partnering 
in many areas of partnership operation as demonstrated by the strong attention the issue 
receives by the literature on multi-sector partnerships for sustainable development. The 
finding that the potentially detrimental effects of power differences are capable of ―to 
some extent― being influenced by concerted interventions in the governance of 
partnerships, can serve as a starting point for further systematic inquiry into such effects 
also in other areas of partnership operation. The present findings demonstrate that both 
aspects power and effectiveness can be integrated in one contingency framework 
through the concept of partnership governance. Future efforts may further explore and 
specify those partnership-level conditions, under which governance matters. 
 











Proceeding from the notice that, on the one hand, differences in power between a range 
of diverse organisations from different societal sectors, regions, with different resources, 
diverse interests, perspectives and attitudes render conflict and partnership failure, but 
nonetheless, on the other hand, effective participation and partnerships exist, the present 
study set out to reconcile these seemingly contradictory observations. The research 
presented in this dissertation set out to explore what the origins and consequences of 
power in partnerships are and ergo which partnership-level influences effectively govern 
power relations in this context. More specifically, the research focused on the following 
over-arching research question:  
 
“What are the origins and effects of power and differences in power in partnerships 
on the effective participation in and the effectiveness of partnerships? And what is the 
role of ‘governance-fit’ in this context? 
 
Answering this question adds to the scientific literature as existing knowledge about 
power in and partnership effectiveness has largely been disconnected so far. On the one 
hand, power has mostly been regarded as something that determines the prospects of 
successful participation for individual partners or groups but rarely conceptualised and 
empirically examined across all participants that is as a partnership-level condition that 
impacts upon and interacts with other conditions and partnership-level outcomes. On the 
other hand, power dispositions and the way differences in such impact upon the 
prospects of effective participation and partnership have been neglected and uniformity 
has been predicated. This way, power differentials have not explicitly been addressed as 
a partnership-level condition that derives from individual organisational differences in 
power dispositions, yet impacts upon collective outcomes and the prospects of overall 
partnership success (Chapter 2).  
Based on the review of existing insights with regard to the origins that is bases of 
power and their effect at the individual organisational level of analysis, it can be 




effect on the degree of effectiveness of individual organisational participation. Taking 
this idea beyond single actors or groups of participants to a more general level, by 
incorporating partnership-level influences on organisational bases of power, these effects 
are confirmed through attending to differences in the functioning of two bases of power: 
resources and positions. Namely, discriminating effects are found for resources on 
involvement in the interactions between partners and influence on decision-making 
processes but not on involvement in the latter. Proceeding from this finding, conclusion 
is drawn that even though partnership-level assessments of organisational bases of 
power, namely resource perceptions, may turn out positive, nonetheless their functioning 
in partnerships and thus effective participation is not guaranteed. This is in particular, 
since no discriminating effect is found of resource perceptions on involvement in 
partnership-level decision-making.  
Yet, in their interaction, the two bases of power, resources and positions, turn out to 
significantly increase this function and the chances for effective participation. On the 
one hand, involvement in partnership interactions and decision-making significantly 
increases the influence in particular of resource-wise less powerful partners. Reversely, 
in particular those resources that most strongly depend on utility perceptions in 
partnerships show discriminating effects on effectiveness, when the partners who access 
and/or control them are involved and can enact them in decision-making processes. This 
finding points out several possibilities for interventions in order to enable effective 
participation in partnerships, for example through interventions aiming at changing 
resource-related perceptions and/or aiming at overcoming structural barriers through 
turning particular attention to the involvement of partners in and control over decision-
making processes (Chapter 3). 
The outcome of this analysis is the idea that micro-level phenomena, such as the 
functioning of bases of power at the individual organisational level of analysis find their 
ways into and are influenced by macro- that is partnership-level phenomena, such as 
partnership governance and effectiveness. The interaction between micro- and macro-
level causes and consequences of power in partnerships is analysed in two steps. By the 
first inquiry into partnership-level conditions that explain the adoption of governance 
forms, it is demonstrated that the presence or absence of power differentials play a 
decisive role. In particular, differences in power differentials are found to explain the 
adoption of shared vis-à-vis brokered governed forms. Shared governed partnerships are 
more frequently characterised by equity financing arrangements, trust and an absence of 
perceived resource-related power differentials. Brokered partnerships instead, frequently 
represent the governance response to perceived resource-related power differentials and 
a parallel absence of equity financing, with enabling and supportive interventions, such 
as assistance and support given to partners and to varying degrees supplemented by 
structural adjustments, e.g. the implementation of external instead of participant-




form over another in face of different partnership conditions, in particular power 
differentials between partners, by development partnerships are identified. Those are 
discussed in the light of previous thinking, in particular of Provan and Kenis’ (2007) 
threefold framework on partnership effectiveness. Distinctive ‘own’ logics for the 
adoption of governance forms by development partnerships are developed, with regard 
to the conditions encountered, e.g. power differentials and uncertainty conveyed by the 
operational environments, and governance interventions applied, e.g. rights-based and 
enabling interventions, which are found characteristic of partnerships in the context of 
international development cooperation (Chapter 4). 
Finally, based on the concepts established in the precedent chapters, it is demonstrated 
by the findings of the last empirical chapter that the interactions between partnership-
level conditions and governance responses, which is conceptually integrated to 
‘governance fit’, have an impact on partnership effectiveness. Not only are different 
governance forms effective depending on the presence and/or absence of certain 
combinations of partnership-level conditions but variation exists also in the degree to 
which they represent effective governance responses in face of particularly challenging 
conditions, which are identified as the absence of trust and/or goal agreement and the 
presence of power differentials. Notably, the impact of governance fit, that is the 
interaction between partnership-level conditions and governance form, on effective 
partnership becomes most significant with respect to the governance of power 
differentials. In face of which, the governance form that displays a parallel presence of 
centralised interactions, shared control and influence, and enabling partnership 
interventions proves to be most effective (Chapter 5). 
The subsequent sections elaborate upon the main effects of power at the individual-
organisational as well as at the partnership-level of analysis, on partnership 
effectiveness, under consideration of the effect of governance fit. The interactions 
between the micro- and macro-level foundations of power in partnerships will be 
discussed based on the empirical results presented in more detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
In section 6.4, an assessment will be made as to what extent the expected contributions 
to the existent knowledge about power and its governance in partnerships have been 
realised. In section 6.5, the limitations of the research undertaken will be discussed. 
Based on these limitations, possible directions for future research are developed.  
 
                     
6.2 The micro-foundations of power and effective participation  
 
A lot of research has already been conducted regarding the relationship between power 
dispositions and effective partnering. However, most of these studies focus on the 
chances for successful partnership involvement of single actors or certain groups and 




Chapter 3, the existing insights generated by this large but fragmented body of literature 
have been used to construct a baseline model of the micro-foundations of power in 
partnerships, encompassing the interaction between bases of power in their relationship 
to effective participation. In this model, partnership-level influences are incorporated to 
the extent that bases of power of individual partners are evaluated, not as static or 
‘centred’ within partners or groups (Allen, 2003) but as being subject to relational 
partnership-level assessments. On the one hand, such influences are integrated through 
resources being subject to partnership-level perceptions of their utility for other partners 
and the success of the partnership and through positions being derived from the ongoing 
interactions among partners, and the selection of partners for involvement in partnership-
level decisions, on the other. This approach allows for a critical analysis of the added-
value of the systematic inclusion of partnership-level relational influences on top of 
already existing insights. 
 With regard to the perceptional measures of resources, the analysis shows that high 
levels of utility perceptions indeed added discriminative value to the impact of resources 
on effective participation. Similar explanatory value is found to be added by considering 
not only participation in partnerships as a means in itself but incorporating partnership-
specific positional measures of involvement in the interactions and decision-making 
processes. With these findings, a distinction between potential power, enacted power, 
influence and effective participation, and herewith a discriminative effect of partnership-
level specific influences on the power dispositions of partners, that has been predicted 
theoretically by various scholars (e.g. Jacobson & Cohen, 1986; Provan & 
Gassenheimer, 1994; Provan, 1980) is confirmed empirically in the context of 
development partnerships. Discriminative effects have previously been confirmed to 
mark a distinction between resources (Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; 
Provan  et al., 1980), and between structural positions in their effects on partnering 
outcomes (Provan et al., 2009). Yet, such effects are only confirmed for resource-related 
perceptions on the involvement in the ongoing interactions between partners and on 
influence in partnership-level decision-making but not on involvement in the latter 
processes. Thus, the present findings question the equity-related assumption of these 
effects to automatically develop and hold for all resources and on all instances of power. 
Rather they point out the need to reconsider traditional views on the functioning of bases 
of power and the development of resource-dependencies and related relational structures 
in resource-diverse and often externally induced, for example mandated contexts, such 
as development partnerships. The findings demonstrate that not all resources to the same 
extent result in advantageous positions and/or effective participation. While such 
discriminative effects of resources were found by previous studies (e.g. Alexander, 1996; 
Huang & Provan, 2007), the present findings are of particular importance for several 
reasons. Firstly, not any but namely the beneficiary-related resources, e.g. manpower and 




at the same time no or even negative effects on involvement in the control-related 
activities and decision-making processes. This finding raises questions, about the 
chances for effective participation of those partners controlling and/or accessing these 
resources, which would typically be those partners whose development needs 
partnerships actually seek to address, or those who represent these needs in partnerships. 
Secondly, herewith this finding as well calls into question the overall success of the 
collective endeavour. This is on the one hand, because partnership effectiveness depends 
on knowledge exchange and building of, not at least, organisational and administrative 
capacities of and the transfer of control to these very constituents (Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff, 2005; Brown & Ashman, 1996). On the other hand, possibilities for 
reciprocal control and mutual influence may be of less importance when conditions are 
favourable, e.g. shared goals serve as a motive of coordination and integrative 
mechanism (Ansell & Gash, 2007) and areas of responsibility and expertise are well-
defined (Huang & Provan, 2006). Yet, safeguards for equitable collaboration become 
crucial for partnerships to become effective, in the event that such favourable conditions 
cannot be taken for granted and risk lies in rendering conflict and withdrawal (Brown & 
Ashman, 1996). In these latter events, the question arises, how the conditions for the 
development of these structures can be created. In particular, if they do not 
‘automatically’ manifest themselves from the interactions between partners, as it is 
demonstrated by the present findings but implicitly assumed when taking cues from 
theories about the functioning of bases of power in markets (Jones et al., 1997) or 
administrative decision-making contexts (Entwistle et al., 2007). From the subsequent 
testing of the effects of the absence of one base of power against the presence of the 
other, several conclusions with regard to such efforts of creating these conditions can be 
drawn. On the one hand, interventions aiming at increasing the chances for involvement 
in the more constitutive decisions about the design of partnerships and in the control-
related activities significantly impact upon the prospects of influence and effective 
participation. Notably, these effects most strongly appear for resource-wise less powerful 
actors. On the other hand, it is demonstrated that, contrary to previous findings (Derkzen 
& Bock, 2007), if involved in decision-making processes, a discriminating effect on 
influence holds, in particular for those resources that most strongly depend on their 
effectiveness on partnership-related utility perceptions, such as manpower and the 
representation of beneficiaries. These findings indicate that if reciprocal control and 
influence do not automatically develop between partners in resource diverse 
partnerships, interventions aiming at both changing perceptions and addressing structural 
barriers to effective participation can significantly increase the chances for effective 
partnership. Yet, the parallel finding of a missing linkage of the translation of these very 
resources into involvement that are perceived as useful and display the strongest effect 
on influence, if they are involved, may ascribe more importance to interventions 




Summarised, the findings show that adding partnership-level influences on top of 
already existing insights about the functioning of bases of power in different inter-
organisational settings significantly enhances the explanatory power of dispositional 
understandings of the micro-foundations of power in partnerships, i.e. the relational 
notion of power in resource-dependence theories. This way, beyond a mere demarcation 
of more or less powerful actors, the more fundamental question of why are certain actors 
more powerful than others is answered. Yet, at the same time, the limits of such 
relational thinking in diversely resourced inter-organisational contexts are demonstrated 
and it is exemplified where interventions can best address the functioning of inter-
organisational bases of power to facilitate effective participation in partnerships.   
 
 
6.3 The macro-foundations of power and effective partnerships 
With regard to the macro-foundations of effective partnerships, a situation similar to the 
one with regard to the micro-foundations is encountered. Theoretical perspectives that 
had seemed likely to provide synergy benefits when studying power in relationship to 
partnership effectiveness exist but have rarely been systematically integrated in one 
framework and analysed across a number of comparable cases. Firstly, comparable to 
what has been attempted in the previous chapter, dispositional and episodic 
understandings of power in partnerships are integrated through the aggregation of the 
individual perspectives of all partners in a partnership to the partnership-level of 
analysis, herewith establishing power differentials as a partnership-level condition. 
Secondly, insights gained from two threads of research, one on the public-service and 
the other one on partnerships operating in the context of international development 
cooperation are integrated to examine the threefold contingency argument recently 
presented by Provan and Kenis (2008). Their argument builds upon the assumption that 
certain governance forms are more or less effective in the face of certain combinations of 
the absence or presence of partnership-level conditions. Again, a multi-disciplinary 
model is built and examined. This model incorporates the combined perspective on 
partnership governance, involving structural governance properties and interventions, of 
which the latter are supplemented by enabling measures that are identified as relevant by 
development scholars. In addition, the conditions of size, trust, goal agreement and 
funding uncertainty that are proposed to be impact upon the effectiveness of public-
service partnerships (Ibid.), are supplemented by the two conditions of internally, power 
differentials between partners, and externally, uncertainty conveyed by the operational 
environment that are proposed to be relevant in a development context.          
Based on the integration of these perspectives it was expected that development 
partnerships will show, on the one hand, their own governance challenges and logics in 




of governance forms to certain combinations of partnership-level conditions, impact 
upon the effectiveness of partnerships, on the other. The conclusions drawn from the 
testing of these assumptions are presented in two steps: 
With regard to the findings with regard to the relationship between the presence and 
absence of partnership-level conditions and the adoption of governance forms, which is 
examined in Chapter 4, several conclusions can be drawn. To begin with, the 
identification of governance forms from the present data reveals that differences between 
structural governance properties indeed relate to differences in the interventions applied. 
For example, shared governed partnerships (with decentralised interactions and shared 
influence on partnership-level decisions) display almost equally high levels of 
formalisation compared to brokered forms but shared control and low levels of applying 
enabling interventions and lack the application of structural interventions, such as the 
establishment of a governing entity or centralised external representation. Further, three 
distinct brokered governance forms are identified along the two structural dimensions of 
decentralised to centralised interactions and shared to concentrated influence in 
partnership-level decisions. With regard to the interventions that accompany these forms, 
difference is found for the occurrence of shared control, which seems to be a prerequisite 
for the shared influence that characterises only the brokered form with shared control. 
This finding contributes to the present understanding of partnership governance by 
demonstrating that structural properties and interventions systematically relate to each 
other (Ibid.). Secondly, the finding that explanations for the adoption of different 
combinations of structural governance properties and interventions are found in the 
parallel absence or presence of certain partnership conditions supports the underlying 
logic of the threefold argument of Provan and Kenis (Ibid.). The main differences are 
identified between the conditions that characterise brokered versus shared governed 
partnerships. Shared governed partnerships are frequently adopted either in the face of 
the combination of the internal conditions of a parallel presence of trust and equity 
financing and an absence of resource-related power differentials, or if funding 
uncertainty is absent but the operational environment is perceived as uncertain. Brokered 
partnerships, instead, are adopted when power differentials and goal agreement are 
present and funding environments are uncertain. The logics of the adoption of different 
governance forms in the face of certain partnership conditions identified here only 
partially support those specified for public-service partnerships by Provan and Kenis 
(Ibid.) but instead suggest the existence of domain-specific ‘own’ logics, characteristic 
of partnerships in the context of international development cooperation. Shared 
governance seems to predicate on the absence of resource-related perceptions of power 
differences. This is reasonable in the face of equity financing arrangements that often 
come along with high levels of formalisation (e.g. Muthusamy & White, 2006) and 
herewith create the basis for relations at eye-level that demand shared control and 




predicate upon the presence of perceived resource-related inequality, in terms of the 
acknowledgement of potential contributions to the partnership and actual levels of 
financing by partners. The common denominator in brokered governed partnerships is 
identified as goal agreement rather than trust. This seems reasonable, since in only the 
minority of brokered cases are control and influence (actually and) effectively shared 
among partners and in face of funding being provided by only one or a few partners, 
goal formulation and agreement is likely to precede successful fund application. With 
regard to external conditions for partnering, the findings are ambiguous. On the one 
hand, decentralised interactions are found to be adopted in the presence of uncertain 
operational environments, e.g. by shared governed partnerships. This is argued to be 
reasoned in the difficulties encountered by often donor-directed attempts to establish 
centralised external representation and consequently a decision by practitioners to rely 
on and keep the individual contacts of partners if such instances lack legitimacy. Yet, if 
brokered and equally as in the shared model displaying decentralised interactions 
internally, governance often was supplemented by a centralised external representation, 
which was not adopted by shared governed partnerships. This finding may indicate that 
although both governance forms are frequently adopted when uncertain operative 
environments are faced, practitioners in shared governed partnerships are financially less 
dependent on and therefore may enjoy more discretion from ‘external’ demands and 
donors’ interests in their decision to keep individual partners as liaisons with external 
stakeholders.  
Hence, both conditions characteristic of partnering in a development context, power 
differentials between partners and uncertain operative environments, received much 
stronger significance than expected based on the propositions derived from research on 
public-service partnerships (Ibid.). Yet ultimately, although different logics for adopting 
one governance form over another in the context of development cooperation are 
identified and compared to existing theoretical thinking on public-service partnerships. 
The actual reasons for their adoption can only be assumed to be guided by, e.g. 
considerations about their effectiveness, but not tested to that effect as guided by the 
explorative research objective of this chapter.  
In Chapter 5 instead, the objective is to test Provan and Kenis’ (Ibid.) contingency 
framework and examine the relationship between ‘governance fit’ and partnership 
effectiveness. Two arguments with regard to ‘governance fit’ are contrasted to explain 
this relationship. To begin with, there is the argument of Provan and Kenis’ (Ibid.) 
distinction between shared and brokered governance forms. This argument posits that the 
more complex the conditions encountered in a partnership, such as when partnerships are 
larger in size, lack goal agreement and trust, and face uncertain funding environments, 
the more likely it is that brokered rather than shared governance forms will be effective. 
The second argument builds on the previous analysis and discussion of different logics 




on this analysis, it is argued, that in face of uncertain operational environments 
decentralised interactions and the governance of external relations via the contacts of 
single partners may be equally or more effective than centralised interactions and 
external representation, if such representation is not (yet) legitimate. Secondly, two ways 
of governing power differentials in partnerships are proposed to be effective. On the one 
hand, by applying enabling interventions and on the other, by interventions targeting 
structural barriers to mutuality, such as sharing control or the separation of partnership-
level from individual organisational interests through assigning an external governing 
entity or partnership-level staff with the governance task. These arguments are examined 
from two directions: firstly, it was analysed under which partnership-level conditions the 
governance modes are effective; secondly, those conditions that showed detrimental 
effects on effectiveness across cases are identified and subsequently tested for which 
governance form is most effective in their presence.  
From the results of these analyses, it can be concluded that external uncertainties are 
more effectively governed by decentralised interactions, if conveyed by the operational 
environment and by centralised interactions, if conveyed by the funding environment. 
This finding confirms existing knowledge about the superior performance of centralised 
structures in the governance of donor relations (e.g. Milward & Provan, 1995) and adds 
insight about the superior performance of decentralised structures and partner-directed 
governance of external relations, in face of uncertain operational environments. Despite 
these external conditions, most clearly, is the detrimental impact on effectiveness 
observed across almost all partnerships for the internal conditions of an absence of goal 
agreement and trust and the presence of power differentials. A lack of goal agreement 
and/or trust in partnerships have previously been specified as potentially detrimental to 
partnership effectiveness (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Hardy & 
Phillips, 1997; Klaster et al, 2010). Power instead has to date mostly been defined and 
examined as determining the prospects for effective participation of single actors or 
groups. That power differentials between partners represent a partnership-level 
condition, which influences the prospects for success of the collective endeavour, has 
frequently been assumed (e.g. Alter & Hage, 1993; Brett, 2003; Brown & Ashman, 
1996; Bryson & Crosby, 2005; 2006), but not empirically examined so far. As such this 
finding represents an important contribution to the existing literature. In particular, 
because in contrast to the absence of goal agreement and trust, which, in almost all cases 
result in ineffective partnerships, the presence of power differentials was identified as 
‘governable’. That is the presence of power differentials as a partnership-level condition 
shows variability in its relationship to effectiveness, depending on the combination with 
certain governance forms. The brokered form, combining centralised interactions with 
shared influence and control, is identified as the governance form that is most effective 
in the face of power differentials. Subsequently, cases with this governance form are 




governance aspects that supplement the  effective form, e.g. enabling governance 
interventions, external governance and/or a separation of individual organisational from 
partnership-level interests. From this comparison the conclusion is drawn that not one of 
these single aspects alone but their combination by the brokered form with centralised 
interactions and shared influence and control, effectively governs the otherwise 
detrimental condition of power differentials. 
 
Based on the above and with regard to the interaction between the micro- and macro-
foundations of effective participation and partnership, the following general conclusions 
can be drawn. Firstly, if power differences exist, a functioning of the micro-foundations 
of effective participation, that is, a translation of bases of power into involvement, 
control and influence is cast into doubt even when perceptions of resource-related 
potential power are shared. As such, power differentials represent a partnership-level 
condition that requires interventions, in terms of structural adjustments, as well as 
relationship building, assistance and support in order for partnerships to become 
effective. Not only the need but a requirement for intervention is made explicit, since 
neither at the micro-level from the interactions and perceptions among partners, nor at 
the macro-level from an ‘installed’ separation of individual organisational and 
partnership-level interests alone, does governance fit emerge automatically. To inform 
the design and implementation of partnerships and increase governance fit in the light of 
these findings, combining theoretical insights from different areas of partnership 
operation and research provides synergy benefits. By treating power seriously but not 
insurmountable for partnerships to become effective, more complete insights with regard 
to the interaction between micro- and macro-level phenomena can be gained. Rather 
than by, either treating power as a non-issue or as something ‘merely’ affecting the 
prospects of effective participation of individual (powerless) partners, or by taking 
power differences between partners for granted in the context of highly diverse inter-
organisational contexts. By combining both perspectives, a picture of various complex 
relations between the micro- and macro-foundations for effective partnership emerges 
and several aspects of the governance of partnerships turn out to play an important role 
in the development of these relations. 
 
 
6.4 Research implications 
Besides the specific contributions of each individual chapter, the research findings 
presented in the above contain more general contributions to the scientific literature on 
power in partnerships and its governance as well.  
By combining the concepts of power, governance and effectiveness in one framework, 




priorities set, a Northern/Western bias in existent partnership research. This issue has 
been brought up by scholars of inter-organisational networks and partnerships (Raab & 
Kenis, 2009) and development scholars (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Thomas, 1996) alike. The 
findings presented here clearly indicate that developing, in this sense, multi-disciplinary 
models yield added value in both fields. For example, the findings reveal that the 
governance of power relations is an issue that not only affects the prospects of effective 
participation of individual partners but in fact, can, if not adequately addressed, 
significantly limit the chances for overall partnership success. Large differences in and 
high levels of diversity of resources of partners combined with the diverse goals and 
values of development work seem at first sight to provoke the empirical significance of 
power in this specific context. Yet, since such partnership arrangements become ever 
more frequent also in a Northern/Western context (Selsky & Parker, 2005), as 
demonstrated by the comparably strong level of attention paid to power by studies on 
multi-sector partnerships (Bryson & Crosby, 2005; Buse & Harmer, 2004; Hardy et al., 
2006). The present findings may be of a general value also in fields of partnership 
operation other than in the specific context of international development cooperation. In 
development studies, partnerships research has to less extent been informed by 
systematic theoretical frameworks (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). In particular and despite the 
great deal of attention it received, the issue of power has largely been the theme of single 
case studies and anecdotal evidence. The present inquiry may contribute to a more 
systematic theoretical and empirical approach in that it adds a theoretical framework and 
comparative perspective and this way, through a synthesis of insights from both fields, 
addresses several crosscutting issues and contributes to the literature in several distinct 
ways.  
First, the current study contributes to the broader literature on power in partnerships  
(see Chapter Two of this volume) in that it integrates the two most pervasive but also 
separately pursued research directions, following a dispositional or episodic 
understandings of power in this context. Studies following a dispositional understanding 
have to date focused on single partners or groups but largely neglected context that is 
partnership-specific influences on the relationship between power dispositions and 
outcomes. The current findings add to this understanding in the way that they 
demonstrate the significant effect of such influence on this relationship, for example by 
the impact of partnership-level perceptions on the effectiveness of resources as bases of 
power, or by the impact of partnership-level structural positions on effective 
participation. These findings highlight the context-dependency of the effectiveness of 
bases of power and further question any static and context-invariant conceptualisations 
of power dispositions to be read of from partners’ resources or differences in resources 
that may exist ‘outside’ of a partnership (cf. Allen, 2003; Derkzen, Franklin & Bock, 
2008). Yet, at the same time, the present integrative approach, by incorporating such 




understandings of power as, entirely defined in and through the processes and contexts 
of partnerships, from an episodic perspective. Certain resources showed in heir 
perception a significantly stronger context-dependency than others and at the same time 
no or an even negative discriminative effect on partners’ involvement in and influence 
on partnering processes. These findings imply that partnership-level theories and 
analytic approaches to the study of power, such as discourse- as well as network-
analyses, must remain sensitive to actor- or ‘node’-related differences in power 
dispositions. Only if uniformity is not postulated, neither by conceptualising partnerships 
as ‘neutral’ or freely negotiated discursive spaces (e.g. Gray, 1985, 1989), nor known 
resource-environments (e.g. Entwistle et al, 2007), can it be examined, if and what kind 
of conditions for effective processes and interactions are needed and which ones partners 
are able to develop by themselves. The current study contributes to this line of literature 
by providing empirical evidence that even if (resource-related) mutual perceptions are 
favourable those do not automatically translate into structural embeddedness, in 
particular in the control-related interactions and partnering processes. 
Second, this research contributes to the rising theme of how constructs and theories that 
originate from the individual organisational or dyadic-level of analysis, such as resource-
dependence and exchange theories, can be extrapolated and examined at the partnership-
level, that is as collective phenomena (Provan et al, 2007b). The present findings 
demonstrate, for example through the relationship between partnership-level conditions 
and adopted governance forms in Chapter Four, that partnerships are not merely the sum 
of their parts but distinct organizational systems, with their own logics of adapting to 
internal and external conditions. A primary contribution is that the present study benefits 
these more recent attempts for theory development (Barnes, MacLean & Cousens, 2010; 
Entwistle & Martin, 2005; Provan et al., 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2008) through the 
analysis of interactions between partnership-level phenomena, partnering conditions, 
governance form and effectiveness. The examination of partnership-level concepts and 
relationships is at the heart of this emerging field and, illustrated by the concept of power 
differentials, likely to benefit from multi-disciplinary and multi-level analysis. In the 
next section of this chapter, some concrete recommendations for future approaches into 
this direction will be presented. 
Furthermore, even though micro- and macro-level analyses each have their own 
merits, the present findings support their interrelation. On the one hand, it is 
demonstrated that the adoption of certain governance forms is influenced by aggregated 
micro-level conditions, such as trust, goal agreement, and not at least power differentials 
between partners. On the other hand, are the effects of these conditions, influenced by 
their interaction with partnership-level phenomena and interventions, on  both collective 
and individual organizational outcomes. The present findings, building on data from all 
participants, demonstrate the strong dependency between the two levels of analysis and 




mutually exclusive (Isett & Provan, 2005; Provan & Kenis, 2008). This circle of 
reasoning is closed by the finding that in the vast majority of cases, partner-level and 
partnership-level effectiveness, show a parallel presence or absence. Yet, interestingly, 
for example the presence of goal agreement is found to be linked to partnership- rather 
than partner-level effectiveness, while trust displays a reverse relationship to the two 
effectiveness measures. Similarly, trust and shared influence are found to characterise 
effective shared governed partnerships even without shared control. Whereas in the face 
of power differentials, goal agreement seems necessary and shared influence and 
effective participation seem to predicate upon shared control, which without brokerage 
through selective measures at the partnership-level do not emerge automatically due to a 
lack of functioning of bases of power at the individual organisational level. Hence, the 
implication seems to be that different micro-level conditions encountered in partnerships 
require different macro-level interventions for collective action to be effective.  
Yet, different perspectives on partnership phenomena and the need for intervention are 
not only determined by what would theoretically be the best solution but also by the 
institutional backgrounds and possibilities of different actors to design and implement 
partnerships and thereby create such conditions. How such perspectives can differ is 
most significantly demonstrated when comparing the present findings to the possibilities 
for intervention discussed in the respective bodies of literature on public-service and on 
development partnerships. For example, one of the most significant findings of Chapter 
4 is that shared governance and trust frequently rest upon equity financing. Equity 
financing is considered a partnership-level indicator for the absence of power 
differentials in the present study, yet, is discussed in the business-alliance literature as a 
governance mechanism (Muthusamy & White, 2006). Another example is found in that 
structural interventions, as they are argued to enhance the effectiveness of public-service 
partnerships (Provan & Kenis, 2008), are largely neglected as interventions in the 
governance of development partnerships (Ashman, 2000). Specifically from the 
perspective of NNGOs and other intermediaries, such are often regarded beyond their 
scope of possibility (Ibid.) mostly for reasons of resource scarcity (Robinson et al., 2000) 
and inflexible financing and reporting requirements and structures (e.g. Ashman, 2000; 
Ashman, 2001b). Examples of which are when separate governing bodies are provided 
only for partnerships with a certain budget or size (Bryson et al., 2006), when those 
instances are ‘installed’ rather than chosen by partners (Awortwi, 2004), when 
interventions and ways of governing a partnership being predetermined before partners 
have a say or partnering conditions can be considered (Hale & Mauzerall, 2004). The 
present study demonstrates the benefits of going beyond such institutional lenses, 
backgrounds and disciplines, by looking at what works best, in combination and under 






6.5 Reflection and recommendation for future research 
Like most research, the present study suffers from several limitations and raises 
numerous (new) questions. First, the limitations of this research will be discussed and 
both their reasons as well as their impact on the results of the study will be addressed. 
Most limitations of this research are the results of conscious choices made during the 
design phase of this research, whereas others only became apparent after analysing the 
gathered data. Some of the questions that came up during and after carrying out this 
research will be discussed. Based on both the limitations of the present study and on the 
new questions it generates, this dissertation will conclude by outlining several directions 
for future research. 
First, a single-donor over other possible strategies, e.g. a national or regional, or mono-
issue design, was chosen. The main reasons for this choice were as follows. First, 
partnership initiatives of this size (involving in total 248 partnerships) are rarely found 
outside of the initiatives of such main donors and it has been argued that the diversity of 
partnership approaches are often less indicative of the various country contexts than of 
the donor initiatives promoted (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Secondly, though the issues 
addressed by the partnerships are diverse, the common themes of the funding facilities, 
water, sanitation, and energy provided a common framework and eventually all but three 
standard-setting partnerships in fact primarily focus on the delivery of public-services in 
these areas, instead of on other issues such as policy setting or awareness raising. 
Thirdly, the goal of the study is to examine power in resource-diverse partnership-
settings, which is ensured, since both facilities were open for proposals from a broad 
range of actors, non-state and state, international actors and participants from Europe and 
the ACP countries. By focusing on partnerships from these two facilities, access to the 
largest possible database on field-level partnerships is utilised. Thereby involving a level 
of diversity characteristic of partnerships in international development cooperation but at 
the same time filtering out heterogeneity in the data on irrelevant criteria, e.g. as a result 
of fragmented initiatives that is partnerships initiated by single or dyadic actors. Yet, a 
clear limitation derives from the chosen design for in-depth inquiries with different 
analytical foci, e.g. on actor-related sub-groups or comparisons between partnerships 
operating in different country contexts. While it was attempted to control for these 
influences when possible, the organisational data obtained clearly is not suitable for in 
particular full-fletched comparisons of the latter kind, since external influences are 
merely incorporated via the perceptions of participants, e.g. of their direct operative 
environments.      
A second and related major limitation of the chosen approach is the focus on cross-
sectional, largely quantitative data. The main reason underlying this choice is the fact 
that it is virtually impossible, within the framework of this dissertation, to gather 




partnerships operating in and across nineteen different countries, by the means of in-
depth qualitative or longitudinal data. Therefore, a trade-off arose between the 
generalisability of the findings of the study and the possibility to gather in-depth and/or 
information over a longer period of time. However, since the literature on partnerships is 
fuelled by single in-depth and often longitudinal data, the trade-off was made in favour 
of generalisability. Yet, with respect to this choice several limitations must be discussed. 
First, the approach chosen to collect data for the present study can be criticised at several 
points. For example, the choice to draw the boundaries of the partnerships by the means 
of gathering a list of participant organisations from the intermediary organisation that 
successfully applied for co-funding can be criticised with regard to the studied concepts. 
On the one hand, for sampling on the dependent variable, that is the governance modes 
(cf. Provan et al., 2007), on the other hand, for sampling on the dependent variable, 
which is power. In an attempt to avoid the first issue, it has been tried to directly contact 
the partners in each project and this way avoid dependence on the decisions of the 
intermediary organisations to provide this data. Yet, only the contacts of the 
intermediary organisations were provided by the donor so that direct establishment of 
first contact was possible only via the intermediary organisations. The latter issue then 
also raises ethical questions. During the data collection, particular attention was paid to 
the issue of obtaining data from all partners involved in the partnerships. Yet, in three 
cases partners whose names were received from the intermediary organisations negated 
their participation and posited their concerns about the authenticity of the obtained 
participant lists. In all three cases, these concerns were accompanied by complaints that 
though their names being ‘used’ as representing certain groups in the partnership for 
reasons of increasing the chances for funding, in fact, those ‘partners’ had never been 
contacted nor were they actively involved in the partnerships. Although these examples 
were excluded they nevertheless give indication that the obtained data must be treated 
with caution with regard to sampling on the concepts that are analysed and in particular 
power. Due to the cross-sectional and quantitative data obtained, in-depth knowledge 
about possible reasons for or against participation in the present study is lacking. Since it 
was impossible to conduct interviews about the reason for their refusal with each of the 
remaining 211 partnerships that did not participate, the findings must be seen relative to 
these concerns.  
     With regard to the generalisability of the study, the total of 38 partnerships 
involved can firmly be regarded as a first step towards this goal with respect to whole 
partnership data (Provan et al., 2007). Yet, it turned out that, as expected, the sample 
displays certain characteristics that may reflect upon partnership practice in international 
development today but at the same time limit the generalisability of the findings from a 
methodological standpoint. For example, Chapter 4 finds that a main difference between 
the partnerships is that some rest on financially relatively equally strong partners while 




result from donor policies that increasingly utilise partnerships as tools to harness private 
capital for development, such attempts and resulting effects in the nature of constituent 
bases may also be rather specific to the areas of water, sanitation and energy, and less 
commonly found in other areas of development operation. Related, the sample cannot be 
considered balanced with regard to several variables, in particular the governance forms. 
This limits the generalisability of findings with respect to the effectiveness of 
governance, in particular of the brokered forms, since not each combination of structural 
properties and governance interventions could be tested in its effects on partnership 
effectiveness under different conditions. Further, the present study looks at certain 
relationships, in particular between the partnership-level conditions, governance forms 
and outcomes, but neglects others that may have an impact on the findings of this 
analysis but operate beneath its radar, due to a lack of counterfactual cases. This 
problem, commonly faced by small-sample research, also limits the generalisability of 
the present study. 
Finally, a main limitation due to the cross-sectional design of the present study is its 
lack of causality. Several aspects, such as the adoption of governance forms or the 
effects of governance fit on partnership effectiveness could only be assessed in their 
parallel presence or absence but no conclusions with respect to causality could be drawn 
which leaves several points for discussion. For example, the parallel occurrence of 
brokered governance forms and enabling interventions aiming for goal and interest 
clarification and high levels of goal agreement cannot be brought into a causal sequence. 
Their parallel occurrence does not give information about whether brokered partnerships 
commence their operations with higher levels of goal agreement, since often partners are 
selected by the intermediary organisation, so that the overarching goals have to be 
clearly defined to attract participation and not least to apply for funding. Or alternatively, 
whether agreement about goals may result from interventions and efforts put into their 
clarification once partners agree to join a project and, if not applied, would lead to 
ineffective partnering processes. These are among the questions that remain unanswered 
by the present study, since cross-sectional data does not allow for an assessment of 
(temporal) causalities.  
  
The main recommendations that can be made based on the research presented in this 
dissertation predominantly serve to address the limitations discussed in the above.  One 
of the recommendations that directly follow from the above is for the more systematic 
collection of data with sampling criteria that increase generalisability. For instance, this 
could take the form of pre-sampling with regard to one of the utilised concepts. Such as 
selecting partnerships from larger initiatives on the basis of a balanced representation of 
different governance forms or by looking only at partnerships that display certain pre-
conditions, i.e. the combination of certain partners or groups, a history of conflict 




way, more directed sample selection may further help to filter out heterogeneity and 
allow for more systematic insights to be gained into the relationship between certain 
partnership phenomena, such as conditions and governance forms. One promising 
example is given by the indicated link between trust and shared governance 
arrangements, on the one hand, and goal agreement and guidance provided by brokered 
partnerships, on the other. In the present sample, a tendency of such different 
relationships was observed and it seems promising for future endeavours to look at and 
compare these relationships in a more a balanced sample, which to equal extents 
involves shared and brokered partnerships. On the basis of such a sample it would be 
interesting to examine whether trust and goal agreement serve similar purposes in shared 
and brokered partnerships, respectively. Such analysis could feed into the discussion 
about the substitutability and mutual dependency of trust versus control (e.g. Tomlinson, 
2005). 
Having established a systematic framework for cross-case analyses of such concepts, 
e.g. partnership-level conditions, governance modes and effectiveness, future research 
can proceed and further explore relevant influences and relations, incorporating different 
conditions or governance aspects which may be of relevance in different areas of 
partnership operation, as it has been done in the present study for international 
development cooperation. Such external validation of theoretical claims, in particular 
posited by the emerging field of partnership and network theory, is needed in face of the 
ever increasing number and spread of partnerships into all different kinds of operational 
areas. Taking the present study as an example, such multi-disciplinary research seems 
promising with regard to the added-value of conceptualising and examining multi-
disciplinary models of partnership-level phenomena.  
In this respect, it is furthermore important to stress that future endeavours should focus 
on not only structural properties or be based on merely cross-sectional data. To give an 
example of the first, the findings of the present study demonstrated that the combined 
presence of structural interventions aiming at relationship building and enabling 
effective participation is most successful in the face of power differentials. Although the 
present study can not reveal whether one of these interventions alone may have similar 
effects on partnership effectiveness. In the face of practical constraints on the application 
of such interventions, this interaction and the distinct effects of one form of intervention 
in comparison to another appear worthy of future exploration. Such a request for 
systematic inquiry then mainly relates, in addition to generalisability also to the second 
issue raised above: causality. Causality is of importance in any inquiry but in particular 
when looking at partnerships from an interventionist perspective. Governance 
interventions and structural designs are assumed to have an effect on partnerships when 
combined with different partner- and partnership-level conditions. Yet, longitudinal data 
is required in order to empirically substantiate such claims. Systematically, longitudinal 




interaction between governance interventions and the emergence and changes in 
partnership-level conditions and governance structures at different points in time. For 
example, it has been previously suggested that partnership-level decision-making issues 
not only involve different qualitative dimensions (e.g. decisions about the design of a 
partnership are more constitutive in nature than those about their implementation) but 
also a temporal dimension (e.g. Hale & Mauzerall, 2004). Similarly, we frequently find 
in the quotes of the respondents the statement that it makes a difference when partners 
perceive the conditions for collaboration in partnerships as favourable from the 
beginning, e.g. they feel involved and recognised as equals. As such, these statements 
indicate that not only the aim and scope of an intervention but also the temporal 
dimension plays a role for its effectiveness. Related to the reception and effectiveness of 
governance interventions and structures, it can as well be assumed that governance 
forms change and become adjusted to changing conditions over time (Provan & Kenis, 
2008). For example, enabling interventions may have a stronger effect in the beginning, 
when a partnership commences its operations, but if not at some point resulting in 
structural changes, show only a limited or no impact at all on later outcomes. It is further 
conceivable that enabling interventions that encompass training, learning and capacity 
building, only emerge and become effective when partners can trust each other based on 
a minimum of structural equity in terms of involvement and control. Further, in terms of 
a temporal dimension, it can be assumed that different interventions show different 
effects depending on the ongoing development of inter-organisational relational 
structures over time. For example, efforts of co-creation and partnership building may be 
more important in the beginning but to a lesser extent when partners start out under the 
condition of shared financing and ownership (e.g. Muthusamy & White, 2006).   
The questions raised in the above are just some examples of the many interesting 
issues that are raised but remain unaddressed by the present study. Many of these issues 
touch upon a variety of different topics that have received different degrees of attention 
in different disciplines that relate to different actors involved in and areas of partnership 
operation, they have one important dimension in common. Yet, they are all related to the 
interplay between the micro- and macro-foundations of partnerships. Hence, the possible 
multi-level and multi-disciplinary applications are numerous and promising. The present 
research has shown that employing such a broader perspective can lead to more 
comprehensive explanations of scientifically and practically relevant phenomena. In this 
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In grote delen van de wereld moet de bevolking toegang ontberen tot veilig drinkwater, 
adequate sanitaire voorzieningen en electriciteit. De overgrote meerderheid van de 
bewoners in deze gebieden woont in een ontwikkelingsland. Bijna tien jaar geleden, op 
de “ Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)” van 2002, 
hebben regeringsleiders hun eerder toegezegde steun bevestigd om de ‘Millenium 
Development Goals’, te behalen. Het behalen van deze doelstellingen zou betekenen dat 
in het jaar 2015 het aantal mensen dat geen toegang heeft tot schoon drinkwater, 
sanitaire voorzieningen en energie is gehalveerd. 
In het verleden werden internationale inspanningen van dergelijke omvang doorgaans 
uitgevoerd door het opstellen van bi- en multilaterale verdragen tussen landen. Echter, 
sinds de opkomst van het moderne “ontwikkelingsmanagement” in de jaren ‘ 50 en ‘ 60, 
is het voor het uitvoeren van ontwikkelingswerk meer en meer gangbaar geworden om 
samenwerkingsverbanden op te starten tussen een breed palet van organisaties van het 
globale zuiden en noorden, zoals overheidsintellingen, non-profit organisaties, en meer 
recentelijk ook for-profit organisaties. Tegenwoordig wordt bijna één derde van al het 
officiële ontwikkelingswerk toegekend aan, en uitgevoerd door, dit soort 
samenwerkingsverbanden. De doelstellingen worden weliswaar nog steeds bepaald in 
bilaterale en multilaterale verdragen, maar de implementatie wordt ter plekke begeleid 
en uitgevoerd door allerlei typen partners. 
Terwijl samenwerkingsverbanden meer en meer de institutionele norm zijn geworden 
in het streven naar duurzame ontwikkeling, zijn er ook steeds meer zorgen dat 
samenwerking tussen onderling sterk verschillende organisaties uit diverse sectoren van 
de maatschappij, met uiteenlopende middelen, belangen, invalshoeken en mentaliteiten 
eerder leidt tot conflicten en machtstrijd dan tot effectieve samenwerking. In eerder 
onderzoek is reeds aangetoond welke uitdagingen voortvloeien uit het starten en 
voortzetten van effectieve samenwerkingsverbanden. Er is echter weinig bekend over de 
wijze waarop machtsverhoudingen zich binnen een samenwerking ontwikkelen, en op 
wat voor manier samenwerkingen door betrokkenen kunnen worden ingericht, 
geïmplementeerd en aangestuurd om dit soort thema’s het hoofd te bieden. Deels komt 
dit vanwege het feit dat er, los van donorvoorschriften en financieringsbehoeften, 
nauwelijks een juridisch kader bestaat voor het besturen van samenwerkingsverbanden, 
en deels omdat macht doorgaans wordt behandeld als een factor die de vooruitzichten 
van samenwerking voor individuele organisaties beïnvloedt en maar zelden wordt gezien 
als een mogelijke bedreiging voor het uiteindelijke succes van het 
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samenwerkingsverband zelf. Echter, door toenemende druk om betere verantwoording, 
meer transparantie en op het verhogen van de effectiviteit, krijgen vragen over het 
besturen van samenwerkingsverbanden meer en meer aandacht. Machtsverhoudingen 
tussen partners, en hieraan gerelateerd de vragen of, en zoja hoe deze in 
samenwerkingsverbanden effectief beheerst kunnen worden, worden gezien als cruciaal 
voor het succes van samenwerkingsverbanden. 
Zoals de titel van dit proefschift “Same same, but different” aangeeft, bestaat er in 
de literatuur over samenwerkingen een gepolariseerde discussie over macht binnen 
samenwerkingsverbanden en over de vraag hoe deze kan worden gedefiniëerd en 
benaderd. Een deel van de literatuur beschouwt macht als onproblematisch, omdat 
verschillen tussen partners worden gezien als aanjager voor creativiteit, wederzijdse 
afhankelijkheid, innovatie en verandering. Anderen zien macht als de belangrijkste 
belemmering voor samenwerking, aangezien scheve machtsverhoudingen een 
onoverkomelijk obstakel zouden zijn en aldus enige vorm van “werkelijke 
samenwerking” op voorhand belemmeren. Dergelijke argumenten bouwen meestal voort 
op de gedachte dat macht inherent is aan bepaalde partners, en kan worden afgelezen aan 
de middelen waarover zij beschikken en waartoe zij exclusief toegang hebben buiten een 
specifieke samenwerking om. De context waarbinnen machtsverhoudingen zich 
ontwikkelen, namelijk het samenwerkingsverband, wordt zelden betrokken in dit 
denken. Tegelijkertijd wordt in studies waar het samenwerkingsverband zélf wordt 
bestudeerd, het feit dat er verschillen bestaan tussen partners in 
samenwerkingsverbanden buiten beschouwing gelaten. Kiest men een perspectief dat het 
midden houdt tussen het bezitten van bepaalde middelen als bron van macht in 
samenwerkingsverbanden en het bestuderen van het samenwerkingsverband zelf, dan 
kan men de overkoepelende vraag stellen waarom sommige samenwerkingen en partners 
effectief zijn in het licht van machtsverschillen en andere niet. 
Wanneer men samenwerkingen beschouwt als een inter-organisationele context 
waarbinnen machtsverhoudingen zich op een eigen manier ontwikkelen, dan biedt de 
literatuur verschillende verklaringen. Aan de ene kant bouwen verklaringen voort op 
traditionele begrippen bij inter-organisationele coördinatie, zoals “markten” en 
“hierarchiëen”. Vertaald naar de context van samenwerkingen wordt betoogd dat de 
macht van partners zich organisch ontwikkeld vanuit wederzijdse doelstellingen en de 
behoefte aan middelen. Toch kan er in ontwikkelingssamenwerkingen en andere 
samenwerkingen tussen partners die normaliter niet aan dit soort 
samenwerkingsverbanden zouden deelnemen (zoals bijvoorbeeld bedrijven) en in minder 
geïnstitutionaliseerde contexten onenigheid ontstaan over doelstellingen, en kunnen 
partners niet de kennis en alertheid ontwikkelen die het herkennen van wederzijdse 
afhankelijkheid door de beschikbaarheid van middelen faciliteert. Worden macht en de 
ontwikkeling van wederzijdse afhankelijkheid en reciprociteit binnen deze context 
bezien, dan kunnen er twee interventionistische benaderingen worden onderscheiden. De 
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literatuur over publieke samenwerkingen is toegespitst op interventies die zich richten op 
beheersing, bijvoorbeeld door de strategische besluitvorming te scheiden van de 
operationele uitvoering, waardoor de belangen van de individuele partners met de 
doelstellingen van de samenwerking als geheel in balans worden gebracht. De literatuur 
over ontwikkelingssamenwerking daarentegen, concentreert zich voornamelijk op 
interventies die gericht zijn op het opbouwen van relaties door middel van uitwisseling, 
leren en het creëren van een perceptie van wederzijdse afhankelijkheid. Hoewel deze 
twee benaderingen vanuit het perspectief van de diverse actoren en daarmee 
samenhangende academische disciplines twee veschillende aspecten van macht binnen 
samenwerkingen behandelen, delen ze de veronderstelling dat macht kan worden 
gestuurd binnen samenwerkingen. Deze gedachte staat centraal binnen een recent 
gepresenteerd drievoudig argument, dat stelt dat een ‘governance fit’, dat wil zeggen een 
bestuursvorm die aansluit bij de omstandigheden en factoren van een samenwerking, 
invloed heeft op het succes van de gezamenlijke samenwerking. Hiermee lijken 
verschillende invalshoeken allemaal te wijzen in eenzelfde richting, maar zijn zij op dit 
moment nog niet theoretisch geïntegreerd en onderbouwd met een empirische analyse. 
De conclusie die kan worden getrokken is dat er weliswaar veel aandacht is geweest 
van zowel academici als uitvoerenden voor macht en de beheersing ervan binnen 
samenwerkingsverbanden, maar dat er weinig pogingen zijn ondernomen om de diverse 
zienswijzen te integreren en dat er nog geen vergelijkende emprische onderbouwing 
bestaat. In dit proefschrift is een poging gedaan om dit hiaat op te vullen. De 
overkoepelende onderzoeksvraag luidt dan ook:  
 
“Wat zijn de oorzaken en de consequenties van macht en machtsverschillen tussen 
partners in samenwerkingsverbanden op de effectieve deelname van partners aan, en de 
effectiviteit van de samenwerking? En wat is de rol van de `governance-fit´ in deze 
context?“ 
 
Dit proefschrift richt zich op a) de oorsprong en gevolgen van macht, en in het bijzonder 
de verschillen in macht tussen partners binnen samenwerkingsverbanden, en hoe deze 
verschillen doorwerken in effectieve deelname aan, en het succes van deze 
samenwerkingsverbanden, en b) de rol van een passende bestuursvorm in deze context. 
In overeenstemming met de titel van dit proefschrift zal het eerste deel van het 
onderzoek verkennen welke machtsverschillen en -overeenkomsten bestaan tussen 
partners, en verklaren hoe machtsverhoudingen zich binnen een samenwerking 
ontwikkelen. In het tweede deel worden deze inzichten gebracht op het analyseniveau 
van het samenwerkingsverband, en wordt bekeken wat de rol is van bestuursvormen die 
passen bij de aanwezigheid van machtsverschillen binnen samenwerkingsverbanden in 
relatie tot het succes van die samenwerkingsverbanden. Deze aannames worden 
onderzocht door middel van een vergelijkende analyse van samenwerkingsverbanden die 
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actief zijn op het gebied van internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Er is niet één 
specifiek theoretisch raamwerk voor interorganisationele macht binnen internationaal 
opererende samenwerkingen, maar er zijn twee stromingen in de literatuur voor een 
dergelijk onderzoek. De eerste betreft de algemene literatuur over interorganisationele 
samenwerking en de rol van bestuur in publieke samenwerkingen en netwerken, en de 
tweede richt zich op samenwerkingen binnen de specifieke context van het bestuur van 
internationaal ontwikkelingswerk. Om inzicht te krijgen in deze materie zijn deze twee 
benaderingswijzen gecombineerd in modellen. Deze multi-disciplinaire modellen zijn 
vervolgens geverifieerd en getoetst. 
Dit onderzoek draagt op drie specifieke manieren bij aan de reeds bestaande 
literatuur. Ten eerste integreert dit onderzoek inzichten in macht en het besturen ervan 
binnen samenwerkingen uit twee gebieden, te weten het werk met betrekking tot de 
effectiviteit van publieke samenwerkingen, en het denken over macht binnen 
internationaal ontwikkelingswerk. Ten tweede wordt in dit onderzoek een multi-
dimensionaal analysekader toegepast: macht wordt geanalyseerd op zowel het niveau 
van de individuele organisatie als dat van het samenwerkingsverband. Op het niveau van 
de organisatie wordt de ontwikkeling van machtsrelaties onderzocht door te kijken naar 
de effecten van machtsverhoudingen op succesvolle deelname. Op het niveau van het 
samenwerkingsverband wordt de interactie tussen machtsverhoudingen en andere 
aspecten die zich afspelen op het niveau van samenwerking, namelijk de wijze waarop 
zij bestuurd worden, verkend. Voor dit deel van het onderzoek worden 
machtsverschillen geaggregeerd op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband, en de 
interactie met verschillende bestuursmaatregelen als het gaat om het voortbrengen van 
effectieve collectieve actie bestudeerd. Waar de bestaande literatuur over macht binnen 
samenwerkingen zich voornamelijk richt op ofwel de effecten van scheve 
machtsverhoudingen op individuele partners of groepen, of het vermogen om macht uit 
te oefenen binnen samenwerkingen zonder veel aandacht voor machtsverhoudingen die 
een bepaald bestuursmodel vereisen om een effectieve samenwerking te bewerkstelligen, 
biedt dit onderzoek tot slot inzichten in de verschillende effecten en interakties tussen 
macht en bestuursmaatregelen op de effectiviteit van samenwerkingsverbanden. Tegen 
de achtergrond van een toenemende inzet van samenwerkingsverbanden in allerlei 
dienstensectoren, probleemgebieden en contexten, met wetenschappelijk gezien een 
beperkte beschikbaarheid aan onderbouwend empirisch bewijs, is de beantwoording van 
de gestelde onderzoeksvraag daarom ook praktisch gezien bijzonder relevant. In het 
vervolg van deze samenvatting zal eerst een overzicht gegeven worden van de 
theoretische studie die uitgevoerd is om het bovengenoemde multidisciplinaire model te 
construeren. Vervolgens zal de toetsing van het model besproken worden en tot slot 
zullen de bevindingen teruggekoppeld worden naar de bovenstaande onderzoeksvraag.  
 




Tot heden heeft de gepolariseerde discussie over macht binnen samenwerkingen, zoals 
uiteengezet in de introductie bij deze samenvatting, veel aandacht gekregen maar weinig 
theoretisch onderzoek en empirisch bewijs opgeleverd. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de 
algemene vraag “Wat zijn de theoretische conceptualiseringen en gerelateerde 
empirische operationaliseringen van macht die zijn voortgebracht in de literatuur over 
samenwerkingen?” beantwoord. Het belanglijkste doel van dit hoofdstuk is identificatie 
van de meest overtuigende benaderingen van macht in deze specifiek empirische 
context, hoe ze overlappen, welke hiaten er bestaan en de methodologische 
aandachtspunten die geadresseerd moeten worden bij pogingen tot synthese en 
integratie.  
De meest basale uitkomst van het onderzoek is dat inzichten in macht binnen 
samenwerkingen tot heden rusten op een vrij gefragmenteerde en magere empirische 
basis, hetgeen leidt tot meerdere uitdagingen voor een integratieve conceptualisatie. Als 
meest belangrijke bron van fragmentatie worden twee relatief onfhankelijk 
ontwikkelende richtingen geïdentificeerd, afhankelijk van de wijze waarop academici de 
latentie van het concept ‘macht’ behandelen en macht begrijpen als een dispositioneel 
concept (“macht bezitten” ) en/of episodisch  concept (“macht aanwenden”).  
Volgt men het dispositionele begrip, dan zijn machtsverschillen de verklaring voor 
verschillen in het resultaat van een samenwerkingsverband voor individuele partners. 
Alhoewel een dergelijk begrip een belangrijk argument voor of tegen een samenwerking 
betekent, aangezien haar impact geëvalueerd kan worden door middel van de daaraan 
ontleende voordelen, leidt deze benadering ertoe dat macht wordt behandeld als een 
eenrichtingsproces en de samenwerking als ‘zwarte doos’. Invloeden op 
samenwerkingsniveau worden onvoldoende gespecificeerd of zelfs genegeerd. De 
operationalisatie van organisationele machtsdisposities en uitkomsten blijven eenzijdig, 
toegespitst op inviduele, danwel groepen van partners. Invloeden op 
samenwerkingsniveau, zoals de impact van diverse bestuursvormen, die de relatie tussen 
de voornoemde twee concepten kunnen verklaren, blijven onderbelicht.  
Volgt men daarentegen de episodische benadering, dan is macht de explarandum, 
gedefinieerd door de interacties tussen de partners die voornamelijk worden bestudeerd 
door discourse- en netwerkanalyses. Deze benadering biedt rijke inzichten in hoe macht 
zich voordoet, bijvoorbeeld in discours, en zich manifesteert, bijvoorbeeld door gunstige 
posities in de relationele structuur van een samenwerking. Desalniettemin mist deze 
benadering de fundering van situatie-specifieke confrontaties en interacties tussen 
actoren in samenwerkingen binnen het bredere beeld van organisationele disposities en 
uitkomsten. Alhoewel bijvoorbeeld de analyse van discours vaak veronderstelt dat 
‘machtige’ en ‘machteloze’ actoren gebruik maken van verschillende strategiëen en 
raamwerken wordt zelden een verkaring geboden voor de totstandkoming van dit 
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onderscheid. Daarnaast blijft dit onderzoek vaag over andere uitkomsten dan discursieve 
winsten (zoals veranderende percepties en de afkadering van onderwerpen). 
Deze nauwe focus is aanvechtbaar omdat deze winsten verdampen indien andere 
onevenwichtigheden blijven bestaan. Op vergelijkbare wijze rusten netwerkanalyses op 
bepaalde impliciete veronderstellingen omtrent kennis van middelen en/of gezamenlijke 
doelstellingen van partners. Deze veronderstellingen kunnen als vanzelfsprekend worden 
beschouwd door samenwerkingen die opereren in de geïnstitutionaliseerde 
dienstensectoren van Europese of Noord Amerikaanse gebieden, maar vereisen validatie 
in contexten waarin deze uitgangpunten niet vanzelfsprekend zijn. Uiteindelijk baseren 
beide analytische benaderingen zich op de analyse van het uitoefenen van macht, zonder 
de voorwaarden waaronder deze macht wordt uitgeoefend expliciet te maken. 
Onderzoekers die bijvoorbeeld de claim willen onderbouwen dat ‘machteloze’ actoren 
desalniettemin de gemeenschappelijke agenda kunnen bepalen omdat zij bepaalde 
discursieve strategiëen hanteren, moeten de onderliggende factoren die het deze actoren 
mogelijk maakt dit te doen in ogenschouw nemen. Het mogelijk maken van bestuur dat 
zich richt op het incorporeren van besluitvormingsprocessen kan bijvoorbeeld de reden 
zijn waarom deze actoren deze mogelijkheid hebben. Het feit dat deze factoren 
nauwelijks aandacht hebben gekregen lijkt gegrond te zijn in de afwezigheid van 
gegevens over samenwerkingsverbanden die een vergelijking tussen meerdere casus 
mogelijk maken. 
Het complementaire potentieel van beide benaderingen, en de daaraan verbonden 
analytische benaderingen is groot. Om dit potentieel te kunnen benutten is het echter 
noodzakelijk om dimensies van macht op zowel het niveau van de individuele partner als 
het samenwerkingsverband te integreren in één multidimensionaal kader. Een aantal 
issues dient te worden aangeroerd door zo een kader. Allereerst, dient in de analyse van 
de microgrondslagen van macht het dispositionele begrip verder te gaan dan louter een 
demarcatie van de machteloze en machthebbende partners, en uitleggen waarom deze 
effecten zich voordoen. Zijn bijvoorbeeld bepaalde middelen (viz, betrokkenheid in het 
samenwerkingsproces) een meer effectieve basis van macht binnen 
samenwerkingsverbanden dan anderen omdat deze middelen als meer waardevol worden 
gezien, of zich vertalen in meer gunstige posities en/of in meer effectieve deelname? Om 
deze en andere vragen te beantwoorden moeten machtsverhoudingen los van uitkomsten 
worden geoperationaliseerd, en beide concepten dienen breed genoeg te worden 
geonceptualiseerd om het potentieel en werkelijke winst voor alle partners te beslaan. 
Met andere woorden, de analyse van de relatie tussen dispositie-uitkomsten moet ruimte 
bieden voor invloeden op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband. 
Een episodisch begrip van macht zou juist het totaal van het samenwerkingsverband 
als context moeten nemen voor episodes waarin macht wordt uitgeoefend. Bestaat er 
bijvoorbeeld interactie tussen machtsdifferentiëlen en bestuursvormen bij het realiseren 
van een effectief samenwerkingsproces? Kunnen verschillende bestuursmodellen de 
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(mogelijk negatieve) effecten van machtsdifferentiëlen opheffen? Zijn interventies in het 
ontwerp van een samenwerking meer of minder effectief dan inspanningen die gericht 
zijn op het bouwen van relaties en het vernieuwen van inzichten? Om deze en 
vergelijkbare vragen te beantwoorden dient een aantal methodologische issues te worden 
opgelost. In de eerste plaats dienen verschijnselen die zich afspelen op het niveau van 
het samenwerkingsverband als zodanig te worden geoperationaliseerd. Verschillen in 
machtsverhoudingen dienen te worden geoperationaliseerd als collectieve voorwaarden 
voor samenwerking op een wijze die geschikt is voor vergelijkbare analyses, teneinde 
inzicht te krijgen in de interacties met andere verschijnselen die zich afspelen op het 
niveau van het samenwerkingsverband, bijvoorbeeld de wijze van besturen. Tenslotte is 
het alleen mogelijk om zowel het niveau van de partner als dat van het 
samenwerkingsverband te integreren door het aggregeren van verschillen in 
machtsverhoudingen en uitkomsten op basis van de evaluaties van de individuele 
partners. Dit alles op zo een manier dat onderzoek informerend werkt voor het 
ontwikkelen van strategieën voor effectieve deelname van individuele organisaties en het 
ontwerp en de implementatie van effectieve samenwerkingsverbanden. 
Het multi-dimensionale en –disciplinaire onderzoekskader dat is ontwikkeld voor 
deze study is een poging om deze onderzoeksrichtingen en methodologische issues te 
behandelen. Op het analyseniveau van de individuele partner worden de effecten van de 
bronnen van organisationele macht, middelen en posities (viz. betrokkenheid in 
processen aangaande samenwerkingsverbanden) op effectieve deelname verkend. De 
operationalisering van beide bronnen van macht incorporeren het niveau van het 
samenwerkingsverband: Middelen worden wederzijds beoordeeld op basis van hun 
utiliteitswaarde, en netwerkposities zijn afgeleid op basis van netwerkanalytische data 
met betrekking tot de betrokkenheid van partners en de interacties en beslissingen binnen 
samenwerkingsverbanden. Deze relatie verklaart de micro-origines van macht binnen 
samenwerkingsverbanden via het functioneren of disfunctioneren van bronnen van 
macht die effectieve deelname aan samenwerkingsverbanden zou moeten 
bewerkstelligen. Op het analyseniveau van het samenwerkingsverband wordt een 
drievoudig argument over het meest passende besturingsmodel, ofwel de interactie 
tussen machtsverschillen en de wijze van besturen en de manier waarop deze effectieve 
samenwerking creëren, onderzocht. Het hierboven voorgestelde analysekader om dit 
argument te onderzoeken is aangepast aan de context van internationale 
samenwerkingsverbanden op het gebied van ontwikkelingshulp. De onderliggende 
logica die een verklaring geeft voor de adoptie van verschillende besturingsvormen in 
het licht van bepaalde combinaties van voorwaarden op het niveau van het 
samenwerkingsverband, ofwel machtsverschillen tussen partners, wordt in deze context 
onderzocht. Deze logica wordt gecontrasteerd met het huidig conceptueel denken over 
het effect van het best passende besturingsmodel op de effectiviteit van 
samenwerkingsverbanden in het onderzoek naar samenwerkingsverbanden tussen 
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publieke diensten. Het drievoudige argument met betrekking tot het effect van het meest 
passende besturingsmodel op een samenwerkingsverband als het gaat om effectieve 




Om het doel van dit onderzoek te bereiken, namelijk het verklaren van de samenhang 
tussen de drie benaderingen van macht, bestuur en effectiviteit, zijn onderzoeksgegevens 
verzameld onder ontwikkelingssamenwerkingen, aangevuld met interviews en 
documentgegevens. Specifiekere informatie over deze enquête is te vinden in 
Appendices I and II. De enquete is uitgezet onder alle samenwerkingen die (mede) 
werden gesubsidieerd door twee initiatieven van de Europese Unie, namelijk het “ 
European Union Energy” en “Water Facility” (EUEF and EUWF). Tegen 2004 werd, als 
onderdeel van de objectieve rol van de EU om haar bijdrage aan de Millenium 
Doelstellingen “ Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs), besloten over de lancering 
van twee financieringsinstrumenten gebaseerd op de voorwaardelijke toewijzing van €1 
miljard uit het Negende Europese Ontwikkelingsfonds “Ninth European Development 
Fund (EDF)” aan samenwerkingsinitiatieven in het ACP (Afrikaans-Caraïbisch-Pacific) 
gebied. Via twee aanbestedingsaankondigingen werden 175 samenwerkingen voor 
duurzame watervoorzieningen en sanitatie in 2005 en 2006 voor de EUWF, en een totaal 
van 75 samenwerkingen voor de ontwikkeling en levering van duurzame energie voor de 
eerste oproep voor de EUEF, geleselecteerd voor subsidiëring. Netwerkanalytische en 
attributionele gegevens werden verkregen van alle 175 partner organisaties die betrokken 
werden in 38 van de gesubsidieerde samenwerkingen. In overeenstemming met multi-
dimensionale benadering van macht binnen samenwerkingen in het onderhavige 
onderzoek, zijn diverse analytische benaderingen gekozen om de resultaten op 
individueel partnerniveau en op samenwerkingsniveau te analyseren. Een statistische 
analyse bestudeert de effecten van de grondslagen van macht op uitkomsten binnen alle 
175 partnerorganisaties (Hoofdstuk 3). De verhouding op samenwerkingsniveau tussen 
de begrippen macht, bestuur en effectiviteit zijn geanalyseerd middels een vergelijkende 
kwalitatieve analyse van de 38 samenwerkingen om de doelstelling van het onderzoek 
van Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 te behalen. Gezocht werd naar verklaringen op 
samenwerkingsniveau voor de verhouding tussen deze begrippen.  
 
De micro-grondslagen van macht en effectieve deelname aan samenwerkingen 
In hoofdstuk 3 is de verwachting dat verschillen in de machtsdisposities van partners 
invloed hebben op de de effectiviteit van hun bijdragen aan samenwerkingen. De 
leidende onderzoeksvraag is: “Hoe zijn organisationele grondslagen van macht 
gerelateerd aan effectieve deelname aan samenwerkingen?” Machtsdisposities of 
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grondslagen van organisationele macht zijn middelen en posities (viz. 
netwerkanalytische gegevens inzake de betrokkenheid van partners in een 
samenwerkingsinteractie en besluitvorming). Het eerste deel van de analyse toont dat de 
vertaling van middelen naar gunstige posities en/of effectieve deelname in gradaties 
afhangt van hun veronderstelde nut. Sommige middelen, zoals arbeid en begunstigde 
vertegenwoordiging, hangen wat betreft hun functie als grondslag van macht sterk af van 
de perceptie van de overige partners van hun waarde voor hen of voor het doel van de 
samenwerking. Andere middelen, zoals financiële middelen of administratieve 
capaciteiten, worden relatief onafhankelijk van dergelijke percepties vertaald naar 
effectieve deelname. Het discriminerende effect van deze middelen die het sterkst 
afhangen van perceptie, werd enkel bevestigd in hun vertaling naar gunstige posities in 
de interacties tussen partners en de invloed op beslissingen op samenwerkingsniveau, 
maar niet met betrekking tot hun vertaling naar betrokkenheid bij het 
besluitvormingsproces. Een verklaring voor dit gegeven is dat de nutswaardering van 
middelen eenzijdig is. Deze verklaring wordt gesteund door de bevinding dat 
bemiddelende organisaties (zij die EU-fondsen aanvraagden) de middelen die partners 
aanbrachten veel hoger waardeerden dan hun eigen inbreng, terwijl deze partners hun 
eigen bijdragen aanmerkelijk lager inschatten.  
Meer dan de enkele afbakening van machtige en machteloze groepen verklaren de 
resultaten van dit onderzoek waarom deze verschillen zich voordien en waarom een 
vertalingen van de grondslagen van macht naar effectieve samenwerking niet als 
vanzelfsprekend kan worden aanvaard, of geacht kan worden organisch te ontwikkelen 
binnen een ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Het tweede deel van de analyse onderzoekt de 
effecten van iedere grondslag van macht op effectieve deelname, en in relatie tot 
anderen. De bevindingen tonen aan de ene kant aan dat betrokkenheid in het 
besluitvormingsproces significant bijdraagt aan de kansen voor effectieve deelname door 
partners die minder machtig zijn qua middelen en dat, indien betrokken, het vooral de 
partners zijn die middelen bezitten die het sterkst afhankelijk zijn van nutswaardering 
profiteren van betrokkenheid. Zodoende, anticiperend op het bestuursargument, wordt de 
behoefte aan en de potentie van bestuursmaatregelen aangetoond als middel om de 
effectiviteit van machtsgrondslagen van partners te vergroten en daarmee de wijze 
waarop interorganisationele machtsverhoudingen zich binnen een samenwerking 
ontwikkelen.  
 
De macro-grondslagen van macht en effectieve samenwerkingen 
De hoofdstukken 4 en 5 onderzoeken de relatie tussen de 3 fenomen van 
samenwerkingsdifferentiëlen en samenwerkingsbestuur, die worden samengevat door het 
concept van ‘governance fit’, en effectiviteit van de samenwerking. Vertrekpunt is het 
argument dat effectieve samenwerkingen afhankelijk zijn van aansluiting van de 
gekozen bestuursvorm op omstandigheden op partnerniveau. Dit argument en de 
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gerelateerde definitie van relevante indicatoren van de drie concepten daarentegen, vloeit 
voort uit hun bestudering binnen publieke samenwerkingen en tot heden zijn daar nog 
geen inzichten in betrokken van partners binnen een internationale 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Inzichten uit beide werkterreinen worden geïntegreerd, 
hetgeen leidt tot de volgende indicatoren voor beide concepten. De gekozen selectie van 
vier eigenschappen (omvang van de samenwerking, de mate waarin doelstellingen en 
vertrouwen worden gedeeld door, en compatibel zijn met, de partners, en de onzekerheid 
die samenhangt met het sponsorklimaat) wordt aangevuld met twee eigenschappen 
(machtsdifferentiëlen tussen partners en de onzekerheid die samenhangt met 
uitvoeringscontext van de samenwerking) die, zo wordt betoogd door 
ontwikkelingsacademici, een adequaat antwoord vereisen op het gebied van bestuur.  
Voor het evalueren van bestuursvormen combineren bestaande modellen de evaluatie 
van bestuursstructuren en interventies. Bestuursstructuren wijzen op de mate van 
bemiddeling door de mate waarin besluitvorming, interacties en controle worden 
gedeeld/ gedecentraliseerd en/of gecentraliseerd/ geconcentreerd tussen partners. 
Bestuursinterventies zijn geacht controlegerelateerd te zijn: bijv. de formalisatie van 
overeenkomsten, of de samenwerking wordt bestuurd door de partners of dat een 
organisatie of samenwerkingstussenpersoon het bestuur krijgt opgedragen, en of externe 
betrekkingen centraal worden aangestuurd of door de meerderheid van partners 
individueel). Dit wordt aangevuld met ondersteunende  bestuursinterventies, die worden 
geïdentificeerd als de primaire strategie om om te gaan met macht in 
ontwikkelingssamenwerkingen, namelijk maatregelen die dienen om doelen, 
overeenstemming, geschillenbeslechting en de inzet van assistentie en steun te 
verduidelijken. Dit aangepaste model wordt in twee stappen onderzocht. Hoofdstuk 4 
verkent de onderliggende logica voor de keuze van een specifief bestuursmodel bij 
bepaalde combinaties van omstandigheden op samenwerkingsniveau door 
ontwikkelingswerkers. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de werkelijke relatie tussen ‘governance fit’ 
en de effectiviteit van een samenwerking onderzocht en besproken in het licht van deze 
voorstellingen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 betreft de vraag “wat zijn de omstandigheden op samenwerkingsniveau die 
de keuze door de partners van een bepaald bestuursmodel verklaren?” De eerste stap van 
de analyse leidt tot de identificatie van 4 bestuursvormen, gebaseerd op de combinatie 
van twee structurele bestuursdimensies. Gedeeld bestuur combineert decentrale 
interactie met gedeelde controle en invloed. Drie uitbestede bestuursvormen tonen ofwel 
centrale interacties of geconcentreerde invloed, of beiden. De vier structurele vormen 
worden geanalyseerd in relatie tot de aanwezigheid van controle-gerelateerde en 
mandaterende bestuursinterventies. Na identificatie van de vier bestuursvormen 
bestudeert een qualitatieve vergelijkende analyse de paralelle aanwezigheid of 
afweziheid van omstandigheden op samenwerkingsniveau. Deze configuratie van 
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omstandigheden markeert een bijzonder onderscheid met betrekking tot de keuze voor 
gedeelde in plaats van uitbestede bestuursvormen. Dit onderzoeksgegeven wordt 
behandeld met betrekking tot divergenties van bestaande modellen van ‘governance fit’: 
De eerste algemene aanname, namelijk dat de keuze voor uitbesteding van bestuur 
sneller wordt genomen naarmate de context van een samenwerking complexer is, wordt 
slechts deels bevestigd door de resultaten van dit onderzoek. Samenwerkingen met 
gedeeld bestuur daarentegen vertonen aan de ene zijde omstandigheden die geacht 
worden te duiden op complexe bestuurstaken (bijv. dat zij relatief groot zijn and hoge 
mates van externe onzekerheid vertonen in hun uitvoeringsgebied), en aan de andere 
zijde interventies die vergelijkbaar zijn met die van uitbestede modellen (bijv. 
formalisatie). Beide zich voordoende omstandigheden  en de bestuursreactie van 
uitbestede versus gedeelde bestuursvormen zijn niet meer of minder complex maar 
gelijken op verschillende complexiteiten of logiciteiten van ‘governance fit’. Drie 
onderscheiden omstandigheden worden geïdentificeerd om samenwerkingen te 
beschrijven met gedeeld bestuur: Een afwezigheid van machtsdifferentiëlen en een 
gelijktijdige aanwezigheid van vertrouwen en onzekerheid in het uitvoeringsgebied. De 
combinatie van gedeeld bestuur met deze twee interne omstandigheden brengt een beeld 
van intra-organisationele relaties op basis van gelijkheid en een bestuurstaak die bestaat 
uit de coördinatie van twee relatief autonome partners die controle eisen op de 
besluitvorming binnen de samenwerking.  
Gelijkluidend worden onzekere uitvoeringsomstandigheden geregeld binnen 
samenwerkingen met gedeeld bestuur door de individuele partners. Dit 
onderzoeksgegeven suggereert dat partners hun individuele verantwoordelijkheden naar 
hun eigen klanten, zoals die van energie en waterlevenciers in dit onderzoek, voorrang 
geven boven wensen (van bijvoorbeeld donors) om deze over te hevelen naar de 
samenwerking. Dit kan in het bijzonder het geval zijn in een ontwikkelingscontext 
waarin zwakke publieke en/of private partijen door de partners niet geschikt worden 
bevonden om de potentiële risico’s van samenwerking te dragen.     
Een methode om een samenwerking legitimiteit te geven in de ogen van haar 
achterban is het bieden van wederkerige controle en het geven van gelegenheid aan 
partners om invloed uit te oefenen op de besluitvormming binnen de samenwerking. 
Echter, in tegenspraak met bestaande voorstellingen, zijn er weinig uitbestede 
samenwerkingen waarbij de externe en/of interne relaties centraal worden geregeld, en 
de controle en/of invloed wordt gedeeld. Dit is verassend, aangezien gelijktijdig de 
uitbestede samenwerkingen het vaakst machtdifferentiëlen vertoonden die gerelateerd 
waren aan middelen. Desalniettemin is de primaire strategie om deze omstandigheid te 
verwerken de toepassing van interventies die gericht zijn op het bieden van assistentie en 
hulp, en veel minder het delen van controle en/of invloed tussen partners. De conclusie is 
dat de meerderheid van samenwerkingen met uitbesteed bestuur nog steeds gelijken op 
het meer traditionele ‘implementatiemodel’ van ontwikkelingssamenwerking waarbij de 
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aard van de bijdragen afhankelijk is van de welwillendheid of het 
ontwikkelingsperspectief van machtige partners. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 laat alle stukken van de puzzel op hun plaats vallen door een antwoord te 
geven op de vraag: “Hoe verhoudt ‘governance fit’ zich tot de effectiviteit van een 
samenwerking?” Vootbouwend op de gedachte dat de effectiviteit van samenwerkingen 
afhangt van de keuze voor een bestuursvorm die past bij de specifieke omstandigheden 
specificeren bestaande modellen enkele veronderstellingen over de aard van deze relatie. 
De meest overtuigende stelt dat gunstige omstandigheden voor een samenwerking, zoals 
kleine omvang, vertrouwen, overeenstemming over de doelen, en stabiele verhoudingen 
met donoren, zich beter verhouden met gedeeld bestuur terwijl uitbesteed bestuur beter 
past bij samenwerkingen binnen uitdagende omstandigheden. Aanvullende specificaties 
vloeien voort uit de voorafgaande verkennende analyse van de geschiktheid van 
bestuursvormen bij machtsdifferentiëlen en onzekere uitvoeringsomstandigheden. Bij 
aanwezigheid van het laatstgenoemde wordt verwacht dat externe relaties worden 
verzorgt door de individuele partners als het risico bestaat dat bestaande banden worden 
bedreigd door de overdracht naar de samenwerking. Voor het besturen van 
machtsdifferentiëlen binnen samenwerkingen worden twee richtingen geïdentificeerd: 
Interventies die partners voorzien van assistantie en hulp en interventies die de 
onderliggende structuur van de samenwerking wijzigen, zoals bestuur door derden en het 
delen van controle. 
De belangrijkste bevindingen van de vergelijkende onderzoek zijn drievoudig. Ten 
eerste is aangetoond dat de veronderstelde effecten van governance fit met betrekking tot 
externe omstandigheden worden bevestigd, in de zin dat effectieve samenwerking met 
onzekerheden rond financiering worden geleid met centrale externe vertegenwoordiging 
en dat samenwerkingen die worden geconfronteerd met onzekere 
uitvoeringsomstandigheden door individuele partners. Echter, het zijn niet de externe, 
maar de drie interne voorwaarden van afwezigheid van vertrouwen en overeenstemming 
over doelen en de aanwezigheid van machtsdifferentiëlen die worden geïdentificeerd als 
het meest precair, aangezien zij het meest worden geassocieerd met ineffectieve 
samenwerking. Gebaseerd op de daaropvolgende analyse van die samenwerkingen die 
geconfronteerd worden met een of meer van deze omstandigheden wordt beweerd dat 
van al deze omstandigheden de aanwezigheid van machtsdifferentiëlen het kan worden 
beïnvloed door de keuze voor een passende bestuursvorm. Ten tweede worden 
machtsdifferentiëlen, indien aanwezig, het meest effectief bestuurd door een uitbestede 
bestuursvorm die de volgende karakteristieken combineert: Gecentraliseerde interacties 
door een hoofdpartner of een entiteit die de bestuurstaak specifiek krijgt opgedragen, 
gedeelde invloed en wederzijdse controle, en ondersteunende interventies. Vergelijking 
van meerdere samenwerkingen die een of meer van deze bestuurskarakteristieken 
hebben, suggereert dat niet een enkele maar de combinatie het effect heeft van de juiste 
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bestuurskeuze op de effectiviteit van de samenwerking. Tenslotte: Aangezien 
effectiviteit wordt geëvalueerd door een gecombineerde inschatting van individueel 
organisationele én samenwerkingseffectiviteit toont de bevinding de interactie aan tussen 





Het in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde onderzoek had als overkoepelend doel te 
achterhalen wat de oorzaken en gevolgen zijn van macht en verschillen in machtsposities 
tussen partners binnen samenwerkingsverbanden en wat de rol is van het bestuur van 
samenwerkingsverbanden binnen deze contect. Om dit doel te bereiken is vanuit diverse 
theoretische perspectieven een interdisciplinair model ontwikkeld, waarvan de sub-
relaties zijn behandeld op het niveau van de partner en het samenwerkingsverband in elk 
hoofdsuk, waarmee een zo compleet mogelijke verklaring kan worden gegeven. Uit de 
empirische toetsing van deze modellen blijkt dat macht en de manier waarop hiermee 
vanuit bestuursoogpunt wordt omgegaan een belangrijke rol spelen voor zowel 
effectieve deelname aan een samenwerkingsverband als het succes van zo’n collectieve 
onderneming. Met betrekking tot de micro-grondslagen van macht binnen 
samenwerkingsverbanden is aangetoond dat het functioneren van individuele 
organisaties als bron van macht niet als gegeven kan worden aangenomen in 
samenwerkingsverbanden met een hoge diversiteit leden en actief in minder 
geïnstitutionaliseerde gebieden, zoals ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsverbanden. Kort 
samengevat lijken bronnen van macht te mislukken op dat punt, wanneer waardevolle 
bronnen zouden moeten worden vertaald in betrokkenheid, terwijl wanneer van deze 
betrokkenheid sprake is de kansen op het inzetten van deze middelen worden vergroot, 
en daarmee de kansen op effectieve deelname door partners die toegang hebben tot deze 
middelen. Daarom kan de conclusie getrokken worden dat, ook al zijn het interventies 
die als doel hebben de perceptie van partners te veranderen en het verhogen van de 
betrokkenheid van partners binnen partneringprocessen, beide interventies de effectieve 
deelname van partners stimuleren. Laatstgenoemde lijkt de voorwaarden te scheppen van 
waaruit veranderende percepties voortvloeien, misschien zelfs organisch en zonder de 
noodzaak tot het uitvoeren van verdere interventies. Met betrekking tot de macro-
funderingen van macht en effectieve samenwerkingsverbanden laten de huidige 
bevindingen zien dat machtsverschillen tussen partners inderdaad een collectief 
fenomeen representeren wat een risico kan vormen voor het succes van de collectieve 
onderneming. Tegelijkertijd laten de bevindingen echter zien dat wanneer deze 
machtsverschillen adequaat worden opgevangen door bestuursmaatregelen, 
samenwerkingsverbanden desalniettemin effectief kunnen worden. 
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Terugkijkend op de doelstelling van dit onderzoek kan geconcludeerd worden dat de 
vooraf gespecificeerde (wetenschappelijke) bijdragen van het onderzoek gerealiseerd 
zijn. Dit onderzoek heeft laten zien dat een multi-disciplinaire benadering een meer 
genuanceerd en volledig plaatje geeft van het probleem van macht in 
samenwerkingsverbanden. Dit is van bijzonder belang in een veld waar de diversiteit van 
wetenschappelijke disciplines dat van de diversiteit binnen een gemiddeld 
samenwerkingsverband evenaart. Op deze wijze zijn interdisciplinaire grenzen geslecht 
die niet alleen theoretisch maar ook praktisch bestaan, gevoed door de actoren die dit 
onderzoek beoogt te informeren. De huidige studie combineert de belangstelling voor 
macht vanuit ontwikkelingswetenschappers om de praktijk van het samenwerken te 
informeren binnen het keurslijf van donor-ontvanger relaties, en de focus op effectiviteit 
door wetenschappers actief in het veld van management en publiek bestuur, aangepast 
aan de behoeften van hen die deze context bepalen. Ook heeft de studie bereikt dat 
inzichten zijn gegenereerd in de multi-dimensionele aard van macht binnen 
samenwerkingsverbanden. De bevindingen laten zien dat macht zich op verschillende 
manieren manifesteert op op het niveau van de partner en op het niveau van het 
samenwerkingsverband. Door het linken van macht aan andere verschijnselen leggen de 
bevindingen het bestaan van een recursieve relatie bloot tussen beide dimensies, wat het 
meest duidelijk gedemonstreerd wordt door governance fit, in de vorm van interactie 
tussen governance maten op macroniveau en machtsverschillen als het gaat om het 
voortbrengen van effectieve samenwerkingsverbanden. 
Zoals elk onderzoek, kent ook dit onderzoek enkele beperkingen. De meest belangrijke 
daarvan is het feit dat, vanwege de onsystematische selectie van cases met betrekking tot 
de concepten op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband en besturingsvormen, een 
situatie is ontstaan waarin niet alle theoretisch relevante combinaties met betrekking tot 
de meest ideale besturingsvorm zijn gerepresenteerd in de huidige data en aldus konden 
worden geanalyseerd met betrekking tot hun effectiviteit. Een andere limitatie is ontstaan 
vanuit het feit dat alleen cross-sectionele data is verzameld. Daardoor konden de 
gesuggereerde causale verbanden, bijvoorbeeld de adoptie van bestuursmaatregelen als 
gevolg van gestelde voorwaarden op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband, niet 
onomstotelijk worden vastgesteld. Tot slot kan, ook al is de non-response analyse 
uitgevoerd op basis van informatie over de betrokken samenwerkingsverbanden in de 
huidige studie, een selectiebias met betrekking tot redenen vóór en tegen de deelname 
van individuele organisaties aan dit onderzoek niet worden uitgesloten. 
Het uitgevoerde onderzoek werpt, zoals gebruikelijk, net zoveel vragen op als het 
beantwoordt. Overtuigend is echter aangetoond dat het gebruik van multi-disciplinaire 
modellen waardevol is. Deze modellen zouden gebruikt kunnen worden (als basis) voor 
toekomstig (longitudinaal) onderzoek, in het bijzonder naar het effect van governance fit 
op de effectiviteit van samenwerkingsverbanden. Zoals deze studie heeft laten zien 
kunnen zulke modellen helpen in het begrijpen waarom verschillende vormen van 
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governance fit de effectiviteit van samenwerkingsverbanden kunnen verklaren in 
verschillende contexten waarbinnen deze samenwerkingsverbanden worden uitgevoerd. 
Voor de context van internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking is door de literatuur 
gesuggereerd, en door de huidige bevindingen bevestigd, dat macht een doorslaggevende 
rol speelt in het definiëren van governance fit en de effectiviteit van 
samenwerkingsverbanden. Vervolgonderzoek kan inzoomen op deze en vergelijkbare 
relaties tussen verschijnselen op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband, door het 
meenemen van additionele condities die doorslaggevend kunnen zijn in andere situaties 
waarin samenwerkingsverbanden worden uitgevoerd. Op deze manier kan 
opeenvolgende cumulatieve kennisopbouw het gat opvullen dat bestaat tussen enerzijds 
het gebrek aan empirische data over samenwerkingsverbanden, en de brede toepassing 
van samenwerkingsverbanden als een institutionele oplossing voor allerlei 
probleemgebieden en takken van dienstverlening. 
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Two concepts had to be operationalised by specifically developing measurements for the 
present study. These concepts are incorporated in the analyses of Chapters 3,4 and 5, as 
follows: In Chapter 3, the relationship between organisational bases of power and 
effective participation in partnerships is examined. For this purpose, two bases of power, 
resources and positions, and one dependent variable, effective participation, as the extent 
of individual organisational influence of partners on partnership-level decisions, are 
operationalised. From these two individual organisational measures, three concepts are 
aggregated and extrapolated to the partnership-level of analysis for the subsequent 
qualitative comparative analyses of Chapter 3 and 4: the partnership-level condition of 
power differentials between partners and the two governance aspects of the extent to 
which control and influence on partnership-level decision-making are shared or 
concentrated among partners. The latter step of aggregation of partner-level measures to 
partnership-level indicators is explained separately in the Chapters 4 and 5. The 
development of the scales that form the basis of the individual organisational 
measurements, which are utilised in Chapter 3, are explained below:  
 
 
Perceived resource-related power    
As noted in the literature review, power resources may be defined as anything, tangible 
or intangible, which partners can muster to their aid in partnership processes, or work 
implicitly without being enacted to their benefit. For the concept resources, it was 
required to arrive at a distinct measurement for their access and/or control by individual 
partners and a context-specific assessment of their value in a specific partnership 
(Jacobson & Cohen, 1986; Provan, 1980). Therefore, a list of potentially relevant 
resources for such a partnership-level specific assessment was developed. The selection 
of relevant resources for this exercise was tailored to the specific context of the 
partnerships studied here. From the precedent review of the literature (see Chapter 2) and 
an explorative interview study, several broader resource categories were developed.  
For the explorative interview study, different organisations were asked , in addition to 
other issues, about the resources they themselves and their partners contribute to a 
partnership. For this, semi-structured interviews were conducted between October and 
November 2006. Respondents were selected on the basis of their organisations’ sector 
affiliation and involvement in a partnership. Two hundred organisations were contacted 
that had either registered at a government-hosted partnership forum
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(www.partnerships.nl46) or participated in the Dutch Social Forum47. Of these, eighty 
respondents from seventy-five organisations48 were interviewed. Although an equal 
share from all three sectors was intended, NGOs account for almost half (46%), while 
businesses represent 33% and government organisations 22% of the organisations 
involved in this study. This has come about due to the fact that few larger businessi and 
government organisations were involved in several partnership projects. NGO 
participation was more widespreadii. Of the seventy-five respondent organisations, sixty-
nine reported their involvement in a partnership at the time of study. The remaining six 
organisations were presently not involved in a partnership but either mentioned that they 
intend to partner with an already agreed upon organisation/s in the near future (the case 
of two organisations), or that they had only recently49 terminated their involvement in a 
partnership (the case of four organisations). All respondent organisations are registered 
in the Netherlands. The partnerships they are involved in operate in developed (56%) 
and developing countries (44%)50.  
From this study and review of the literature, seven broader categories of potentially 
relevant resources were identified: i) financial means, ii) relational resources e.g. 
membership in associations (Brown & Ashman, 1996; Provan  et al., 1980) iii) 
administrative resources (Huang & Provan, 2006) e.g, project management capacities 
and experience; iv) production means and technologies (Marfo, 2006); v) scientific, 
technological and local knowledge (Bontenbal, 2009; Brokenshaw, Warren, & Werner, 
1980; Hardy et al., 2003; Johnson & Wilson, 2006), vi.) authority, such as coercive 
and/or licensing, regulative and price-setting authority (Birner & Wittmer, 2006; 
Derkzen et al., 2008; Dill, 2009), and vii.) legitimacy in representing third parties’ 
interests (Ashman, 2001b; Phillips & Hardy, 1997; Phillips et al., 2000) (beneficiary 
communities, etc.).  
According to these categories, a list of twenty-one resources was developed. In a 
second step, groups of partners potentially involved in the partnerships under study were 
identified on the basis of publicly available reports and funding statistics of the two 
financing initiatives, the EUWF and EUEF. Those were: IOs and foreign (non-ACP) 
national governments, national local (ACP) governments, regional local government, 
foreign NGOs, foreign energy/water operator, local operator, local NGO, research 
institutes. Subsequently, representatives of each group were asked to identify for 
themselves resources they would typically contribute to a partnership. The selection 
                                                 
46 Dutch National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development , 
NCDO, http://www.ncdo.nl/) 
47 Held in the same year (2006) in Nijmegen, The Netherlands (Nederlands Social Forum,   
    www.sociaalforum.nl) 
48 In 5 cases two interviewees were from the same organisation but involved in different 
partnerships. 
49 Within the last year. 
50 With a focus on partners from the Benelux and African countries, respectively. 
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criterion for the representatives was their experience with partnerships in international 
development cooperation. Since knowledge of the specific context of the funding 
initiatives was desired, pre-tests were conducted with organisations who knew the 
initiatives but were not directly involved in the partnerships under study. Such 
representatives were contacted and interviewed for each group in 2008, during a 
stakeholder meeting of one of the over-arching partnership initiatives51, the European 
Water Initiative (EUWI), at the Water Week in Stockholm. If no representative of one of 
the groups attended this meeting and/or were not available for interviews, then they were 
contacted via follow-up telephone interviews. The resources named by the 
representatives of the groups were compared with the list of twenty-one resources 
obtained from the pre-test and literature. Only those resources were kept that adequately 
represented the resources typically contributed by representative organisations of the 




Positions and influence           
Both positions and influence describe the capacity of partners to use their resources 
(Jacobson & Cohen, 1986) in order to successfully interact and effectively participate in 
partnerships. Positions were operationalised two ways: the structural position of partners 
in the ongoing interactions between partners, in reporting, resource exchange, advice and 
support; and through the involvement of partners in and influence on partnership-level 
decisions. Involvement and influence in the decision-making processes of partnerships 
were measured via a partner’s involvement in the decisions about ten partnership-related 
issues. For the development of this issue-related influence measure, the same procedure, 
involving the same group of experts, was applied as described for the measurement of 
resources. From the literature a list of fifteen issues was extracted. A distinction was 
adapted between partnership-constitutive issues regarding the design, and issues about 
the implementation of partnerships, since previous research found differences in the 
level of participation between these stages and dimensions of the partnering process (e.g. 
Finsterbusch, 1987). The representatives of each group were asked in the interviews to 
assess for each of the fifteen issues on a five-Likert-scale (to “very important”) how 
important the decision about this issue normally is to their organisation. Keeping an 
equal proportion of design and implementation related issues, a list of ten decision-
making issues was arrived at. 
 
                                                 
51 Notably, the EUWI and EUEI describe the two over-arching, so-called Type-II partnering 
initiatives (Stewart & Gray, 2006) from which the EUWF and EUEF derived as financing 
instruments. The partnerships studied here are the field-level partnerships, which were (co-
)financed by the two facilities.    
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The two measurements of resources and the partnership-related decision-making 
issues were combined with the other measures, explained in detail in each chapter, and 
compiled in a survey instrument. The survey instrument was programmed as an online-
survey tool52, which was provided in English and French. Since the majority of the 
measurements were relational, each single survey was designed for the respective 
respondent and partnership individually, asking about the respondent’s relations to and 
assessment of their own and their partners’ involvement in the partnership. Pre-tests 
were conducted with a randomly selected sample of one survey for each partnership in 
order to check for the correct display of names and to ensure correct item coding and 
data transfer into SPSS. After the initial invitations for participation were sent, follow-up 
reminders were used in intervals of two weeks. Since the complexity and the time 
needed to complete the survey increased proportionally by the number of partners 
involved, it was decided to personally conduct interviews via telephone with the 
participants of the two partnerships that involved thirteen and sixteen participants, 
respectively. Furthermore, in five partnerships one or more of the participant 
organisations had no steady internet access and or indicated language preferences other 
than English or French. These respondents participated via telephone interviews (which 
were conducted with in total eleven organisations). For all other partnerships that 
involved fewer participants and for which the participant organisations had internet 
access, data collection was conducted via the online-survey tool 
 
                                                 
52 cf. ESF survey design and administration tool: http://www.unipark.info/30-1-products.htm 
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 Respondents Non-respondents   
 38 partnerships 212 partnerships Difference Significance 
 Percentage Percentage Percentage p-value 
Variable     
Initiative:     
Energy 34,2 28,6 -5,60 
Water 65,8 71,4 5,60 
0,4541 
     
Region of operation:     
ACP 0 1,9 1,90 
Africa 94,7 89,0 -5,70 
Caribbeans 5,3 5,2 -0,10 
Pacifics 0 3,8 3,80 
0,6822 
     
Budget:     
5   5.0-77 Mill. 15,8 17,1 1,30 
4   2.5-5.0 Mill. 28,9 22,4 -6,50 
3   1.8-2.5 Mill. 7,9 22,9 15 
2   1.0-1.8 Mill. 15,8 20,5 4,70 
1   0.2-1.0 Mill. 31,6 17,1 -14,50 
Mean 2,82 3,02 0,20 
0,4332 
     
Percentage (%) of budget 
financed by partners: 
    
5   80-100% 2,6 1,0 -1,60 
4   60-80% 15,8 4,3 -11,50 
3   40-60% 21,1 17,6 -3,50 
2   20-40% 50,0 76,7 26,70 
1   0-20% 10,5 0,5 -5,50 
Mean 2,50 2,29 -0,21 
0,1722 
     
Intermediary 
organisation: 
    
IOs and Foreign National 
governments 
13,2 18,6 5,40 
National local governments 18,4 13,3 -5,10 
Regional local government 2,6 5,7 3,10 
Foreign NGO 47,4 40,5 -6,90 
Foreign operator 2,6 2,9 0,30 
Local operator 2,6 8,1 5,50 
Local NGO 2,6 4,3 1,70 
Research Institute 10,6 6,7 -3,90 
0,8232 
1 Binomial Test 
2 Mann-Whitney U-Test 
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Negotiation skills 0,731     
Relations to committees  0,674     
Reputation and reach 0,664     
Personal relations to partners 0,655     
Political support 0,643     
Relations to decision-makers 0,619     
Relations to public/media 0,507     
Technological/scientific 
knowledge 
 0,789    
Project management 
experience 
 0,753    
Administrative Capacities  0,659    
Financial means  0,632    
Licensing power   0,890   
Ownership of licenses/patents   0,794   
Coercive power   0,659   
Manpower1    0,787  
Production means1    0,754  
Representation of 
beneficiaries11 
    0,872 
Local/regional knowledge11     0,764 
      
Cronbach’s Alpha 0,829 0,790 0,783 (0,7311) (0,6461) 
KMO measure 0,801 
Test of Sphericity 1588,332 
Significance 0,000 
% of variance explained 70,034 
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Table IV.II: Factor analysis of in/out-degree centralities (whole sample) 
 Factor 
Variable Control Resources 
Out-degree centrality “Resources” 0,876  
Out-degree centrality “Support” 0,832  
In-degree “Reporting” 0,746  
Out-degree “Advise” 0,716  
In-degree “Advise”  0,732 
In-degree centrality “Support”  0,731 
Out-degree “Reporting”  0,687 
In-degree “Resources”  0,676 
   
Cronbach’s Alpha 0,825 0,687 
KMO measure 0,701 
Test of Sphericity 546,851 
Significance 0,000 
% of variance explained 53,246 
 
Table IV.III Factor analysis of involvement in decision-making issues  
 Factor 
Variable Design Implementation 
Partner selection 0,789  
External Monitoring 0,752  
Goal definition 0,737  
Contributions to partnership 0,695  
Resource allocation to partners 0,645  
Task and responsibilities  0,767 
Outcomes  0,676 
Internal monitoring  0,674 
Ownership  0,656 
Governance  0,599 
Beneficiaries  0,566 
   
Cronbach’s Alpha 0,817 0,712 
KMO measure 0,818 
Test of Sphericity 351,459 
Significance 0,000 
% of variance explained 53,203 
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Table IV.IV: Factor analysis of trust 
Variable Factor 
We are confident that our partners negotiate honestly.1 0,896 
We are confident that our partners do not take excessive advantage. 1 0,862 
We are confident that our partners do their best to make this partnership a success. 1 0,858 
We are confident that our partners are fully capable of keeping commitments. 1 0,841 
  
Cronbach’s Alpha 0,887 
KMO measure 0,826 
Test of Sphericity 345,530 
Significance 0,000 
% of variance explained 74,767 
1All items are taken from the OTI (Organisational Trust Inventory, Cummings & Bromirley, 
1996 in (Nyhan & Marlowe, 1997)) 
 
 
Table IV.V: Factor analysis of external uncertainty 
Variable Factor 
Resource supply 0,826 
Institutional/political environment 0,812 
Beneficiaries 0,788 
  
Cronbach’s Alpha 0,727 
KMO measure 0,716 
Test of Sphericity 241,330 
Significance 0,000 
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Governance form Effectiveness 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 Shared Not effective 
2 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Centralised/ 
Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 
3 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Centralised/ 
Concentrated 
Effective at both 
levels 




5 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 
6 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Centralised/ 
Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 
7 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Decentralised/ 
Concentrated 
Effective at both 
levels 
8 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 
9 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Centralised/ 
Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 
10 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 Shared Not effective 
11 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Decentralised/ 
Concentrated 
Effective at both 
levels 
12 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 Shared Partnership-level 




14 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Centralised/ 
Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 




16 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 
18 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 













Governance form Effectiveness 
20 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 




22 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 
23 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 Shared Partner-level 
24 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 
25 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 Shared Not effective 












29 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 
30 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 Shared Not effective 








33 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Centralised/ 
Shared 
Effective at both 
levels 
34 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 Centralised /Concentrated Partnership-level 




36 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Shared Not effective 




38 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Decentralised/ 
Concentrated 
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Table VI.I: Truth table: Governance forms 







        N=16 N=22 N=11 N=7 N=4 
size eqy. power Trust goal envtl. fund N consist consist Consist Consist Consist 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 7 1,00 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1,00 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1,00 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1,00 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 1,00 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 1,00 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 1,00 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 1,00 1,00 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 1,00 1,00 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1,00 1,00 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1,00 1,00 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1,00 1,00 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 1,00 0 1,00 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 1,00 0 0 1,00 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1,00 0 0 1,00 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1,00 0 1,00 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1,00 0 0 1,00 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1,00 0 1,00 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1,00 1,00 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1,00 0 1,00 0 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1,00 0 1,00 0 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1,00 0 1,00 0 





Table VI.II: Truth table: Effectiveness 
Partnership-level conditions Governance form  effective ~effective 







N Consist consist 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1,00 0 
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 1,00 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1,00 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1,00 0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1,00 0 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 1,00 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1,00 0 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 7 0,857 0,143 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0,500 0,500 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1,00 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1,00 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 1,00 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 1,00 
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1,00 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1,00 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1,00 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1,00 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1,00 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1,00 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 1,00 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1,00 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1,00 




                                                 
 
 
